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Sri Bagawati Tea Estates Ltd. And Another Petitioners/ v. Government Of India And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The judgment disposes of two sets of matters:
- Writ Petition (C) Nos. 974 of 1991 & 419 of 1989 – filed by erstwhile owners of private forests in Kerala acquired under the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 (“Kerala Act”).
- Civil Appeal No. 120 of 1986 – filed by a lessee of forest land challenging a High Court order that had reopened a final judgment in favour of the lessee.
Key statutory and procedural history common to both matters:
- The Kerala Act vested ownership and possession of private forests in the State without compensation, intending to redistribute portions of those forests to landless cultivators under Section 10. Section 11 envisaged completion of such assignments within two years of the Act’s publication.
- The Kerala High Court initially struck the Act down (AIR 1973 Ker 36), but a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court reversed that decision in State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. Co., (1973) 2 SCC 713.
- Implementation lagged: of 2,26,975 hectares vested, only about 10,878 ha were distributed; roughly 8,000 ha were under encroachment.
- Parliament subsequently enacted the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (“FCA 1980”), later amended in 1988, requiring prior Central Government approval for diversion of forest land to non-forest purposes, thereby complicating Kerala’s assignment programme.
Separate background for Civil Appeal No. 120 of 1986:
- The appellant had taken 550 acres on lease in 1963 from Venkunadu Kovilkam and converted 440 acres into coffee/cardamom plantations before 10-5-1971 (the “appointed day” under the Kerala Act).
- A Forest Tribunal (1981) and the Kerala High Court (1983) held that the land had ceased to be “private forest” and therefore did not vest in the State. That 1983 judgment became final.
- Keralan Ordinance No. 39 of 1983 inserted Section 8-C(3) in the Kerala Act, empowering the State to seek review of High Court decisions within six months on specified grounds. Invoking that provision, the State obtained a review order in 1985 that reopened the 1983 judgment, giving rise to the present civil appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the prolonged failure of the State to assign forest land under Section 10, combined with the constraints introduced by the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980/1988, renders the Kerala Act unconstitutional and necessitates restoration of the forests to their former owners.
- Whether the Kerala Act is repugnant to, or rendered unworkable by, the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980.
- In Civil Appeal No. 120 of 1986: Whether the High Court could lawfully set aside its final 1983 judgment under Section 8-C(3) of the Kerala Act on the ground of “failure to produce relevant data or particulars” when no new material was in fact produced.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners in the Writ Petitions
- The Kerala Act was upheld only because it purported to be an agrarian-reform measure protected by Article 31-A, yet its object (distribution for cultivation) has not been achieved in 20 years.
- Enactment and amendment of the FCA 1980 make large-scale diversion of forests for agriculture impossible; Central Government approval is unlikely, so the Act’s purpose is unattainable.
- The State continues to exploit the forest wealth for revenue, turning the statute into a mere device for expropriation without compensation, contrary to the ratio in Gwalior Rayons.
- The Kerala Act and FCA 1980 are mutually repugnant; until Central approval is granted, the State Act cannot operate.
- Reliance placed on Bhim Singhji v. Union of India, (1986) 4 SCC 615, to contend that Ninth-Schedule inclusion cannot protect a statute that violates the Constitution’s basic structure.
State of Kerala (Respondent in Writ Petitions & Applicant in Review)
- Filed counter-affidavit noting partial distribution of forest land and alleging that approximately 8,000 ha are under encroachment.
- In the review proceedings (Civil Appeal), contended that the earlier High Court judgment was vitiated because it was rendered without considering the absence of Collector’s permission under Section 3 of the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act for the 1963 lease.
Appellant in Civil Appeal No. 120 of 1986
- Maintained that the review petition lacked any “relevant data or particulars” not already before the High Court in 1983; hence Section 8-C(3) was incorrectly invoked.
- Emphasised the finality of the 1983 Division Bench judgment affirming his plantation’s exclusion from vesting.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. Co. (1973) 2 SCC 713 | Upheld constitutional validity of the Kerala Act under Article 31-A; emphasised that true agrarian reform must be implemented within a reasonable time. | Quoted extensively; Court held that non-implementation may justify mandamus to enforce Section 10 but cannot invalidate the Act. |
| Bhim Singhji v. Union of India (1986) 4 SCC 615 | Inclusion in Ninth Schedule does not save a law that damages the basic structure. | Court found the precedent inapposite given its conclusion that the Kerala Act remains valid. |
| AIR 1973 Ker 36 (Kerala HC) | Original High Court judgment striking down the Kerala Act. | Referenced as the decision reversed by the Supreme Court in Gwalior Rayons. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Writ Petitions
- The Court acknowledged the State’s slow implementation but held that governmental non-performance does not render the enabling statute unconstitutional; no legal principle supports voiding an Act because its objectives are only partially fulfilled.
