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Integrated Rural Development Agency v. Ram Pyare Pandey .

Supreme Court Of India
Feb 24, 1995
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Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, Ram Pyare Pandey, was appointed as a Junior Clerk on 14 May 1980 by the appellant, Integrated Rural Development Agency (a society registered under the Societies Registration Act). His appointment letter expressly stated that the post was temporary and could be terminated “at any time.” On 6 June 1980 his services were in fact terminated.

Challenging the termination, the respondent filed OS No. 1204 of 1981 before Munsiff Court No. 3, Deoria, seeking a declaration that the order was illegal as it violated Rule 13(b) of the Agency’s service rules, which requires one month’s notice for termination. The suit was dismissed, and this dismissal was affirmed in Civil Appeal No. 186 of 1982 by the VIth Additional District Judge, Deoria.

The respondent then preferred Second Appeal No. 2163 of 1983 before the Allahabad High Court. On 22 March 1993, Katju, J. allowed the appeal, holding the termination illegal under Rule 13(b) and ordering reinstatement with full back wages. The Agency obtained special leave and appealed to the Supreme Court, leading to the present decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an employee of a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, whose contract of employment is purely contractual, can be reinstated with back wages when terminated without the one-month notice contemplated by the society’s internal Rule 13(b).
  2. Whether courts can grant specific performance (reinstatement) of a contract of personal service in the absence of statutory or public-law elements.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vine v. National Dock Labour Board (1956) 1 All ER 1; (1956) 3 All ER 939 (HL) Wrongful dismissal of an employee terminates the contract; remedy is damages, not reinstatement. Relied on to show that a pure master-servant relationship cannot be specifically enforced through reinstatement.
Nandganj Sihori Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Badri Nath Dixit (1991) 3 SCC 54 Specific performance of employment contracts is generally refused; exceptions exist only for statutory or public positions. Formed the backbone of the Court’s conclusion that reinstatement and back wages were impermissible.
S.R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra AIR 1964 SC 1680 Enumerated exceptions where reinstatement may be granted (e.g., public servants, statutory breaches). Cited to emphasize that the present case does not fall within any recognized exception.
Executive Committee of U.P. Warehousing Corpn. v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi (1969) 2 SCC 838 Same principle regarding limited situations where reinstatement is permissible. Used as additional authority limiting specific performance of service contracts.
Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain (1976) 2 SCC 58 Reaffirmed contractual nature of private employment and limits on reinstatement. Cited in support of denying reinstatement.
Ridge v. Baldwin (1963) 2 All ER 66 (HL) In a pure master-servant situation, employer may dismiss at will subject to damages for breach; no specific performance. Quoted to underscore that the question is one of damages, not reinstatement.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court first noted that the appellant is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and is neither created by statute nor controlled by the State. Consequently, its relationship with the respondent is purely contractual, governed by the common-law principles of master and servant.

Invoking Vine v. National Dock Labour Board and Ridge v. Baldwin, the Court reiterated that in ordinary contracts of service, wrongful dismissal merely gives rise to a claim for damages; courts will not decree specific performance or reinstatement. The Court then referred to its own decision in Nandganj Sihori Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Badri Nath Dixit, which catalogues the limited exceptions (public servants protected by Article 311, industrial-law remedies, statutory breaches, etc.). None of these exceptions applied because the Agency is not a statutory or State instrumentality.

Therefore, even if Rule 13(b) required one month’s notice and the termination breached that rule, the proper remedy lay in damages, not reinstatement or back wages. Granting such relief would amount to enforcing a personal service contract contrary to settled law.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; the orders directing reinstatement and payment of arrears of salary are set aside.

Implications: The decision confirms that employees of non-statutory bodies incorporated as societies cannot, upon wrongful termination, obtain reinstatement or back wages through civil courts. Their remedy is confined to damages, unless they fall within recognized statutory or public-law exceptions. No new legal doctrine is introduced, but the judgment reinforces existing principles limiting specific performance of contracts of personal service.

Show all summary ...

K.S Paripoornan, J.— Special leave granted.

2. The defendant in OS No. 1204 of 1981, in Munsiff Court No. 3, Deoria, is the appellant. The plaintiff in the suit is the respondent. The appellant — Integrated Rural Development Agency — is a body registered under the Societies Registration Act. It has its own Articles of Association. The respondent-plaintiff was appointed as Junior Clerk in the Integrated Rural Development Agency on 14-5-1980 against a permanent vacancy. His service was terminated on 6-6-1980. Thereupon, the respondent filed a suit and prayed for the grant of a declaration that the termination order was illegal and void and it was passed in violation of the rules governing the appellant. The learned Munsiff held that the appointment of the respondent was temporary and the termination order was not illegal or void and dismissed the suit. The respondent-plaintiff filed an appeal before the VIth Additional District Judge, Deoria — Civil Appeal No. 186 of 1982. By judgment dated 29-4-1983 the appeal was dismissed. Thereafter, the respondent-plaintiff filed Second Appeal No. 2163 of 1983 in the High Court of Allahabad. Katju, J. by judgment dated 22-3-1993 held that the termination of the service of the respondent was against the mandate of Rule 13(b) and so the termination order dated 6-6-1980 was illegal. The concurrent judgments of the courts below were reversed and the learned Judge further directed that the appellant will be reinstated in service and also will be entitled to arrears of salary from the date of termination. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge, the Integrated Rural Development Agency — defendant in the suit — has filed this appeal by special leave.

