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Sita Devi And Others v. State Of Haryana And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Aug 23, 1996
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Supreme Court of India – Case Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

In March 1989, 748 petitioners filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. They were employed as non-matriculate instructors in the Adult Literacy Programme run by the State of Haryana, each receiving a consolidated honorarium of Rs 200 per month. Having worked for five to six years, they sought parity with matriculate instructors who, following the decision in Jaipal v. State of Haryana, enjoyed the regular pay scale of “squad teachers,” continuity of service despite artificial breaks, and recognition of their posts as regular appointments within the Education Department. Three principal reliefs—pay parity, continuity of service, and departmental regularisation—were claimed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the State’s refusal to grant non-matriculate instructors the same pay scale as matriculate instructors contravenes the “equal pay for equal work” principle protected by Article 14.
  2. Whether artificial breaks in service should be ignored, entitling the petitioners to continuous service from their initial appointments.
  3. Whether the Adult Education and Non-formal Education Department is a permanent department thereby warranting regularisation of the petitioners’ posts.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners’ Arguments

  • The petitioners perform identical duties as matriculate instructors; therefore, under the doctrine of equal pay for equal work, they deserve the same pay scale.
  • The six-month contractual renewals creating breaks in service are artificial and should be disregarded for pay fixation and continuity of service.
  • They relied on precedents such as Randhir Singh, Dhirendra Chamoli, and Surinder Singh to demonstrate the Court’s commitment to equal remuneration for equal work.

No specific counter-arguments from the respondents are recorded in the judgment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jaipal v. State of Haryana (1988) 3 SCC 354 Entitled matriculate instructors to pay parity with squad teachers; breaks ignored. Distinguished on the basis that petitioners in the present case lacked the same educational qualification.
Randhir Singh v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 618 First articulated “equal pay for equal work” under Article 14. Acknowledged as laying down the doctrine but subject to proof of similarity in work.
Dhirendra Chamoli v. State of U.P. (1986) 1 SCC 637 Extended equal pay to daily-rated employees doing identical work. Cited by petitioners; held inapplicable without proof of identical work conditions.
Surinder Singh v. Engineer-in-Chief, CPWD (1986) 1 SCC 639 Applied equal pay doctrine to casual labourers. Referenced by petitioners; similarly distinguished.
State of M.P. v. Pramod Bhartiya (1993) 1 SCC 539 Set criteria for determining “same work” using the Equal Remuneration Act. Used to emphasise the petitioners’ burden of proof.
Federation of All India Customs & Excise Stenographers (1988) 3 SCC 91 Recognised variation in quality and conditions of work. Quoted to caution against mechanical application of equal pay.
State of Mysore v. P. Narasinga Rao AIR 1968 SC 349 Upheld differential pay for matriculate and non-matriculate tracers. Applied as direct authority validating educational qualification-based classification.
State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa (1974) 1 SCC 19 Permitted education-based classification for promotion. Cited to support the reasonableness of the State’s pay differentiation.
P. Murugesan v. State of T.N. (1993) 2 SCC 340 Reaffirmed validity of education-based classifications. Relied upon to reinforce precedent supporting the State’s stance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court reiterated that “equal pay for equal work” is a facet of Article 14 but stressed that the burden of proof lies with employees to demonstrate parity in skill, effort, and responsibility. Relying on Pramod Bhartiya and the definition in Section 2(h) of the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, the Court examined whether non-matriculate and matriculate instructors are similarly situated.

It observed that educational qualifications constitute a valid ground for classification under Articles 14 and 16, citing P. Narasinga Rao, Triloki Nath Khosa, and P. Murugesan. Even where duties appear similar, a higher qualification may justify a higher pay scale. The Court noted that the petitioners neither alleged nor proved that their duties matched those of squad teachers.

Consequently, the refusal to extend the higher pay scale to non-matriculate instructors did not amount to unlawful discrimination.

Holding and Implications

The writ petition was dismissed. W.P.(C) Nos. 1008 and 815 of 1988 and 545 of 1993 were also dismissed on identical grounds, all without costs.

Implications: The petitioners remain on their existing honorarium and gain no continuity of service or regularisation. The judgment reinforces that educational qualification is a constitutionally permissible basis for differential pay and underscores employees’ evidentiary burden when invoking “equal pay for equal work.” No new precedent was established.

Show all summary ...

B.P Jeevan Reddy, J.—

Writ Petition (C) No. 584 of 1989

1. In this writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, three reliefs are asked for by as many as 748 petitioners. The reliefs sought for are:

“(a) Issue writ in the nature of mandamus or any appropriate writ, order or direction that the petitioners be treated to be in the service of the respondents from the date of their initial appointment irrespective of there being artificial break in their services during the period.
(b) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondents to put the petitioners on regular pay scales to that of primary school teachers in the Education Department of Haryana plus other consequential benefits from the date of their initial appointment and further direct the respondents to pay the petitioners the difference in arrears of salary accrued to them from the date of their initial appointment.
(c) Issue by appropriate writ, order or direction that the Department of Adult Education and Non-formal Education is a permanent department of the State and the petitioners are regular teachers in the department appointed against sanctioned posts of Instructors.”

