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Faridabad Complex Administration v. Yadu And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Biharilal and Mahipal began constructing shops on the disputed land. The competent municipal authority served them with notices for unauthorised construction. Before any further action, they sold the land to the present respondents, who then filed suits seeking a permanent injunction to stop the appellant-municipality (successor to Ballabgarh Municipality under the Faridabad Complex Administration (Regulation and Development) Act, 1972) from demolishing the constructions.
The trial court, first appellate court, and subsequently the Punjab and Haryana High Court (in second appeal, dismissed in limine on 17-7-1985 and 11-9-1985) all ruled in favour of the respondents. They accepted the plea that, under Section 208 of the Haryana Municipalities Act, 1973, any notice for removal of unauthorised construction must be served within six months of the offending construction. Because the notice to Biharilal was dated 18-3-1982 while the constructions were put up around February 1981, the lower courts held the notice time-barred. The present appeals were filed before the Supreme Court by special leave.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the six-month limitation in Section 208 of the Haryana Municipalities Act, 1973 barred the appellant from issuing a notice for removal of unauthorised construction on land owned by the municipality.
- Whether purchasers from an unauthorised occupant (the respondents) could obtain an injunction against the true owner—here, the municipal successor—preventing it from removing unauthorised structures.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondents' Arguments
- The notice dated 18-3-1982 was beyond the six-month limitation prescribed in Section 208 because construction had commenced in February 1981; therefore, any demolition proceedings were void.
- On that basis, they were entitled to a permanent injunction restraining the appellant from demolishing the shops.
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant, as successor-in-interest to Ballabgarh Municipality under Act 4 of 1972, is the true owner of the land by virtue of Section 61(1)(f) of the Haryana Municipalities Act.
- Notices were served for unauthorised occupation as well as unauthorised construction; Section 208 applies only when the person causing construction is the lawful owner proceeding without sanction.
- Because neither Biharilal nor the respondents had any title independent of the municipality, limitation under Section 208 was irrelevant, and the municipality could require removal of the constructions at any time.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court observed that the land had vested in the municipality under Section 61(1)(f) of the Haryana Municipalities Act and had subsequently passed to the appellant through statutory succession. The respondents derived their interest solely from Biharilal, who himself lacked any title independent of the municipality.
The Court distinguished the scope of Section 208: the six-month limitation arises only when an owner constructs without sanction. Here, because the respondents were never owners, the limitation provision did not apply. The notice issued for unauthorised occupation and construction was therefore legally valid regardless of the time elapsed.
The trial court’s finding that the notice was unrelated to the disputed site, and the lower courts’ acceptance of Section 208 limitation, were labelled “obviously incorrect.” Further, an injunction cannot lie against the true owner (the appellant) seeking to remove unauthorised structures on its own land.
Holding and Implications
Appeals Allowed; Suits Dismissed; No Costs.
By setting aside the decrees of all lower courts, the Supreme Court confirmed the appellant’s right to remove unauthorised constructions on its land notwithstanding the six-month period in Section 208, where the builders or their successors lack title. The ruling affects only the parties; it clarifies, but does not create new precedent on, the inapplicability of Section 208’s limitation when the municipality is the true owner.
Order
1. These appeals by special leave arise from the judgments of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, made on 17-7-1985 and 11-9-1985 dismissing the appeals in limine.
2. The undisputed facts are that one Biharilal and Mahipal attempted to construct shops on the lands in question. Notices were issued to them for unauthorised construction. Thereafter, admittedly, they sold the lands to the respondents who filed suits for injunction restraining the appellant from demolishing the construction made by them on the premise that Section 208 of the Haryana Municipalities Act, 1973 (for short “the Act”) requires notice to be given within six months from the date of unauthorised construction. Since, admittedly, the notice was issued to Biharilal on 18-3-1982 and constructions were made sometime in February 1981, it was beyond the period of limitation. That plea found favour with the courts below and accordingly the trial court as well as the appellate court decreed the suit and affirmed the same. The High Court dismissed the second appeals in limine. Thus, these appeals by special leave.
3. It is not disputed that the appellant is the successor-in-interest by operation of Faridabad Complex Administration (Regulation and Develop-ment) Act, 1972 (Act 4 of 1972) and succeeded to the property held by Ballabgarh Municipality. Section 61(1)(f) of the Act provides that subject to any special reservation made or special conditions imposed by the State Government all properties of the nature mentioned in that section specifically and situated within the Municipality shall vest in and be under the control of the Committee and that all other properties which have already vested shall thereafter vest in the Committee and shall be held and applied by the Committee for the purpose of the Act, i.e, to say “(f) all lands … or other properties transferred to the Committee by the State Government or acquired by the Government by purchase or otherwise for public purpose”. It would be seen that all properties as enumerated in sub-section (1) of Section 61 are possessed by the Ballabgarh Municipality. The appellant being the successor-in-interest, they stood transferred to and vested in the appellant by virtue of Section 15 of the Act.
4. In the written statement filed by the appellant, it was averred that notice was given to Biharilal to the effect that he was in “unauthorised occupation of the land” and he was constructing unauthorisedly. He had given a reply thereto stating that he had already transferred the land. DW 4, Krishan Lal had stated in his evidence that notice was issued to Biharilal earlier for unauthorised construction and reply thereto was received from him stating that he had already transferred the land. Thus, it could be seen that the appellant had asserted the title over the land and the unauthorised construction carried thereon was asserted and notice on that premise was given to Biharilal. Admittedly, the respondents have purchased the properties from Biharilal and others. Thus, they being the successors-in-interest in title from Biharilal and others, the question emerges whether they had the right to and title over the land in question and whether notice could be issued against the appellant (sic). Unfortunately, the courts below have not adverted these aspects and they have proceeded on the basis that notice for unauthorised construction was given under Section 208 of the Act. The trial court found thus:
“Therefore, it is amply clear that notice dated 18-3-1982 served upon Biharilal related to land other than the one involved in the previous litigation. Even if it is held that notice dated 18-3-1982 served upon Biharilal related to the site in dispute then also the same cannot be binding upon the plaintiff.”
5. It is obviously incorrect finding recorded by the trial court since, admittedly, the respondents had purchased the lands from Biharilal and it is not their case that Biharilal had title independent of the Municipality. In these circumstances, the question arises whether the notice issued by the appellant is vitiated by any error of law. It is seen that the notice issued under Section 208 is relatable to unauthorised construction on the premise that the person proceeding with the construction is the owner of the property. In this background, it is not their case that they are the owners and were proceeding with the constructions in accordance with law after obtaining permission for construction according to building rules. Therefore, the limitation would arise only when it is asserted that they are the owners of the property and they were proceeding with the constructions in violation of the Municipal Rules. In these circumstances, the limitation of Section 208 would not arise. In this case, the findings of the courts below is clearly erroneous. There is no error in issuing notice for removal of the unauthorised construction on the land of the appellant. Therefore, the decrees granted by the courts below are clearly unsustainable. The High Court has not adverted to and applied its mind to consider this aspect of the matter. No injunction could be issued against the true owner, i.e, the appellant.
6. Thus, the appeals are allowed and the suits stand dismissed. No costs.
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