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Prasanna Kumar Roy Karmakar v. State Of W.B And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute originated from a landlord–tenant conflict over possession of a flat. The landlord first invoked proceedings under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before an Executive Magistrate but, without awaiting the outcome, filed a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court. On 13-8-1993, a single-judge Bench, ex parte and without notice to the tenant, directed the Officer-in-Charge of Muchipara Police Station to investigate the landlord’s complaint and report back.
Relying solely on the police report, the writ court on 30-8-1993 ordered the police to secure the landlord’s “free ingress and egress” and, if necessary, to remove any obstruction. Acting on this direction, the police evicted the tenant, Prasanna Kumar Roy Karmakar, and placed the landlord in possession.
The tenant appealed. On 14-10-1993, a Division Bench allowed the appeal and set aside the writ-court order, citing Mohan Pandey v. Usha Rani Rajgaria, but did not restore the tenant’s possession. When the tenant sought consequential relief, the Division Bench on 14-1-1994 declared itself functus officio and dismissed the application.
The tenant then filed the present special-leave petition before the Supreme Court, which was initially dismissed for default but later restored.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court exceeded its writ jurisdiction by intervening in a purely private landlord-tenant dispute and passing mandatory directions that resulted in the tenant’s dispossession.
- Whether, after setting aside the writ-court order, the appellate Division Bench was obliged to restore the dispossessed tenant to possession in order to re-establish the status quo ante.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant-Tenant’s Arguments
- The writ-court order was passed ex parte, without affidavits, and in violation of procedural safeguards; it therefore lacked jurisdictional foundation.
- Because the tenant was evicted solely due to that unlawful order, the appellate court, having reversed it, had a duty to restore possession under the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit.
- The Division Bench erred in treating itself as functus officio and in denying consequential relief.
Respondents’ (Landlord & State) Arguments
- Counsel for the respondents conceded that the writ-court had exceeded its jurisdiction and did not seriously oppose restoration of possession.
- An ancillary contention was raised that the appeal might be prosecuted in the name of a person no longer interested in the property, a claim disputed by the appellant.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mohan Pandey v. Usha Rani Rajgaria, (1992) 4 SCC 61; AIR 1993 SC 1225 | High Courts should not entertain writ petitions that essentially concern private disputes between landlords and tenants. | The Division Bench relied on this decision to set aside the writ-court’s ex parte order; the Supreme Court noted the Division Bench’s reliance without questioning its correctness. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Justice Suhas C. Sen characterized the High Court’s intervention as “extraordinary” and procedurally flawed. The writ petition was moved, heard, and disposed of within three weeks without notice, affidavits, or a rule nisi; the tenant was evicted solely on the strength of a police report. Such a procedure, the Court held, was “unknown to law” and well outside the proper scope of writ jurisdiction.
Turning to the appellate Division Bench, the Supreme Court observed that, having set aside the writ order, the Bench was obliged to undo the consequences of that illegal order. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit imposes a duty on courts to ensure that no party suffers because of a court’s own act. By failing to restore the tenant’s possession and by dismissing the tenant’s subsequent application as functus officio, the Division Bench had left the successful appellant without a remedy, thereby perpetuating the injustice.
The Supreme Court declined to delve into the respondents’ assertion that the appellant was no longer an interested party, holding that any such factual controversy must first be examined by the appellate court. Consequently, the Court set aside the Division Bench’s order of 14-1-1994 and remitted the matter to enable an enquiry into whether the appellant had indeed been dispossessed pursuant to the writ-court order and, if so, to restore him to possession.
Holding and Implications
Order of 14-1-1994 SET ASIDE; case remanded to the appellate Division Bench with directions to enquire into the appellant’s dispossession and, if established, restore him to possession of the disputed premises. Costs of Rs 1,000 awarded to the appellant.
Implications: The decision reinforces the limits of writ jurisdiction in private landlord-tenant disputes and underscores the judiciary’s duty to reverse the effects of its own erroneous orders. While no new legal precedent is established, the ruling emphasizes that appellate courts must grant effective relief—including restoration of possession—once an underlying order is reversed.
Suhas C. Sen, J.— Special leave granted.
2. This is an extraordinary case. A private dispute between a landlord and a tenant was taken up in writ jurisdiction and mandatory orders were passed directing the State and the police authorities to allow the writ petitioner (the landlord) to have ingress and egress to and from the disputed premises. On the basis of this order, the landlord with the help of police authorities evicted the tenant from his flat. In other words, the landlord was able to get back possession of tenanted premises without having to go through the usual landlord and tenant proceedings before appropriate forum in accordance with law.