2. On the date of the filing of the writ petition (March 1989) the petitioners were working as “under-matriculate instructors in the Adult Literacy Programme” devised by the Government of Haryana. They were being paid a lump sum amount of Rs 200 per month as salary. They had put in 5 to 6 years' service and have been performing their duties to the satisfaction of all concerned. Their submission is that when matriculate instructors approached this Court for similar reliefs, they were granted certain reliefs though not all the reliefs asked for by them. The reference is to the judgment of this Court in Jaipal v. State of Haryana (1988) 3 SCC 354, (1988) 7 ATC 771, AIR 1988 SC 1504 wherein this Court directed that the “matriculate instructors are entitled to the same pay scale as sanctioned to squad teachers”. This Court had also directed that the salary of the said petitioners shall be fixed in the same scale as that of the squad teachers, having regard to the length of their service with effect from their date of initial appointment by ignoring the break in service on account of six months' fresh appointments. It was further directed by this Court that the said petitioners will be entitled to the said pay scales in accordance with law notwithstanding the break in service that might have taken place. The said directions were made effective with effect from 1-9-1985. However, the claim for regularisation of their services put forward by the said petitioners was rejected, since the very project was likely to last only till 1990. The present petitioners' case is that though they are non-matriculates they too have been performing the very same duties as were being performed by matriculate teachers (petitioners in Jaipal (1988) 3 SCC 354, (1988) 7 ATC 771, AIR 1988 SC 1504). The petitioners invoke the principle of “equal pay for equal work”. According to them, except the difference in the matter of educational qualifications there is no other distinction between the post held and the duties and functions performed by the petitioners in Jaipal (1988) 3 SCC 354, (1988) 7 ATC 771, AIR 1988 SC 1504 and the petitioners herein. They have set out in the writ petition the several duties performed by them. Reliance is also placed upon certain other decisions of this Court viz., Randhir Singh v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 618, (1982) 3 SCR 298; Dhirendra Chamoli v. State of U.P (1986) 1 SCC 637 and Surinder Singh v. Engineer-in-Chief, CPWD (1986) 1 SCC 639.

3. The doctrine of “equal work for equal pay” is recognised by this Court as a facet of the equality clause contained in Article 14 of the Constitution. The first of the several decisions on the subject is Randhir Singh v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 618, (1982) 3 SCR 298. The said doctrine has been dealt with by this Court in several later decisions including State of M.P v. Pramod Bhartiya (1993) 1 SCC 539, (1993) 23 ATC 657 decided by a three-member Bench of which one of us (B.P Jeevan Reddy, J.) was a member. This decision dealt mainly with the manner in which the claim of equal work has to be judged. It was held, after referring to the definition of “same work or work of a similar nature” in Section 2(h) of the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, that:

“… the stress is upon the similarity of skill, effort and responsibility when performed under similar conditions. Further, as pointed out by Mukharji, J. (as he then was) in Federation of All India Customs and Excise Stenographers (1988) 3 SCC 91, (1988) 7 ATC 591 the quality of work may vary from post to post. It may vary from institution to institution. We cannot ignore or overlook this reality. It is not a matter of assumption but one of proof. … It must be remembered that since the plea of equal pay for equal work has to be examined with reference to Article 14, the burden is upon the petitioners to establish their right to equal pay, or the plea of discrimination, as the case may be.”

4. It was observed in the said decision, on the basis of the earlier decisions of this Court, that where the petitioners complain of unlawful discrimination offending Article 14, it is for them to satisfy the court that the distinction made is irrational and baseless and that it really amounts to unlawful discrimination prohibited by Article 14. Applying the principle of the said decision to this case, can it be said that the petitioners herein who are non-matriculate instructors are similarly placed to that of the matriculate instructors or that the distinction made between both the categories is irrational or baseless. In other words, the question is whether the Government of Haryana is guilty of unlawful discrimination in refusing to extend to non-matriculate instructors the pay scale which has been extended to matriculate instructors pursuant to the judgment of this Court in Jaipal (1988) 3 SCC 354, (1988) 7 ATC 771, AIR 1988 SC 1504. We do not think so. Classification on the basis of educational qualifications has always been upheld by this Court as reasonable and permissible under Article 14. In State of Mysore v. P. Narasinga Rao AIR 1968 SC 349, (1968) 2 LLJ 120 the Government of Karnataka had prescribed two different scales for tracers — one for matriculate tracers with higher scale and another for non-matriculate tracers with lower pay scale. The non-matriculate tracers complained of discrimination. The said plea was negatived holding that prescribing two different scales for matriculates and non-matriculates is not violative of Articles 14 and 16. It was held that distinction made on the basis of technical qualifications or for that matter even on the basis of general educational qualifications relevant to the suitability of the candidate for public service is permissible under the said articles. Indeed, in that case both the matriculate and non-matriculate tracers formed one single category with one single pay scale earlier. It was only at a later stage that a distinction was made between matriculates and non-matriculates, which led to the said proceedings. This Court proceeded on the assumption that both matriculates and non-matriculates tracers “were doing the same kind of work”; yet the classification made was upheld as permissible under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Distinction on the basis of educational qualifications has been upheld as valid by this Court in a large number of cases since. By way of illustration, in State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa (1974) 1 SCC 19, AIR 1974 SC 1 the classification of Assistant Engineers as diploma-holders and degree-holders and providing more promotional avenues to degree-holders was upheld as reasonable. The later decision in P. Murugesan v. State of T.N (1993) 2 SCC 340, (1993) 24 ATC 149 is also to the same effect. In this decision, all the decisions on the subject of classification on the basis of educational qualifications have been fully discussed.

5. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the grievance made by the petitioners is unacceptable. We may also mention that apart from relying upon the decision of this Court in Jaipal (1988) 3 SCC 354, (1988) 7 ATC 771, AIR 1988 SC 1504 and claiming that the benefit given to matriculate teachers should also be given to them, no attempt has been made in the writ petition to allege and establish that their qualifications, duties and functions are similar to those of squad teachers.

6. For the above reasons, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

WPs (C) Nos. 1008 and 815 of 1988 and 545 of 1993

7. No separate arguments are addressed in these writ petitions. They too are accordingly dismissed for the very same reasons. No costs.