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State Of Maharashtra v. Maharau Srawan Hatkar .
Factual and Procedural Background
Land in Village Kasampura was notified for acquisition for a percolation tank under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on 13-8-1979. The Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation on 17-12-1981. At the instance of the claimants, the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jalgaon, enhanced the compensation by an award dated 25-10-1983 rendered on a reference under Section 18 of the Act. No appeal was preferred against that decree.
After the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 came into force on 24-9-1984, the claimants moved the reference court for additional benefits—12% additional amount (Section 23(1-A)), 30% solatium (Section 23(2)) and enhanced interest (Section 28). By order dated 31-3-1986, the Civil Judge granted those benefits. The State of Maharashtra filed First Appeal No. 169 of 1987 before the Bombay High Court, which was summarily dismissed on 24-4-1987. The State then filed the present appeal before the Supreme Court by special leave.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a civil court, after passing an award under Section 26(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, possesses jurisdiction to grant additional benefits introduced by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984—namely the additional amount under Section 23(1-A), the solatium under Section 23(2) and the enhanced rate of interest under Section 28—by entertaining a subsequent application.
Arguments of the Parties
State/Appellant
- The civil court’s jurisdiction is confined to the reference under Section 18 and to determining compensation under Section 23(1).
- Once an award is passed, it becomes a decree under Section 26(2); it can only be corrected for clerical or arithmetical errors under Section 152 CPC or Section 13-A of the Act, not substantively modified.
- Grant of benefits under the Amendment Act constitutes an independent exercise of power for which the court lacks statutory authority.
Respondent/Claimants (assisted by amicus curiae Shri G.K. Bansal)
- By virtue of Section 53 of the Act, the Code of Civil Procedure applies to reference proceedings; therefore, the court may invoke its inherent powers under Section 151 CPC to award the newly introduced statutory benefits.
- The grant of such benefits meets the ends of justice and prevents multiplicity of proceedings.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court observed that upon a reference under Section 18, the civil court’s competence is confined to determining compensation in accordance with Section 23(1). Sections 23(1-A) and (2) and Section 28 provide for amounts in addition to the market value, but these components are outside the scope of the original decree if not determined at that stage.
Once the award is pronounced, it is deemed a decree under Section 26(2). The court thereafter may rectify only clerical or arithmetical errors (Section 152 CPC or Section 13-A of the Act). Invoking inherent powers under Section 151 CPC is impermissible because an express statutory scheme governs the field and implicitly excludes such resort.
Consequently, the Civil Judge lacked jurisdiction ab initio to entertain the application for additional benefits, rendering the order void. The High Court, having dismissed the State’s appeal summarily, failed to consider this jurisdictional infirmity.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; orders of the High Court and Civil Judge set aside; application for additional benefits dismissed.
Immediate Effect: The claimants are not entitled to the additional amount, 30% solatium, or enhanced interest awarded by the reference court post-decree. Each party bears its own costs.
Broader Implications: The decision affirms that civil courts cannot, after passing a decree under Section 26(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, reopen the matter to grant benefits introduced by the 1984 Amendment Act unless empowered by a specific statutory provision. The ruling underscores strict adherence to the statutory confines of jurisdiction and limits the use of inherent powers under Section 151 CPC in land acquisition proceedings.
Order
1. Since the respondent had not been represented, we requested learned Advocate Shri G.K Bansal, to assist the Court which he accepted and has given good assistance for which we express our gratitude to him.
2. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in First Appeal No. 169 of 1987, dated 24-4-1987. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the Act”) was published on 13-8-1979 in the State Gazette acquiring the land for percolation tank in Village Kasampura. The Land Acquisition Officer by his award dated 17-12-1981 awarded the compensation. At the instance of the claimants, on reference under Section 18 of the Act, the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Jalgaon in his award and decree dated 25-10-1983, enhanced the compensation. It would appear that no appeal was preferred. After the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984 had come into force on 24-9-1984, the claimants made an application to the reference court for awarding the enhanced solatium, additional compensation and interest under the Amendment Act. The Civil Judge by his order dated 31-3-1986 allowed the application and awarded as under:
“(i) All the petitioners are entitled to the additional amount of compensation as calculated at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of notification or the date of dispossession, whichever is earlier to the date of the award on the entire market value, i.e, the market value as assessed by the Special LAO and increased by this Court in their respective cases.
(ii) The petitioners are also entitled to the solatium at the rate of 30 per cent on the entire market value.
