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Superintendent Of Police (C.B.I) v. Deepak Chowdhary And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
In 1982, while Respondent 1 was serving as Branch Manager of the Desh Priya Branch of United Bank of India in Calcutta, it was discovered that certain bank officers had conspired with a creditor, defrauding the bank of Rs 45,000. After investigation, the appellant obtained sanction on 14-1-1987 under Section 6(1-c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 to prosecute the respondent for offences under Sections 120-B, 420, 467, 468, 471, 477-A, 201 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the PC Act. The respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court seeking to quash the sanction. By order dated 2-4-1992 (Matter No. 498 of 1987), the High Court quashed the sanction on the grounds that (a) the respondent had not been given an opportunity of hearing before sanction and (b) he had been exonerated in the bank’s departmental enquiry. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. Delay of 232 days in filing the appeal was condoned, and leave was granted.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a public servant accused of an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act is entitled to an opportunity of hearing before the competent authority grants sanction for prosecution.
- Whether exoneration of the accused in a departmental enquiry renders the criminal prosecution unsustainable or makes it inexpedient to grant sanction.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Grant of sanction is an administrative, not quasi-judicial, function; therefore, no opportunity of hearing need be afforded to the accused prior to sanction.
- The sanctioning authority must merely examine the investigative materials to form a prima facie view that an offence is disclosed; the respondent’s departmental exoneration is irrelevant to this determination.
Respondent's Arguments
- The sanction was vitiated because the respondent was not given an opportunity to be heard before its issuance.
- Given the departmental enquiry had exonerated the respondent, it was not expedient to prosecute him.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court held that granting sanction under Section 6 of the PC Act is an administrative act. The sanctioning authority’s duty is to consider the investigative material to determine whether the facts prima facie constitute the alleged offences; it is not required to afford the accused a prior hearing. Consequently, the High Court erred in treating the absence of such an opportunity as a violation of natural justice.
Regarding departmental exoneration, the Court ruled that findings in disciplinary proceedings do not govern the criminal process. The decisive question for sanction is whether the investigation discloses facts constituting an offence, not the outcome of a separate departmental enquiry.
Because evaluating the respondent’s substantive culpability would prejudice the pending trial, the Court refrained from commenting on the merits of the evidence.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; High Court order quashing sanction set aside.
The trial court is directed to proceed expeditiously with the criminal trial against the respondent, conducting a joint trial with other accused if still pending, or concluding the separate trial within one year if the co-accused have already been tried. The decision revives the prosecution but sets no new precedent beyond affirming that sanction for prosecution under the PC Act is an administrative act not requiring a prior hearing.
Order
1. Leave granted.
2. Delay of 232 days condoned.
3. The facts lie in a short compass. During the year 1982, while Respondent 1 was working as a Branch Manager in Desh Priya Branch of the United Bank of India at Calcutta it was realised that certain officers working in that Bank had conspired with a creditor and the Bank was defrauded for a sum of Rs 45,000. On a complaint laid, a crime case was registered and the appellant investigated the matter and submitted the report to the competent authority for sanction, who, by its order dated 14-1-1987 accorded sanction under Section 6(1-c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (for short ‘PC Act’) to file the charge-sheet against the respondent for the offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 420, 467, 468, 471, 477-A, 201 and 109 IPC and also under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the PC Act. The respondent filed writ petition in the High Court to quash the sanction. The High Court by the impugned order dated 2-4-1992 in Matter No. 498 of 1987 quashed the sanction on two grounds, namely, that the respondent was not given any opportunity of hearing before granting sanction and in the departmental enquiry conducted by the Bank, the respondent was exonerated of the charge. Therefore, it was not expedient to proceed with the prosecution of the respondent. Hence, the above appeal has been filed.
4. It is contended for the appellant that the question of giving an opportunity to the charged officer before granting sanction does not arise since it is not a quasi-judicial function. Grant of sanction is an administrative function. What is required is that the investigating officer should place all the necessary material before the sanctioning authority which should apply its mind to that material and accord sanction. Therefore, the question of giving opportunity of hearing to the accused before granting sanction does not arise.
5. We find force in the contention. The grant of sanction is only an administrative function, though it is true that the accused may be saddled with the liability to be prosecuted in a court of law. What is material at that time is that the necessary facts collected during investigation constituting the offence have to be placed before the sanctioning authority and it has to consider the material. Prima facie, the authority is required to reach the satisfaction that the relevant facts would constitute the offence and then either grant or refuse to grant sanction. The grant of sanction, therefore, being administrative act the need to provide an opportunity of hearing to the accused before according sanction does not arise. The High Court, therefore, was clearly in error in holding that the order of sanction is vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice.
6. The second ground of departmental exoneration by the disciplinary authority is also not relevant. What is necessary and material is whether the facts collected during investigation would constitute the offence for which the sanction has been sought for.
7. It is not appropriate at this stage to go into the merits of the culpability of the respondent though sought to be contended for by Shri Thopas Roy, the learned counsel. In fairness to the accused, we deem it inappropriate to go into the merits to express any opinion.
8. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside and the trial court is directed to proceed with the trial against the respondent as expeditiously as possible and conduct joint trial, if trial is not already concluded, along with other accused. If the case has been separated and the trial of other accused has been concluded, then the trial court is directed to expeditiously conclude the trial of the respondent, not exceeding one year.
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