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Deputy Director Of Collegiate Education (Administration), Madras v. S. Nagoor Meera .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent, a Superintendent in the office of the Regional Deputy Director of Collegiate Education, Madurai, was investigated by the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department in 1986 on allegations of corruption. The inquiry found the allegations true, leading to prosecution before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai. The respondent was convicted under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act for accepting ₹10,000 from one Vijay Kumar in exchange for a promised job. He was sentenced to one year of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹1,000.
Upon appeal, the Madras High Court suspended the sentence and granted bail on 14 February 1991. On 27 October 1993, the Deputy Director issued a show-cause notice proposing dismissal from service in view of the conviction, noting that only the sentence—not the conviction—had been suspended. The respondent challenged the notice before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal (O.A. No. 6851/1993). The Tribunal quashed the notice, holding that disciplinary action could not proceed while the criminal appeal was pending and criticising an unexplained delay of over two years in issuing the notice. The Deputy Director appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a government servant’s conviction can be used as the basis for dismissal under clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution when the appellate court has only suspended the sentence, not the conviction itself.
- Whether a delay of approximately two years and eight months in issuing a show-cause notice invalidates disciplinary proceedings under Article 311(2).
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent’s Arguments
- Because the High Court had suspended the sentence pending appeal, the conviction was not final; therefore, disciplinary action under Article 311(2) proviso (a) was impermissible until the appeal concluded.
- The two-year-and-eight-month delay in issuing the show-cause notice rendered the notice unsustainable.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang (1995) 2 SCC 513 | Scope of Section 389(1) CrPC—distinction between suspension of sentence and suspension of conviction; possibility of suspending a conviction when necessary to avoid collateral consequences. | Used to clarify that Section 389 normally permits suspension only of the sentence, not the conviction, and that suspension of conviction requires specific judicial reasoning, which had not occurred here. |
| Shankar Dass v. Union of India (1985) 2 SCC 358 | Power under Article 311(2) proviso (a) must be exercised fairly, justly, and reasonably, focusing on the gravity of the conduct leading to conviction. | Cited to emphasise that dismissal must correspond to the seriousness of the conduct but that the constitutional power is available once a conviction exists. |
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
Article 311(2) generally requires an inquiry before dismissal, but clause (a) of its second proviso provides an exception where dismissal is based on “conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge.” The Court noted that:
- The constitutional text speaks of the employee’s conduct leading to conviction, not of the sentence imposed. Suspension of sentence or release on bail under Section 389 CrPC does not nullify the conviction or the underlying conduct.
- While Section 389 allows suspension of sentence, suspension of conviction is rare and was not granted in this case. Therefore, the conviction remained operative for disciplinary purposes.
- Waiting for the outcome of criminal appeals would compel the State to retain in service persons convicted of serious offences, contrary to public interest. If the conviction is later set aside, reinstatement and restoration of benefits can always follow.
- The delay in issuing the show-cause notice was adequately explained: the department had been uncertain about the legal effect of the High Court’s suspension order and proceeded only after obtaining legal advice. Such delay did not prejudice the respondent or vitiate the proceedings.
Holding and Implications
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Tribunal’s order.
Consequently, the show-cause notice to the respondent stands revived. The respondent is granted four weeks from the date of the judgment to submit his explanation, after which the competent authority may pass an appropriate order.
Implications: The decision affirms that a government servant’s conviction—even when the sentence is suspended—permits immediate disciplinary action under Article 311(2) proviso (a). Departments need not await the final outcome of criminal appeals, although they must act fairly and review the dismissal if the conviction is ultimately overturned. No new legal doctrine was created, but existing constitutional and procedural principles were clarified and reinforced.
B.P Jeevan Reddy, J.— Leave granted. Heard counsel for the parties.
2. The respondent was working as Superintendent in the office of the Regional Deputy Director Collegiate Education, Madurai in 1986. Complaints of corruption were received against him. An inquiry was held into those complaints by the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department which opined that the charge was true. Accordingly, the respondent was prosecuted before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai, who convicted the respondent under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The charge was that the respondent received a sum of Rs 10,000 from one Vijay Kumar promising to secure a job for him. He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year in addition to fine of Rs 1000. The respondent filed an appeal in the High Court against the conviction and sentence aforesaid and on 14-2-1991, the Court suspended the sentence imposed on the respondent and released him on bail.
3. On 27-10-1993 the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education issued a notice to the respondent calling upon him to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service in view of his conviction by the criminal court. The show-cause notice expressly recites that inasmuch as the High Court has only suspended the sentence, his conviction is still in force. The notice also recites the nature of the offence for which the respondent was convicted.
4. Soon after receiving the show-cause notice, the respondent filed Original Application No. 6851 of 1993 before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal. His submission, which has been upheld by the Tribunal, is that inasmuch as the sentence imposed upon him by the criminal court has been suspended by the appellate court (High Court), no proceedings can be taken for terminating his services under and with reference to clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. The Tribunal has quashed the aforesaid show-cause notice on the following reasoning:
“Therefore, it is clear that once the sentence has been suspended admitting the appeal, the criminal proceedings of the lower court which ended in conviction and sentence of the applicant is being continued in the appellate court and it can end only when the proceedings in the appellate court come to an end. Till then the applicant cannot be proceeded under the provisions of the TNCS (CCA) Rules as has been done in this case. Yet another flaw is that there has been inordinate delay of two years and eight months after the conviction and sentence was passed by the lower court in issuing the impugned show-cause notice. This inordinate delay is unexplained. Therefore, the show-cause notice to the applicant is not sustainable in law till the appellate court disposes of the criminal appeal.”