(iii) The petitioners are also entitled to the interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of notification under Section 4 of the LA Act or the date of dispossession, whichever is earlier, till the expiry of one year from that date and thereafter till the date of payment of 15 per cent per annum on the amount of compensation i.e the total market value plus components, plus solatium at 30 per cent for their respective cases.
(iv) Whatever has already been paid on account of market value, solatium, interest shall be deducted from their respective claims.”
Dissatisfied therewith, the State carried the matter in appeal and the High Court summarily dismissed the appeal. Thus this appeal by special leave.
3. The only question that arises for consideration is whether the civil court has power and jurisdiction to award the benefits of the Amendment Act 68 of 1984. Shri Bhasme, the learned counsel for the State contended that the civil court gets jurisdiction to determine compensation under Section 23(1) of the Act only on reference. On its making the award enhancing the compensation under sub-section (1) of Section 23, it would be a decree under Section 26(2). The Court thereafter has no power to amend the decree except in accordance with law. This is not either a clerical or arithmetical mistake for correction under Section 152 of CPC or under Section 13-A of the Act, but is an independent exercise of power. Unless the court is empowered to do so by law, the civil court is devoid of jurisdiction to give the benefits under the Amendment Act.
4. Shri G.K Bansal, learned counsel, on the other hand, contended that since the CPC is made applicable to the proceedings of reference under Section 18, by operation of Section 53 of the Act, the civil court gets inherent power under Section 151 CPC to grant the benefits and that, therefore, the court can pass a fresh order giving the benefits under the Amendment Act.
5. We find no force in the contention of Shri Bansal. On receipt of reference under Section 18, the procedure prescribed under Sections 19 and 20 of the Act is required to be followed and the civil court determines the compensation in the manner indicated under sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act which envisages that in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for the land acquired under this Act, the court shall take into consideration clauses first to sixthly mentioned thereunder, while determining the compensation. Sub-section (1-A) of Section 23, which was brought by the Amendment Act, and sub-section (2) of Section 23 provide that:
“(1-A) In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier.
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(2) In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award a sum of thirty per centum on such market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition.”
Section 28 envisages that:
“28. Collector may be directed to pay interest on excess compensation.— If the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as compensation is in excess of the sum which the Collector did award as compensation, the award of the Court may direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of nine per centum per annum from the date on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into Court:
Provided that the award of the Court may also direct that where such excess or any part thereof is paid into Court after the date of expiry of a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of such excess or part thereof which has not been paid into Court before the date of such expiry.”
6. It would thus be seen that the additional amounts envisaged under sub-sections (1-A) and (2) of Section 23 are not part of the component of the compensation awarded under sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act. They are only in addition to the market value of the land. The payment of interest also is only consequential to the enhancement of the compensation. In a case where the court has not enhanced the compensation on reference, the court is devoid of power to award any interest for one year from the date of taking possession at 9 per cent and 15 per cent thereafter till date of payment into the court as envisaged under the proviso.
7. Section 26 of the Act envisages that:
“(1) Every award under this Part shall be in writing signed by the Judge, and shall specify the amount awarded under clause first of sub-section (1) of Section 23, and also the amounts (if any) respectively awarded under each of the other clauses of the same sub-section, together with the grounds of awarding each of the said amounts.
(2) Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of Section 2, clause (2), and Section 2, clause (9), respectively, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908).”
8. Thus, it would be seen that a decree having been made under Section 26(2), the civil court is left to correct only either clerical or arithmetical mistakes as envisaged expressly under Section 13-A of the Act or under Section 152 CPC. Though Section 151 CPC gives inherent power to the Court, it is intended only to prevent abuse of the process of the court or to meet the ends of justice. The present is not a case of such nature. Further, since Section 23 is an express power under which the civil court has been conferred with the jurisdiction to determine compensation, and in addition to the market value certain percentage of the amount is directed to be awarded as envisaged under Sections 23(1-A) and 23(2) and the interest component under Section 28, the invocation of Section 151 CPC by necessary implication stands excluded.
9. Thus, we hold that the civil court has inherent lack of jurisdiction and it was devoid of power to entertain the application to award additional benefits under the Amendment Act. The order thereby is clearly a void order. The High Court has not applied its mind to this crucial consideration but summarily dismissed the appeal.
10. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The order of the High Court and that of the civil court are set aside and the petition stands dismissed. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.
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