3. It appears that after instituting proceeding under Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the Court of the Executive Magistrate, the landlord moved the High Court under its constitutional writ jurisdiction. Shyamal Kumar Sen, J. on 13-8-1993 passed an order directing the Officer-in-Charge, Muchipara Police Station, to make an enquiry into the complaint dated 26-7-1993 and submit a report on 19-8-1993. This was an ex parte order without any notice to the tenant. On 30-8-1993 the writ petition was finally disposed of on the basis of the police report. It was alleged that Rabin Roy and his brother Gobinda Roy had taken forcible possession of the first floor and other portion of the premises which had not been let out to Rabin Roy. The police authorities were directed to ensure that the free egress and ingress of the landlord to and from the disputed flat was not interfered with by the tenant. If necessary, the police authorities were directed to remove the obstruction to such free egress and ingress. All parties including the Officer-in-Charge, Muchipara Police Station, were directed to act on a signed copy of the minutes of the order. It is not known how the proceedings under Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code ended. But, as a result of the order passed by the writ court, the police evicted the tenant from the disputed premises and the landlord was able to resume possession immediately with police help.
4. The scope of writ jurisdiction of the court was lost sight of by the learned Judge and an extraordinary situation was brought about by an improper and unjust order passed without any affidavit in less than three weeks' time. Between 13-8-1993 and 30-8-1993 a writ petition was moved, taken up for hearing and finally disposed of. A tenant was dislodged from the disputed premises with police help. No proper hearing was given to the respondents. A copy of the police report was not given to the respondents. No direction was given for filing of affidavits even to the State. There is no explanation why the proceedings were not allowed to be continued in the Court of the Executive Magistrate in accordance with law. It was most unfortunate that the court intervened in a proceeding under Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code which was actually being heard and a drastic order of this nature was passed by the court in such a manner without issuing a rule nisi and without any proper hearing. A procedure unknown to law was adopted for disposing of a landlord-tenant dispute.
5. What happened thereafter was also very unfortunate for the appellant. The appeal court on 14-10-1993 passed the following order:
“The Hon'ble A.M Bhattacharjee, the Chief Justice
The Hon'ble Justice N.K Batabyal
October 14, 1993.Prasanna Kr. Roy Karmakar
v.
State of W.B
The Court heard learned counsel for the parties. It is purely a private dispute between the private parties. We are fully satisfied particularly in view of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Mohan Pandey v. Usha Rani Rajgaria (1992) 4 SCC 61, AIR 1993 SC 1225, that the writ petition which has given rise to this appeal ought not to have been entertained. That being so, we allow this appeal and set aside the order under appeal.
All parties to act on a signed copy of the minutes of this order on the usual undertaking.”
6. This order, however, did not enable the appellant to get back possession. The appeal court lost sight of the fact that the writ court had intervened in a purely private dispute and as a result of its order the appellant had been dispossessed by the police.
7. A further application, therefore, was made to the appeal court for necessary relief. On 14-1-1994 the appeal court passed the following order:
“The appeal has already been disposed of and we have accordingly become functus officio. This application can therefore no longer be entertained and is rejected.”
8. The two orders passed by the appeal court on 14-10-1993 and 14-1-1994 did not give any relief to the appellant, even though his appeal was allowed and the order under appeal was set aside. The appeal court lost sight of the fact that the appellant, who had been dispossessed by the order passed by the writ court, had to be put back in possession after setting aside the writ court's order.
9. A special leave petition was made against the aforesaid two orders passed by the appeal court on 14-10-1993 and 14-1-1994. It may be mentioned here that the special leave petition was dismissed for default, but later on restored on an application made by the appellant. Mr Ganguli appearing on behalf of the respondents has not tried to justify the extraordinary and unfair ex parte orders passed. In fact, he fairly admitted that the writ court had exceeded its jurisdiction in intervening in a private dispute. He also did not seriously object to the proposition that since by an erroneous order the appellant had been evicted from the possession of the disputed premises, it was the duty of the appeal court, after reversing the order of the trial court, to restore the appellant back into possession. If the appellant was ejected from the disputed premises with police help pursuant to the order which was set aside, the possession should have been restored to him with police help, if necessary. Otherwise, even after succeeding in the appeal, the appellant will remain without remedy and out of possession as a result of the order passed by the trial court. Actus curiae neminem gravabit — An act of the court shall prejudice no man. It was the duty of the appeal court to restore status quo ante to passing of the order on 30-8-1993.
10. Mr Ganguli has, however, contended that the appeal is being conducted in the name of the appellant, who is not an interested party any more. Mr Sen appearing on behalf of the appellant has seriously disputed this proposition. We are not inclined to go into this controversy at this stage. If the appellant has been dispossessed by court order which has been reversed by the court of appeal, as is the position in this case, his possession must be restored.
11. In view of the aforesaid, the order passed by the appeal court dated 14-1-1994 is set aside and we remand the case back to the appeal court. The appeal court will direct an enquiry as to whether Prasanna Kumar Roy Karmakar was the person who was actually evicted from possession on the strength of the order passed on 30-8-1993 and, if so, restore Prasanna Kumar Roy Karmakar back into the possession of the disputed premises. Before passing any order the Court must satisfy itself as to the true identity and the wish of the appellant, Prasanna Kumar Roy Karmakar. If necessary, the Court will direct Prasanna Kumar Roy Karmakar to be personally present in the Court.
12. The appeal court will be at liberty to pass such order in the interest of justice as it thinks fit after ascertaining the facts and in accordance with law. The respondents, who were the writ petitioners in this case, will pay costs assessed at Rs 1000 to the appellant.
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