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Arvind Industries And Others v. State Of Gujarat And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Aug 23, 1995
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants, manufacturers of edible oil with solvent-extraction plants in Gujarat, claimed entitlement to a five-year sales-tax exemption allegedly promised by the State through a press note (9-9-1969), statements in the Legislative Assembly (3-3-1970), and a notification dated 11-11-1970 issued under the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969. Their plants were commissioned on 3-12-1970 (Junagadh) and 31-12-1970 (Dhoraji) respectively.

On 17-7-1971 the State issued a subsequent notification withdrawing the benefit for industries involved in solvent extraction and related activities. The appellants challenged this withdrawal before the High Court and, upon an adverse decision, filed the present civil appeals in the Supreme Court of India, invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the State of Gujarat was estopped, by virtue of earlier representations and the notification of 11-11-1970, from withdrawing sales-tax benefits through the later notification dated 17-7-1971.
  2. Whether the factual foundation necessary to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel had been established by the appellants.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The government had assured new industries of a five-year sales-tax exemption through a press note, Assembly statements, and the 11-11-1970 notification.
  • Relying on these assurances, the appellants established their solvent-extraction plants and altered their position to their detriment.
  • The State was therefore estopped from rescinding the exemption via the 17-7-1971 notification.
  • The two notifications were administrative/executive in nature rather than delegated legislation; hence unilateral withdrawal was impermissible.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent State’s legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Arvind Industries v. State of Gujarat (supra) Illustrative of similar factual matrix involving invocation of promissory estoppel against withdrawal of tax incentives. The Court noted that the present appeals were factually similar and reached the same conclusion—that the factual basis for estoppel was not made out.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. The Court scrutinised the factual record and found no concrete evidence of any unequivocal promise by the Government that the tax benefit would remain unaltered. Neither the press note nor the Assembly statements were produced, and the 11-11-1970 notification itself contained no assurance of irrevocability.

2. To invoke promissory estoppel, an assessee must show: (a) a clear and unambiguous promise by the State; (b) reliance on that promise; and (c) consequent alteration of position to its detriment. On the facts, the Court held each element unproved:

  • The notification was a general fiscal measure subject to modification; no promise of permanence could be inferred.
  • The rapid commissioning dates (3-12-1970 and 31-12-1970) made it implausible that the plants were established solely in reliance on the 11-11-1970 notification.
  • No specific dates or evidence were offered regarding land purchase, procurement of machinery, or financing that would demonstrate detrimental reliance.

3. The Court emphasised the State’s authority to adjust fiscal policy and incentives from time to time in the public interest.

4. Given the absence of a factual foundation, the Court found it unnecessary to reach broader questions on the applicability of promissory estoppel to fiscal legislation.

Holding and Implications

The appeals were dismissed with no order as to costs.

Immediate effect: the appellants cannot claim the five-year sales-tax exemption, and the withdrawal effected by the 17-7-1971 notification stands. The judgment turns on lack of evidentiary support rather than creation of new legal doctrine; hence it sets no expansive precedent beyond reaffirming the stringent factual requirements for invoking promissory estoppel against the State.

Show all summary ...

C. Sen, J.—

Civil Appeal No. 951 of 1976

1. The appellants are manufacturers of edible oil and have their own solvent extraction plants at Junagadh. The case of the appellants is that on or about 9-9-1969, a press note was issued by the State Government that new industries will be granted exemption from sales tax for a period of five years from the date of commencement of production. The then Chief Minister as well as the Finance Minister of the State Government of Gujarat also made statements on 3-3-1970 on the floor of the Legislative Assembly that new industries will be granted exemption from sales tax for a period of five years. The press note has not been annexed to the petition. Copies of the alleged statements made by the Chief Minister and the Finance Minister in the Legislative Assembly have also not been produced in court.

2. However, a copy of the notification dated 29-4-1970 issued under Section 49(2) of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969, has been included in the paperbook. This notification contains a recital that the Government of Gujarat is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary to take immediate action to amend the Gujarat Sales Tax Rules, 1970 and to dispense with the previous publication thereof. This notification does not make any reference to any previous press note or assurance given by anybody on behalf of the Government. It merely provides that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 86 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969, the rules were being framed to amend the Gujarat Sales Tax Rules, 1970. Rule 42-A was introduced in the Gujarat Sales Tax Rules, 1970, whereby on fulfilment of certain conditions, a new industry was granted drawback, set-off or refund of the whole or any part of the tax in respect of the purchase of raw materials, processing materials and machinery or packing materials used in manufacture of goods for sale. Certain conditions were laid down which had to be fulfilled before a new industry could avail of this benefit of the amended Rule 42-A. “New Industry” was defined to mean and include an industry which has been commissioned at any time during the period from 1-4-1970 to 31-3-1975. One of the conditions laid down in the notification was that the assessee had to obtain an eligibility certificate from the Commissioner of Industries, Gujarat State, to the effect that the new industry had been commissioned in an area beyond 24 kilometres from the municipal limits of the cities of Ahmedabad and Baroda and 16 kilometres from the municipal limits of Surat, Bhavnagar, Rajkot and Jamnagar. A new industry would enjoy the benefit of this notification for a period of five years from the date of commissioning of the industry as stated in the eligibility certificate.