5. The correctness of the said order is questioned by the Deputy Director of the Collegiate Education in this appeal.
6. Article 311(2) declares that no person, who is a member of the civil service of the Union or All India Service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. The second proviso, however, carves out three exceptions to the said rule. We are concerned with the first exception mentioned under clause (a). Insofar as it is relevant, the second proviso reads as follows:
“Provided further that this clause shall not apply—
(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge.”
7. This clause, it is relevant to notice, speaks of “conduct which has led his conviction on a criminal charge”. It does not speak of sentence or punishment awarded. Merely because the sentence is suspended and/or the accused is released on bail, the conviction does not cease to be operative. Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 empowers the appellate court to order that pending the appeal “the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or on his own bond”. Section 389(1), it may be noted, speaks of suspending “the execution of the sentence or order”, it does not expressly speak of suspension of conviction. Even so, it may be possible to say that in certain situations, the appellate court may also have the power to suspend the conviction — an aspect dealt with recently in Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang (1995) 2 SCC 513, JT (1995) 1 SC 515. At pages 524 and 525, the position under Section 389 is stated thus:( and 16)
“Section 389(1) empowers the Appellate Court to order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended pending the appeal. What can be suspended under this provision is the execution of the sentence or the execution of the order. Does ‘order’ in Section 389(1) mean order of conviction or an order similar to the one under Section 357 or Section 360 of the Code? Obviously the order referred to in Section 389(1) must be an order capable of execution. An order of conviction by itself is not capable of execution under the Code. It is the order of sentence or an order awarding compensation or imposing fine or release on probation which are capable of execution and which, if not suspended, would be required to be executed by the authorities.
***
In certain situations the order of conviction can be executable, in the sense, it may incur a disqualification as in the instant case. In such a case the power under Section 389(1) of the Code could be invoked. In such situations the attention of the Appellate Court must be specifically invited to the consequence that is likely to fall to enable it to apply its mind to the issue since under Section 389(1) it is under an obligation to support its order ‘for reasons to be recorded by it in writing’. If the attention of the Court is not invited to this specific consequence which is likely to fall upon conviction how can it be expected to assign reasons relevant thereto? … If such a precise request was made to the Court pointing out the consequences likely to fall on the continuance of the conviction order, the Court would have applied its mind to the specific question and if it thought that case was made out for grant of interim stay of the conviction order, with or without conditions attached thereto, it may have granted an order to that effect.”
8. We need not, however, concern ourselves any more with the power of the appellate court under the Code of Criminal Procedure for the reason that what is relevant for clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) is the “conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge” and there can be no question of suspending the conduct. We are, therefore, of the opinion that taking proceedings for and passing orders of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a government servant who has been convicted by a criminal court is not barred merely because the sentence or order is suspended by the appellate court or on the ground that the said government servant-accused has been released on bail pending the appeal.
9. The Tribunal seems to be of the opinion that until the appeal against the conviction is disposed of, action under clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) is not permissible. We see no basis or justification for the said view. The more appropriate course in all such cases is to take action under clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) once a government servant is convicted of a criminal charge and not to wait for the appeal or revision, as the case may be. If, however, the government servant-accused is acquitted on appeal or other proceeding, the order can always be revised and if the government servant is reinstated, he will be entitled to all the benefits to which he would have been entitled to had he continued in service. The other course suggested, viz., to wait till the appeal, revision and other remedies are over, would not be advisable since it would mean continuing in service a person who has been convicted of a serious offence by a criminal court. It should be remembered that the action under clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) will be taken only where the conduct which has led to his conviction is such that it deserves any of the three major punishments mentioned in Article 311(2). As held by this Court in Shankar Dass v. Union of India (1985) 2 SCC 358:
“Clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution confers on the Government the power to dismiss a person from service ‘on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge’. But that power like every other power has to be exercised fairly, justly and reasonably. Surely, the Constitution does not contemplate that a government servant who is convicted for parking his scooter in a no-parking area should be dismissed from service. He may, perhaps, not be entitled to be heard on the question of penalty since clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) makes the provisions of that article inapplicable when a penalty is to be imposed on a government servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. But the right to impose a penalty carries with it the duty to act justly.”
10. What is really relevant thus is the conduct of the government servant which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. Now, in this case, the respondent has been found guilty of corruption by a criminal court. Until the said conviction is set aside by the appellate or other higher court, it may not be advisable to retain such person in service. As stated above, if he succeeds in appeal or other proceeding, the matter can always be reviewed in such a manner that he suffers no prejudice.
11. The Tribunal has given yet another reason for quashing the show-cause notice, viz., that whereas the conviction of the criminal court was on 4-2-1991, the impugned show-cause notice was issued only on 27-10-1993. The appellant has explained that though the respondent (sic appellant) had come to know the conviction soon after the judgment of the criminal court, there was a doubt whether action can be taken against the respondent in view of the order of the High Court suspending the sentence. It is stated that after obtaining legal advice, the show-cause notice was issued. In our opinion, the delay, if it can be called one, in initiating the proceedings has been properly explained — and in any event, the delay is not such as to vitiate the action taken.
12. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of the Tribunal is set aside.
13. Since the appellant himself has chosen to issue a show-cause notice to the respondent before passing orders under the said clause, the respondent is given four weeks from today to submit his explanation. The appellant is free to pass such orders thereafter as may be found appropriate in the circumstances.
14. No costs.
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