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State Of H.P v. Suresh Kumar Verma And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondents were initially engaged as Assistant Development Officers on a daily-wage basis for a specific project undertaken by the State of Himachal Pradesh. When that project concluded, their services were terminated “for want of work.” They challenged this termination in CWP No. 722 of 1993 before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. A Division Bench of the High Court, by order dated 10 September 1993, directed that the respondents be re-engaged. The State appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave, resulting in the present decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether daily-wage engagement confers any right to continued or regular employment after the project for which the workers were engaged has ended.
- Whether the High Court could direct the State to re-engage the respondents or appoint them against existing vacancies, bypassing the statutory recruitment rules.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondents’ Arguments
- The counter-affidavit filed by the State in the High Court allegedly admitted the existence of vacancies; therefore, the respondents contended they were entitled to be continued in service in those posts.
No detailed arguments of the appellants were recorded in the opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court held that once a State frames statutory recruitment rules, it is legally bound to follow them. Employment on a daily-wage basis is not an appointment to a post “according to the Rules”; it does not make the worker a member of the service from the date of engagement.
The Court noted that the specific project for which the respondents were hired had ended. Consequently, their termination was justified for “want of work.” The judiciary, it emphasized, cannot become an alternative channel of recruitment; directing re-engagement or appointment would amount to a “back-door entry,” undermining the principles of merit, transparency, and efficiency, and fostering nepotism and corruption.
Addressing the respondents’ reliance on alleged vacancies, the Court ruled that any existing vacancies must be filled strictly in accordance with the recruitment rules, allowing all eligible candidates— including the respondents— to compete. A daily-wage appointment cannot be a “conduit pipe” for regular appointment. Even Class IV posts require recruitment through prescribed procedures; one temporary employee cannot be replaced by another.
Holding and Implications
HELD: The High Court’s order was set aside and the appeal was allowed.
Direct Effect: The respondents’ claim to automatic continuation or regularisation was rejected. However, if they choose to apply for future regular posts and are over-age at that time, the State must relax the age limit by the length of their prior daily-wage service and consider them in accordance with the recruitment rules.
Broader Implications: The decision reinforces the principle that judicial orders cannot override statutory recruitment processes, and that daily-wage or temporary engagement does not create a vested right to permanent employment.
Order
1. Delay condoned.
2. We have heard the counsel on both sides. This appeal by special leave arises from the orders passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. In this case in CWP No. 722 of 1993 dated 10-9-1993, the Division Bench of the High Court has disposed of the matters on the ground that the respondents were re-engaged as Assistant Development Officers on daily wages pursuant to the direction by it. It is settled law that having made rules of recruitment to various services under the State or to a class of posts under the State, the State is bound to follow the same and to have the selection of the candidates made as per recruitment rules and appointments shall be made accordingly. From the date of discharging the duties attached to the post the incumbent becomes a member of the services. Appointment on daily-wage basis is not an appointment to a post according to the Rules.
3. It is seen that the project in which the respondents were engaged had come to an end and that, therefore, they have necessarily been terminated for want of work. The Court cannot give any directions to re-engage them in any other work or appoint them against existing vacancies. Otherwise, the judicial process would become other mode of recruitment dehors the rules.
4. Mr Mahabir Singh, learned counsel for the respondents, contended that there was an admission in the counter-affidavit filed in the High Court that there were vacancies and that, therefore, the respondents are entitled to be continued in service. We do not agree with the contention. The vacancies require to be filled up in accordance with the Rules and all the candidates who would otherwise be eligible are entitled to apply for when recruitment is made and seek consideration of their claims on merit according to the Rules for direct recruitment along with all the eligible candidates. The appointment on daily wages cannot be a conduit pipe for regular appointments which would be a back-door entry, detrimental to the efficiency of service and would breed seeds of nepotism and corruption. It is equally settled law that even for Class IV employees recruitment according to Rules is a precondition. Only work-charged employees who perform the duties of transitory nature are appointed not to a post but are required to perform the work of transitory and urgent nature so long as the work exists. One temporary employee cannot be replaced by another temporary employee.
5. Under these circumstances, the view of the High Court is not correct. It is accordingly set aside. It is mentioned that the respondents have become overaged by now. If they apply for any regular appointment by which time if they become barred by age, the State is directed to consider necessary relaxation of their age to the extent of their period of service on daily wages and then to consider their cases according to rules, if they are otherwise eligible.
6. The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.
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