- The FCA 1980 imposes a qualified, not absolute, restriction; forest clearance remains possible with Central approval, so the Kerala Act is still operative.
- The petitioners’ assumption that the Centre would invariably refuse approval is speculative and cannot ground a constitutional challenge.
- Krishna Iyer, J.’s caution in Gwalior Rayons envisaged enforcement actions by beneficiaries—not by dispossessed owners—to compel compliance; the present petitioners therefore lack standing under that dictum.
- No precedent supports invalidating acquisition because objectives were unmet within a reasonable period or because a further administrative permission is outstanding.
Civil Appeal No. 120 of 1986
- Section 8-C(3) permits High Court review only when prior orders were “passed due to” (i) suppression/misrepresentation, (ii) failure to produce relevant data, or (iii) procedural delay preventing appeal.
- The State’s review relied solely on ground (ii), yet produced no new data; the 1985 order merely reassessed the same material, amounting to a change of opinion rather than rectifying evidentiary omission.
- Therefore, the statutory precondition for review was not met; the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside its 1983 final judgment.
Holding and Implications
Writ Petition (C) Nos. 974 of 1991 & 419 of 1989: DISMISSED. The Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 remains constitutionally valid; no restoration of forest lands to former owners.
Civil Appeal No. 120 of 1986: ALLOWED. The 1985 High Court order reviewing and reopening the 1983 judgment is quashed; the 1983 judgment in favour of the appellant stands restored, and all consequential orders are set aside.
Implications: The ruling reaffirms that:
- Failure by the executive to implement an agrarian-reform statute does not invalidate the statute; the appropriate remedy lies in mandamus to enforce statutory duties, not constitutional annulment.
- Section 8-C(3) review powers are tightly circumscribed; review cannot be used to revisit conclusions absent genuinely new material.
- No new constitutional precedent is created, but the decision underscores judicial reluctance to strike down legislation merely for administrative inertia and reinforces limits on statutory review mechanisms.
B.P Jeevan Reddy, J.—
Writ Petition (C) Nos. 974 of 1991 and 419 of 1989
1. The Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, (Act 26 of 1971) was enacted by the Kerala Legislature to acquire forest lands held on janmam right as a measure of agrarian reform. The Act did not provide for any compensation being paid to the owners of these private forests. The forest lands so vesting in Government were intended to be assigned to landless agriculturists and agricultural labourers for cultivation. Sub-section (1) of Section 10 says that the Government shall first reserve such extent of the private forests vesting in the Government under the Act as may be necessary for purposes directed towards the promotion of agriculture or the welfare of the agricultural population or for purposes ancillary thereto. Balance extent of the vested private forests were to be assigned on registry or lease to agriculturists, agricultural labourers, members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes who are willing to take up agriculture as means of their livelihood and other categories of persons mentioned therein. Section 11 expected that such assignment “shall, as far as may be, completed within two years from the date of publication of this Act in the Gazette”.
2. Soon after the Act was made, which had the effect of vesting the ownership and possession of private forests in the Government, the affected owners filed writ petitions in the Kerala High Court challenging the constitutional validity of the enactment. A Full Bench of the Kerala High Court struck down the Act holding it to be outside the protective umbrella of Article 31-A of the Constitution, which decision is reported in AIR 1973 Ker 36 1972 Ker LT 628. The State of Kerala questioned the said judgment in this Court which, by its judgment and order dated 18-9-1973, allowed the appeals, set aside the judgment of the Kerala High Court and upheld the validity of the enactment. The decision of this Court is reported in State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. (1973) 2 SCC 713, (1974) 1 SCR 671 The main judgment of the Constitution Bench was delivered by Palekar, J. while V.R Krishna Iyer, J. delivered a separate concurring judgment.
3. After the judgment of this Court, the Government of Kerala constituted a committee comprising certain high officials to study the forest areas and to formulate guidelines for the assignment of the vested forests. After receiving the report of the said committee, the Government says, it started the process of assignment. It is stated in the counter-affidavit that out of a total area of 2,26,975 hectares vesting in the Government under the Act, 4000 hectares has been given to tribals, cooperatives and agricultural reforms and an additional area of 6878 hectares has been handed over to the Revenue Department for being distributed. An extent of 8000 hectares is said to be under the possession of encroachers.
