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Tulsi v. Paro (Dead) (Smt) .
Case Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent owned agricultural lands measuring 12.4 bighas and 22.4 bighas in Mohal Kanyarka, Pargana Churah, Tehsil Bhattiyat, District Chamba, Himachal Pradesh. She instituted a suit for possession, asserting that the appellant was a mere licensee who had agreed to cultivate the land on her behalf and was therefore liable to eviction.
The trial court decreed eviction. The first appellate court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. In second appeal, the High Court reversed the first appellate court and restored the trial court’s decree. The present appeal by special leave challenges the High Court’s judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellant’s occupation of the suit land was that of a tenant-at-will or merely a licensee.
- If the appellant is a tenant-at-will, whether he can be evicted through a possession suit without following the statutory procedure governing tenant eviction.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent’s Arguments
- The appellant was a licensee who agreed to cultivate the land on her behalf.
- Because his possession was permissive, she was entitled to a decree for eviction.
Appellant’s Arguments
- He was a tenant-at-will, not a licensee, cultivating in his own right while delivering produce to the respondent.
- Revenue records from 1951-52 to 1971-72 consistently recorded him as “Gar Marusi” (tenant-at-will), confirming his tenancy status.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court relied on Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, noting that a lease may exist even without a written instrument if the essential elements—transfer of a right to enjoy the property for consideration and delivery of possession—are present.
The continuous description of the appellant as “Gar Marusi” in the revenue records for over two decades was treated as compelling evidence of tenancy. A licensee, by contrast, has no transferable interest and occupies only at the licensor’s will, lacking exclusive possession. The court found it “unthinkable” to categorize uninterrupted possession spanning twenty years as mere licence.
Accordingly, the High Court and trial court erred in treating the appellant as a licensee. The appellant is a tenant at will who may be evicted only under the procedure prescribed for tenants.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED.
Immediate Effect: The judgment and decree treating the appellant as a licensee are set aside. The respondent’s possession suit fails, and the appellant remains in occupation unless and until lawfully evicted as a tenant.
Broader Implication: The decision reaffirms that long-standing revenue entries labeling an occupant as a tenant-at-will constitute strong evidence of tenancy, and that eviction must conform to tenancy law procedures. No broader precedent beyond this clarification was established.
Order
1. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Himachal Pradesh High Court, dated 16-6-1980 in RSA No. 138 of 1979. The trial court had decreed the suit and the appellate court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. In the second appeal, the High Court reversed the judgment and decree of the appellate court and confirmed that of the trial court. Thus, this appeal.
2. The admitted facts are that the suit properties of various khasra nos. admeasuring 12.4 bighas and 22.4 bighas situated in Mohal Kanyarka, Pargana Churah, Tehsil Bhattiyat, District Chamba in the State of Himachal Pradesh, belonged to the respondent. She had filed a suit for possession against the appellant pleading that he is a licensee and had agreed to cultivate the lands on her behalf as licensee and, therefore, he is liable to be ejected by a decree of eviction in the suit. It is the case of the appellant that though the parties are related, he is only a tenant at will and he agreed to cultivate the land as a tenant giving the produce to the respondent-landlady as he was looking after her. The admitted position is that the revenue records for the period from 1951-52 to 1971-72 do indicate that the appellant had been shown as “Gar Marusi”. It would appear that it means “tenant at will”. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines lease thus:
“A lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms.”
It is not necessary that lease should always be reduced to writing. What is necessary is for transfer of a right of enjoyment of the property made for a certain time, expressed or implied and for consideration of the price, paid or promised, the transferee must have been put in possession of the demised property. It is also necessary that an agreement can be entered into for rendering periodical service and for consideration thereof and on transfer of the land to the transferee and acceptance thereof, either orally or in writing, the lease comes into existence. It is seen that when the name of the appellant has successively found place in the records for the period from 1951-52 to 1971-72 as “tenant at will”, the necessary conclusion is that he is a tenant at will liable to eviction according to law. The theory that he is a licensee, as has been accepted by the High Court and the trial court, is untenable. A licensee has no right in the property, not to speak of any right to the exclusive possession of the property and animus of possession always remains with the licensor; the licensee gets the possession only with the consent of the licensor and is liable to vacate when so asked. In this case, since the appellant remained in uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the property for over 20 years, it is unthinkable to conclude that they are only licensee. The High Court and the trial court, therefore, were clearly in error in reaching the conclusion that the appellant is only a licensee. On the other hand, from the facts, it is clear that the appellant is a tenant and he will be liable for ejectment only in accordance with law. If he is otherwise entitled to tenancy right of the property, the right can be had in accordance with law and it is open to him to work out the same in accordance with law.
3. The appeal is allowed in the light of the above facts and circumstances. No costs.
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