3. On 11-11-1970, a further notification was issued amending the earlier notification dated 29-4-1970. It was specifically provided that “New Industry” will not include industries engaged in, inter alia:

(12) decorticating, expelling, crushing, roasting, parching, frying of oil seeds and colouring, decolouring, scenting of oil;

(13) solvent extraction of oil from oilseeds and oilcakes.

4. The contention made on behalf of the appellants is that the solvent extraction plant at Junagadh was set up by the appellant on the strength of assurance made out by the Government in the press statement, the speeches made by the Chief Minister and the Finance Minister on the floor of the Legislative Assembly, and also the notification issued on 11-11-1970. The appellant would not have set up this industry at Junagadh but for the aforesaid assurances given by the Government. It is not open to the Government now to withdraw the benefits of this notification by a subsequent notification issued on 17-7-1971. Since the appellant had changed his position to his detriment on the strength of the earlier assurance held out by the Government, the appellant is entitled to continue to enjoy the benefits given by notification dated 11-11-1970 for a period of five years from the date of commissioning of its plant. The Government was estopped from withdrawing the benefits by removing the appellant from the list of eligible industries by the subsequent notification dated 17-7-1971.

5. Elaborate arguments were advanced as to the scope and effect of the doctrine of promissory estoppel and under what circumstances could this doctrine be invoked. It was argued that the two notifications issued by the Government were not in exercise of legislative power delegated by the statute. The Government could not unilaterally withdraw the benefits conferred by the earlier notification from industries which had started production after the notification dated 11-11-1970 came into force. Having regard to the facts of the case, it is not necessary to go into this controversy. The date of commencement of the appellant's industry, according to the eligibility certificate obtained by the appellant from the Commissioner of Industries, is 3-12-1970. It is difficult to believe that the appellant, after the exemption notification dated 11-11-1970 was issued and on the basis of it, set up an oil extraction plant which commenced production within three weeks' time on 3-12-1970. No particulars have been given as to when the land was purchased, or when the plant and machinery for the industry were procured.

6. Moreover, the notification dated 11-11-1970 does not contain any promise that the benefits given to new industries will not be altered from time to time. The Government is entitled to grant exemption to industries having regard to the industrial policy of the Government. The Government is equally free to modify its industrial policy and grant, withdraw or modify fiscal benefits from time to time. There is nothing in the notification dated 11-11-1970 by which any assurance was held out to any industry. This was a usual Government notification relating to purchase and sales tax, granting reliefs to certain industries on fulfilment of the conditions laid down in the notification.

7. Even otherwise, the notification dated 11-11-1970 grants exemption to new industry — which “has been commissioned on or after 1-4-1970, in the areas beyond 24 kilometres from the municipal limits of the cities of Ahmedabad and Baroda and 16 kilometres from the municipal limits of Surat, Bhavnagar, Rajkot and Jamnagar”. In other words, the Government wanted to encourage industries set up beyond the specified distance from the municipal limits of the aforesaid towns. This cannot be construed to mean that the Government was contemplating to encourage industries set up in other cities of Gujarat which were far away from Ahmedabad, Baroda, Surat, Bhavnagar, Rajkot and Jamnagar. The appellant had set up its industry at Junagadh, which is a large city. It is doubtful whether such an industry was at all entitled to any benefit of the notification dated 11-11-1970. However, we need not express any final opinion on this aspect of the case, because no argument was advanced on this issue at the hearing of the case.

8. There is also a further point to be noted. In the special leave petition, it has been stated that some time in April 1970, the then Chief Minister and the Finance Minister had announced that the Government had adopted the policy of giving incentives to establishment of new industries. It has further been stated that petitioner's total investment in the oil extraction plant is roughly 23 lakhs out of which about Rs 14 lakhs was for the cost of machinery, about Rs 8 lakhs was towards erection, construction of necessary sheds and buildings and about Rs 68,000 was towards the cost of land. The appellant is a partnership firm. It has not been stated at what point of time the partners decided to set up this plant and when and how the fund required for setting up of the plant was raised.

9. The appellant has been entirely unable to make out any factual basis for a case of promissory estoppel. The appellant cannot claim that merely because it had set up its industrial unit at Junagadh at a certain point of time, the fiscal laws of the State must remain unaltered from that date. The appellant has not been able to show that some definite promise was made by or on behalf of the Government and the appellant had acted upon that promise to its detriment and thereafter the changes effected by the notification dated 17-7-1971 have caused great prejudice to the appellant.

10. In the premises, it is not necessary to go into the question of applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the field of fiscal legislation.

11. The appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

Civil Appeal No. 1011 of 1977

12. The facts of this case are similar to the facts in the case of Arvind Industries v. State of Gujarat (supra). Here again, the contention of the promissory estoppel has been raised.

13. The appellant has set up a factory at Ambavadi Road, Dhoraji. The industrial undertaking was commissioned on 31-12-1970, i.e, within seven weeks from the date of the notification dated 11-11-1970. The appellant had stated in the petition that on 31-8-1970, it had set up the factory premises at Dhoraji at a cost of Rs 38,000. This was long before the exemption notification dated 11-11-1970. No dates have been given for the purchase of machinery and spare parts worth Rs 45,000. But it has been stated that the production in the factory started from 31-12-1970. Having regard to the facts of the case and also nature of the two notifications issued by the Government dated 11-11-1970 and 17-7-1971, we are of the view that the factual basis for a case of promissory estoppel has not been made out. It is unnecessary to deal with the elaborate arguments advanced on the scope of the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the facts of this case. The appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.