4. While so, Parliament enacted the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 by virtue of Entry 17-A of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. It may be recalled that the subject-matter of forests was originally in List II but by virtue of the 42nd (Amendment) Act to the Constitution, it was deleted from List II and inserted in List III. Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act provides that:
“[N]otwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force in a State, no State Government or other authority shall make, except with the prior approval of the Central Government, any order directing (i) that any reserved forest (within the meaning of the expression ‘reserved forest’ in any law for the time being in force in that State) or any portion thereof, shall cease to be reserved; (ii) that any forest land or any portion thereof may be used for any non-forest purpose.”
The explanation to Section 2 says that for the purpose of Section 2 “non-forest purposes” means breaking up or clearing of any forest land or portion thereof for any purpose other than reafforestation. The enactment of the Conservation Act certainly placed a hurdle in the way of the implementation of the objectives of the Kerala Act inasmuch as one of the main objectives was assignment of said forest land for cultivation and cultivation meant clearance of forest growth — and no such clearance was possible without the prior approval of the Central Government. No doubt, the forest land could probably be assigned as such, i.e, with the forest growth but this was not done. In the year 1988, Parliament amended the Forest (Conservation) Act prohibiting the leasing of forest land or any portion thereof to any private person or to any authority, corporation, agency or any other organisation not owned, managed or controlled by the Government. The explanation to Section 2 was also substituted which says inter alia that “non-forest purpose” means any purpose other than reafforestation. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the private forests acquired under the Kerala Act could not be reserved or assigned so far, as contemplated by Section 10 of the Act, except assignment of a small portion mentioned above.
5. Having failed to challenge successfully the validity of the Act, some of the affected owners applied for exemption of certain portions of the private forests under Section 3. Their applications were rejected against which they filed appeals which too were dismissed. Some of them approached this Court by way of special leave petitions which were dismissed. It is then that some of them have come forward with these writ petitions.
6. The relief sought for by the petitioners in these writ petitions is for a declaration that the Kerala Act is unconstitutional and for a direction restraining the State of Kerala and its officers from enforcing the provisions of the said Act with respect to the private forests owned by them prior to their vesting in the Government. It is also prayed that the possession of the private forests be restored to the erstwhile owners. The main ground urged in support of these writ petitions is this: The Act is a measure of agrarian reform; because it was supposed to be a measure of agrarian reform, it was held protected by Article 31-A of the Constitution though it provided no compensation whatsoever to the deprived owners. The Act contemplates distribution of the forest lands so acquired to specified categories of persons for the purposes of cultivation. Though a period of more than twenty years has elapsed since the said Act was enforced, the forest lands have not been assigned as contemplated by Section 10, except perhaps a minor portion. The Government is deriving income from the forest wealth just as the owners were doing prior to their vesting in the Government. In other words, the Government is using the said forest lands for augmenting its income. It is not really interested in distribution/assignment of the land. Moreover, with the enactment of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 the assignment of the forest land has become impossible. It is idle to presume that the Central Government would permit the clearance of such vast tracts of forests. Since clearance of forest growth from such a large extent of land would affect the ecology and environment of the State, the Central Government would never agree to it, which means that the object of the enactment has become impossible to achieve. Since the main objective of the Act has failed, the entire Act fails and the private forests must be restored to their erstwhile owners. The inclusion of the Act in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution (at Sl. No. 146) by Constitution 40th (Amendment) Act, does in no manner stand in the way of the above submission. Not only has it been included in the Ninth Schedule by a post-Bharati Amendment Act, the protection afforded by Article 31-B is no answer to the submission of the petitioners. The counsel for the petitioners submitted further that the Kerala Act and the Forest (Conservation) Act are repugnant to each other and that in any event until the prior approval of the Central Government is granted, the inconsistency remains.