3. We heard Mr A.K Srivastava, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr S.A Gilani, learned counsel for the respondent.

4. The order of appointment of the respondent is quoted at page 21 of the paper-book, which is as under:

“S/Shri Mohan Prasad and Gorakh Nath on being promoted to the posts of Stenographer and Accountant respectively, the following employees who are working as work-charged employees for the last four months are hereby appointed as clerks in the pay scale of Rs 200-320 with effect from 14-5-1980. They shall be entitled to receive Dearness Allowance and other allowances as approved by the Government. Their appointment is temporary and their services can be terminated at any time.

1. Shri Ram Pyare Pandey s/o Late Kushahar Pandey, r/o Village Pipraich, P.O Deoria.

2. Shri Krishan Kumar Shukla, s/o Shri Ram Subhag Shukla, r/o Sindhi Mill Colony, Deoria.

District Development Officer/

Project Officer, Deoria.”

(Shri Ram Pyare Pandey is the respondent herein.)

5. In exercise of the powers vested under Section 20(a) of the Articles of Association, the governing body of the appellant had framed its own rules regarding the conduct of business and office procedure. Rule 13 of the said rules is to the following effect:

“13. Period of the office of the Employees.— The period of office of an employee of the Agency shall not be determined until:

(a) His resignation has been accepted in writing by the authority competent to his successor, or

(b) The services of the employee can be terminated with one month's notice from either side.”

(emphasis supplied)

Katju, J. after having held that notwithstanding the terms of appointment order to the effect that the services of the respondent can be terminated at any time, Rule 13(b), quoted above, requires one month's notice to be given before termination and that the rule should prevail, which renders the termination order dated 6-6-1980 illegal and void. In consequence, the learned Judge directed reinstatement of the respondent in service with arrears of salary. We are of the view that the respondent is not entitled to either reinstatement or arrears of salary from the date of termination. The learned Single Judge was wholly in error in affording the relief of reinstatement and back wages. We will state our reasons for the aforesaid conclusion.

6. The appellant — Integrated Rural Development Agency — is one registered under Societies Registration Act. It has its own Articles of Association. It has framed its own rules thereunder. There is no plea or material or proof that the appellant — Integrated Rural Development Agency — is one constituted under statute or is owned or controlled by the State Government or an instrumentality of the State. The relationship between the appellant — Integrated Rural Development Agency — and the respondent is based on contract and is purely one of master and servant. As stated by Jenkins, L.J in his dissenting judgment in Vine v. National Dock Labour Board (1956) 1 All ER 1, which was approved in appeal by the House of Lords in Vine v. National Dock Labour Board (1956) 3 All ER 939, (1957) 2 WLR 106, 1957 AC 488:

“In the ordinary case of master and servant, however, the repudiation or the wrongful dismissal puts an end to the contract, and a claim for damages arise. It is necessarily a claim for damages and nothing more. The nature of the bargain is such that it can be nothing more.”

Delivering the judgment of three-member Bench of this Court in Nandganj Sihori Sugar Co. Ltd., Rae Bareli v. Badri Nath Dixit (1991) 3 SCC 54 Thommen, J. stated the law thus:

“A contract of employment cannot ordinarily be enforced by or against an employer. The remedy is to sue for damages. (See Section 14 read with Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act; see Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts by Pollock and Mulla, 10th Edn., page 983). The grant of specific performance is purely discretionary and must be refused when not warranted by the ends of justice. Such relief can be granted only on sound legal principles. In the absence of any statutory requirement, courts do not ordinarily force an employer to recruit or retain in service an employee not required by the employer. There are, of course, certain exceptions to this rule, such as in the case of a public servant dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311 of the Constitution; reinstatement of a dismissed worker under the Industrial Law; a statutory body acting in breach of statutory obligations, and the like. (S.R Tewari v. District Board, Agra AIR 1964 SC 1680, (1964) 3 SCR 55, (1964) 1 LLJ 1; Executive Committee of U.P Warehousing Corpn. v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi (1969) 2 SCC 838; Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli v. Lakshmi Narain (1976) 2 SCC 58; see Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 44, paras 405 to 420).”

Similarly in Ridge v. Baldwin (1963) 2 All ER 66, (1963) 2 WLR 935 (HL), Lord Reid stated the law emphatically thus:

“The law regarding master and servant is not in doubt. There cannot be specific performance of a contract of service and the master can terminate the contract with his servant at any time and for any reason or for none. But if he does so in a manner not warranted by the contract he must pay damages for breach of contract. So the question in a pure case of master and servant does not at all depend on whether the master has heard the servant in his own defence: it depends on whether the facts emerging at the trial prove breach of contract. But this kind of case can resemble dismissal from an office where the body employing the man is under some statutory or other restriction as to the kind of contract which it can make with its servants, or the grounds on which it can dismiss them.”
(emphasis supplied)

7. In the light of the above principles, it follows that the relief of reinstatement could not be granted in the present case. By affording the relief of reinstatement or back wages, the courts will, in fact, be granting specific performance of contracts of service, which can be done only in the exceptional or rare cases referred to in the judgment of this Court in Nandganj Sihori Sugar Co. Ltd., Rae Bareli v. Badri Nath Dixit (1991) 3 SCC 54.

8. In the result, the relief of reinstatement of the respondent in service and also arrears of salary from the date of termination, are improper and unjustified in law. The reliefs so granted are hereby set aside. The appeal is allowed. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.