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K. Raheja Constructions Ltd. And Another v. Alliance Ministries And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners filed OS No. 213 of 1993 (renumbered as OS No. 251 of 1987) seeking a permanent injunction restraining the respondents from alienating the trust property described in Schedule “A” to the plaint. In the plaint they pleaded that a concluded contract for sale of the property had already come into existence and asserted their readiness and willingness to perform the contract, notwithstanding the respondents’ letter dated 29-4-1987 refusing to accept their offer.
On 25-11-1994—over seven years after the suit was instituted—the petitioners moved IA No. 745 of 1994 under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to amend the plaint so as to add the relief of specific performance. They claimed that they had subsequently learned that the Charity Commissioner had granted permission for sale of the trust property, and that this discovery justified incorporation of the additional relief.
The trial court dismissed the amendment application on 20-1-1995, and the High Court affirmed that order on 21-2-1995 in CRP No. 510 of 1995. The petitioners then approached the Supreme Court by way of a special leave petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an amendment of the plaint under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC to convert a suit for injunction into one for specific performance can be permitted after expiry of the three-year limitation period prescribed by Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
- Whether subsequent knowledge of the Charity Commissioner’s permission for alienation constitutes a sufficient ground to allow such an amendment.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The amendment seeks only a “formal” relief; all foundational facts supporting specific performance were already pleaded in the original plaint.
- Because the petitioners learned only later that the Charity Commissioner had granted permission to sell, they were justified in seeking the amendment when that fact came to their notice.
- The Supreme Court’s decision in A.K. Gupta v. Damodar Valley Corporation permits amendments that merely convert an existing claim into an alternative or consequential relief founded on the same facts.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| A.K. Gupta v. Damodar Valley Corporation (1966 1 SCR 796; AIR 1967 SC 96) | An amendment may be allowed where the plaintiff has already reserved the right to claim the relief, and the amendment does not introduce a new cause of action. | The Court distinguished the case, holding that the petitioners in the present matter had not reserved the relief of specific performance and that allowing the amendment would defeat the respondents’ accrued limitation defence. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court observed that permission from the Charity Commissioner is not a condition precedent for instituting a suit for specific performance; rather, any decree for specific performance would automatically be subject to the competent authority’s approval. The petitioners themselves had pleaded in 1987 that the respondents had repudiated the contract; therefore, the cause of action for specific performance had already arisen at that time, and they ought to have sought that relief in the original suit.
Under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the limitation period for a suit seeking specific performance is three years. Because more than seven years had elapsed, permitting the amendment would defeat a “valuable right of limitation” that had accrued in favour of the respondents. The Court rejected the reliance on A.K. Gupta, noting that unlike in that case, the petitioners here had not reserved any such relief in the plaint.
Holding and Implications
Petition dismissed. The application to amend the plaint so as to introduce the relief of specific performance was held to be barred by limitation.
Implications: The dismissal leaves the petitioners confined to their original prayer for injunction; they cannot now seek specific performance of the alleged contract. The decision reiterates that amendments introducing a time-barred claim will not be permitted, and that subsequent administrative permissions do not revive limitation periods. No new legal precedent was set; the Court applied settled principles on limitation and amendment of pleadings.
Order
1. The petitioners admittedly filed OS No. 213 of 1993 (subsequently numbered as OS No. 251 of 1987) for relief of permanent injunction restraining the respondents from alienating, encumbering, selling, disposing of, or in any way dealing with the said property, more particularly described in Schedule ‘A’ to the plaint or any portion thereof. In para 13 of the plaint it was stated thus:
“The said defendants after a lapse of a month, through a letter dated 29-4-1987 sent by defendant 4 to plaintiff 1 blandly intimated that the offers of plaintiff 1 were not being accepted by the trustees of defendant 1, a copy of the 4th defendant's said letter dated 29-4-1987 is annexed hereto and marked as Document No. 4. By his letter dated 4-5-1987 addressed to defendant 4, plaintiff 1 set out the correct position and reiterated that a definite and concluded contract for sale of the said property in favour of plaintiff 1 had been confirmed by the said defendants to allege that the offers had not been accepted. The 1st plaintiff by their said letter also reiterated their readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract and pay the balance purchase price in accordance with the terms and conditions agreed upon. A copy of the said letter dated 4-5-1987 is annexed hereto and marked as Document No. 5.”
2. Pursuant to the letter dated 29-4-1987 addressed by the plaintiff, the defendants in their reply dated 4-5-1987 rejected the offer of the petitioners. Therein the petitioners themselves have expressly set out that there is a concluded contract of sale between the petitioners and the respondents and that they are ready and willing to perform their part of the contract paying the balance consideration in the terms and conditions of the said letters. In para 28 of the plaint, 29-4-1987 is one of the dates set out to give them cause of action. On 25-11-1994 application under Order 6, Rule 17 was filed in IA No. 745 of 1994 seeking to amend the plaint for the grant of the relief of specific performance. The averments made in support thereof is that they subsequently, discovered that the Charity Commissioner had granted permission for the sale of the trust property and, therefore, the petitioners are entitled to the decree of specific performance. That application was dismissed by the trial court on 20-1-1995 and by the High Court on 21-2-1995 in CRP No. 510 of 1995. Thus, this petition for leave.
3. Shri Santosh Hegde, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, has contended that the petitioners have not come forward with any new plea. They have set out all the material allegations and their claims in the plaint. What they are seeking for is only a formal relief which, though not originally asked for, the omission does not preclude the petitioners to file the application under Order 6, Rule 17 seeking for the amendment of the plaint. The relief is really founded upon the facts set out in the plaint and it is the subsequent knowledge about permission granted by the Charity Commissioner for alienation, which required the amendment. We find that the contention is not tenable.
4. It is seen that the permission for alienation is not a condition precedent to file the suit for specific performance. The decree of specific performance will always be subject to the condition to the grant of the permission by the competent authority. The petitioners having expressly admitted that the respondents have refused to abide by the terms of the contract, they should have asked for the relief for specific performance in the original suit itself. Having allowed the period of seven years to elapse from the date of filing of the suit, and the period of limitation being three years under Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, any amendment on the grounds set out, would defeat the valuable right of limitation accruing to the respondent.
5. Shri Hegde placed strong reliance on the judgment of this Court in A.K Gupta v. Damodar Valley Corpn. (1966) 1 SCR 796, AIR 1967 SC 96 In that case, the petitioners had expressly reserved the right to claim the amount of Rs 65,000 in the original plaint, valuing it accordingly. Since, the relief of injunction was confined to a limited point, subsequently, he filed an application for the alternative relief of recovery of the amount of Rs 65,000. In that view, this Court held that since the petitioners have already reserved the right in the plaint, the relief of injunction, as originally prayed for, did not preclude the appellant to file the application under Order 6, Rule 17 to claim the relief for the amount which he originally sought for. The ratio therein has no application to the facts in this case.
6. On the facts, we hold that the application for amendment was barred by limitation. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
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