7. Section 3 of the Kerala Act vests all the private forests in the State in the Government on the appointed day. “Appointed day” means 10-5-1971 as per clause (a) of Section 2. The constitutional validity of the enactment was questioned by the affected owners but they failed ultimately as stated hereinbefore. The decision of this Court upholding the validity of the Act was rendered in September 1973. Having waited for about sixteen years, some of the owners have come forward with the present writ petitions again impugning the constitutional validity of the said enactment, no doubt on a different ground. The main ground now urged, in substance, is that inasmuch as the acquired forest lands have not been assigned as contemplated by Section 10 of the Act in spite of more than twenty years having elapsed, the main objective of the Act has failed. It is submitted that the enactment of Forest (Conservation) Act by Parliament in the year 1980 and its subsequent amendment in 1988 has made the achievement of the objective of the Act impossible. In other words, they say, the Act has failed as a measure of agrarian reform. It has turned out to be a mere and sheer measure of expropriation of private property. The Act incorporates a composite scheme; if one part fails, the whole scheme/enactment fails, it is submitted. It does not even appear, say the counsel for the petitioners, that the Government of Kerala had ever applied for the prior approval of the Central Government under Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 which fact according to them establishes that the Government is never minded to enforce the Act. Since it is sitting pretty upon the forest wealth and deriving income therefrom, it has no inclination to distribute the land, they say. Strong reliance is placed upon the following observations in the opinion of Krishna Iyer, J. in Gwalior Rayons (1973) 2 SCC 713, (1974) 1 SCR 671:
“We may, however, point out here that in ascertaining whether the impugned enactment outlines a blueprint for agrarian reform the Court will look to the substance of the statutory proposal and not its mere outward form. The Court will closely study to see if the legislation merely wears the mask of agrarian reform or it is in reality such. A label cannot salvage a statute from the clutches of constitutional limitations if the agrarian reform envisaged by it is ‘a teasing illusion or promise of unreality’. The Court should not be too gullible to accept a scheme of agrarian reform when it is nothing but a verbal subterfuge, but at the same time the Court should not be too astute to reject such a scheme because it is not satisfied with the wisdom of the scheme or its technical soundness. Can the State take over an industrial unit or a business undertaking without payment of compensation and claim the protection of Article 31-A by stating that the profit arising from such industrial unit or business undertaking would be utilised for purposes directed to agriculture or welfare of the rural population? Such an acquisition would obviously not be an acquisition for carrying out a scheme of agrarian reform because there will be no direct nexus between the subject-matter acquired and its utilisation for agrarian reform. It would not be enough merely to say that the income of the property acquired is to be utilised for purposes of agrarian reform. The property itself must be acquired for carrying out such a reform. This requirement is satisfied in the present case because forest lands reserved under Section 10 are to be utilised ‘for purposes directed to the promotion of agriculture or for the welfare of the agricultural population or for purposes ancillary thereto’. We do not think it would have been sufficient merely to provide that the income from the produce of the forests shall be utilised for promotion of agriculture or the welfare of the agricultural population, but the forest lands need not be so utilised. That would have been merely a devise for augmenting the revenues of the State though with a direction that such addition to the revenue shall be expended only on purposes of promotion of agriculture or the welfare of the agricultural population. But here it is clear on a reading of Section 10 that the forests and not merely the income are to be devoted to or directed towards the promotion of agriculture or the welfare of the agricultural population or for ancillary uses closely related to agrarian reform. The details of the scheme of agrarian reform to which the acquired forests would be subjected cannot obviously be embodied in the statute and they are left to be provided by rules which are to be made under Section 17 for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the statute. No rules could so far be made by the State Government, it is said, because there was a stay against the implementation of the Act when the petition was pending in the Kerala High Court and thereafter the Act was declared to be ultra vires and void by the judgment of the Kerala High Court which is under appeal before us. Now that the Act is being declared by us as constitutionally valid, the State Government will have to make rules setting out the precise programme of agrarian reform which is intended to be carried out. Counsel for the forest owners has expressed an apprehension before us that the State Government may keep the forests as they are for a long number of years and merely go on augmenting the revenues of the State by cutting and selling timber growing on them and thereby defeat the rationale of Article 31-A itself. But there is no basis or justification for this apprehension because we are of the view that the agrarian project would have to be spelt out concretely by the State Government within the prescribed period of two years or at any rate within a reasonable time thereafter. If the State Government merely goes on making money by cutting and selling the timber grown on the forests without implementing the definite proposals of agrarian reform contemplated in Section 10 within a reasonable period of time, it would be a subversion of the statute and in such a case it would be competent to the aggrieved parties to take legal action compelling the State to make good the statutory promise and to act in terms of Section 10 and if the forests are diverted for uses outside the scope of Section 10 the court could restrain the State from such illegitimate adventures.”
8. We are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioners. While we see the force of the argument that the Government of Kerala has, to a large extent, failed in carrying out the objectives of the enactment as contemplated by Section 10, we see no ground for holding that such failure of the Government renders the enactment void. It has never been held by any court that failure to fully carry out the objectives of an enactment renders the enactment void or unconstitutional. There is no such principle known to law. We are equally unable to agree that the Forest (Conservation) Act has made the Kerala Act unworkable. The Conservation Act does not prohibit the clearance of forests altogether. All that it says is that no such clearance shall take place without the prior approval of the Central Government. The bar is not an absolute one but qualified. Even the 1988 Amendment to Forest (Conservation) Act does not make the implementation of the State Act impossible. It may be remembered that Section 10 does not contemplate assignment or distribution of entire private forest lands (vesting in the Government under the Act) but only a portion of it. First, it requires the Government to reserve an appropriate portion of the acquired forests for purposes directed towards the promotion of agriculture and other matters mentioned therein. The remaining land has to be given out on lease or registry to individuals or cooperatives. All this can still be done without violating the provisions of the Act. It is also not possible to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Central Government is bound to decline prior approval under Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act. We cannot decide for the Central Government nor can we presume so and invalidate the Act on that ground.
9. Indeed, the very observations in the opinion of Krishna Iyer, J. in Gwalior Rayons (1973) 2 SCC 713, (1974) 1 SCR 671 quoted hereinbefore militate against the contention of the petitioners. The learned Judge observed that if the State Government fails in carrying out the provisions of Section 10 within a reasonable period “it would be competent to the aggrieved parties to take legal action compelling the State to make good the statutory promise and to act in terms of Section 10”. The petitioners cannot be treated as aggrieved parties contemplated by the learned Judge. In the context, the expression means those persons who stand to gain if the forest land is reserved or assigned as contemplated by Section 10. The learned Judge had also observed that “if the forests are diverted for uses outside the scope of Section 10, the court could restrain the State from such illegitimate adventures”. All that can be done, if a proper party comes to court, will be to direct the Government of Kerala to make good the statutory promise by acting in terms of Section 10.
10. We must also mention that the counsel for the petitioners could not bring to our notice any decision of this Court or of any other court where such acquisition was invalidated on the ground that the objects of acquisition were not achieved within a reasonable period or that permission/approval of some other authority has to be obtained before taking steps for implementation of its objectives.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon certain observations in Bhim Singhji v. Union of India (1986) 4 SCC 615, 1985 Supp (1) SCR 862 to say that inclusion in the Ninth Schedule does not save an Act if it damages the basic structure of the Constitution. We see no relevance of those observations herein, in view of what we have said hereinabove.
12. For the above reasons, the writ petitions fail and are dismissed. No costs.
Civil Appeal No. 120 of 1986
13. This appeal is preferred against the judgment of the Kerala High Court allowing a review petition filed by the State and setting aside its earlier judgment dated 3-8-1983.
14. The appellant states that he entered into an agreement on 7-8-1963 with the karta and the senior members of the Venkunadu Kovilkam to take on lease 550 acres of land belonging to the said Kovilkam in janmam, situated in Neelamala Palghat District. He says that he was put in possession of the entire extent and that he raised coffee on 215 acres and cardamom on 225 acres before 10-5-1971, the date on which the Kerala Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 came into force. The appellant further says that he has been paying land tax and basic tax for the said plantation from 1974 onwards, i.e, after the plantation started yielding. Contending that the said extent had vested in the Government under Section 2 of the Act, he says, the authorities encroached upon the said extent whereupon he instituted OA No. 139 of 1977 under Section 8 of the Act before the appropriate tribunal. His contention before the Tribunal was that the said land did not vest in the Government under Section 3 for the reason that well before the date of coming into force of the Act it had ceased to be a private forest within the meaning of Section 2(f). By its order dated 25-5-1981, the Forest Tribunal upheld the appellant's claim against which the State of Kerala filed an appeal, MFA No. 1 of 1982 before the High Court. The Division Bench which heard the appeal dismissed the same on 3-8-1983 affirming the findings of the Tribunal. One of the contentions urged by the State before the Division Bench was that the said agreement of lease having been entered into without obtaining previous sanction of the Collector, as required by the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, the lease is not only void but the said fact also establishes that the alleged agreement of lease and delivery of possession pleaded by the appellant is not true. This argument was rejected by the Division Bench relying upon Exh. A-20, the report of the receiver appointed in OS No. 1 of 1964 on the file of the learned District Judge, Palghat and upon the recitals in the formal lease deed Exh. A-21 executed pursuant to the agreement of lease in the year 1973. In addition to the above, the Division Bench also relied upon Exh. A-8, the rent receipt dated 9-11-1963 issued by the Kariastha of the Kovilkam to the appellant. The Bench held that the appellant had indeed come into possession of the said land on 7-8-1963 and had also converted the said extent into plantation prior to 10-5-1971. This order became final, not having been questioned by the State in this Court or otherwise.
15. On 18-11-1983, the Governor of Kerala issued an ordinance being Ordinance No. 39 of 1983 amending Section 8 of the Act and inserting new Sections 8-B, 8-C and 8-D after Section 8-A in the Principal Act. Section 8-B extended the period of limitation for the State to apply for review of a judgment rendered by the Tribunal on the grounds specified therein. Section 8-C(3), which is relevant for our purposes, extended the period of limitation for the State to apply for review of judgment delivered by the High Court, on the grounds specified therein. For the purpose of this case, it is enough to notice sub-section (3) of Section 8-C. It reads as follows:
“(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in the Limitation Act, 1963 (Central Act 36 of 1963), or in any other law for the time being in force, or in any judgment, decree or order of any Court or other authority, the Government, if they are satisfied that any judgment or order [other than an order referred to in sub-section (2)] passed by the High Court in any proceeding, relates to any land which is a private forest and that such judgment or order has been passed due to suppression or misrepresentation of facts or due to the failure to produce relevant data or other particulars or that an appeal against such judgment or order could not be filed by reason of the delay in applying for and obtaining a certified copy of such judgment or order, may, within six months from the commencement of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Amendment Ordinance, 1983, make an application to the High Court for review of such judgment or order.”
(quoted from the Paper Book)
16. It is brought to our notice that after the lapse of the original ordinance, successive ordinances were issued from time to time. Be that as it may, taking advantage of Section 8-C(3), the State of Kerala filed a petition for reviewing the judgment of the High Court dated 3-8-1983. It was posted before Thommen, J., who was one of the two members of the Division Bench which had dismissed the appeal on 3-8-1983. The learned Judge allowed the review petition and restored the appeal to file under the impugned order dated 17-9-1985.
17. A reading of Section 8-C(3) shows that the High Court can review its order on any of the following three grounds:
(1) that such judgment or order has been passed due to suppression or misrepresentation of facts;
(2) that such judgment or order has been passed due to the failure to produce relevant data or other particulars; or
(3) that an appeal against such judgment or order could not be filed by reason of the delay in applying for or obtaining a certified copy of such judgment or order.
The review petition filed by the State was based upon the second ground, viz., failure of the State to produce relevant data or other particulars, a fact specifically noted in the very first paragraph of the impugned order. The contention urged on behalf of the Government Pleader before the learned Judge was that it was not brought to the notice of the High Court that prior to the execution of Exh. A-5 in 1963, the sanction of the District Collector as required under Section 3 of the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act had not been obtained. The learned Judge took note of the fact that this contention was urged before the Division Bench when it heard the appeal and had rejected it. Even so the learned Judge observed, after noticing Section 3 of the Madras Act, that according to the said provision any alienation without the previous sanction of the District Collector is null and void and that the said circumstance raises several questions for consideration, viz., whether the agreement of lease amounts to alienation within the meaning of Section 3 of the Madras Act and if so whether it was entered into with the previous sanction of the Collector and further whether such alienation without such previous permission can constitute a foundation for excluding the land from the purview of the Kerala Act and certain other questions. What is of relevance is that the learned Judge did not say or find that the order of the High Court was made, or vitiated, due to the failure to produce relevant data or other particulars. Indeed, no such data or particulars were placed before the Court by the State in the review petition. On the same material, which was on record in the appeal, the impugned order has been made. We are of the opinion that the words “due to failure to produce relevant data or other particulars” mean what they say. It must be a failure to produce relevant data or particulars; it cannot mean a mere change of opinion on the same material or on the same evidence. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the ground on which the review petition was filed was not made out and hence the order dated 3-8-1983 could not have been reviewed and set aside. It is true that under the impugned order the learned Judge has merely restored the appeal to file after setting aside the order dated 3-8-1983, which meant that appeal is yet to be heard, but, in our opinion, the very setting aside of the order dated 3-8-1983 was not called for until and unless one or the other ground specified by statute is made out.
18. In view of the above, it is not necessary to consider the other question raised in this appeal, viz., the validity of the successive ordinances inserting the aforesaid sections in the Kerala Act.
19. Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and restore the judgment of the Division Bench dated 3-8-1983. It is made clear that if pursuant to the order impugned herein, any orders are passed in the appeal, whether interim or final, they shall equally stand set aside. No costs.
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