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Devku Bhikha v. State Of Gujarat .
Factual and Procedural Background
Ramniklal, a middle-aged headmaster, was waiting at the Lathi bus-stand for transport to his school in Akala. The appellant, Devku Bhikha—an unemployed young man seeking work under the headmaster—arrived and conversed with him. During their interaction the deceased allegedly asked Devku to send his wife to the deceased’s house at night and taunted him as “impotent” when he appeared shocked. Claiming that the wife had written him an inviting letter, the deceased produced a bag containing a knife. Enraged, the appellant snatched the bag, failed to find the alleged letter, and in a fit of anger stabbed the deceased five or six times in public view before fleeing.
At the dispensary, the dying Ramniklal made two statements—first to police officers and later to an Executive Magistrate—naming the appellant but omitting the motive. All eyewitnesses called by the prosecution turned hostile. Based primarily on the two dying declarations, the trial court convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The High Court affirmed the conviction. On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the matter, after which the appellant’s wife was examined as a court witness; she corroborated claims that the deceased had made repeated sexual advances toward her. The matter returned to the Supreme Court for final adjudication in this opinion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellant’s conviction for murder under Section 302 IPC could stand when the only prosecution evidence comprised two dying declarations and all eyewitnesses had turned hostile.
- Whether the appellant’s own admission of stabbing the deceased, coupled with his claim of grave and sudden provocation, reduced the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I IPC.
Arguments of the Parties
Prosecution’s Arguments
- Relied exclusively on the two dying declarations in which the deceased identified the appellant as his assailant.
- Contended that the multiple knife wounds demonstrated intention to kill, justifying a Section 302 conviction.
Defence’s Arguments
- Admitted inflicting injuries but asserted grave and sudden provocation: the deceased, a high-caste superior, repeatedly insulted the appellant’s masculinity and solicited his wife for immoral purposes.
- Highlighted that all eyewitnesses had retracted their earlier statements, leaving only self-serving dying declarations.
- Emphasised settled law that an accused’s confession must be considered in its entirety, including exculpatory portions indicating provocation.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court noted that the prosecution case hinged solely upon two dying declarations; every other witness had retracted. The appellant’s statement under Section 313 CrPC and his sworn testimony admitted the act but placed it in the context of immediate, grave provocation. Reiterating the principle that an accused’s confession must be taken as a whole—inculpatory and exculpatory parts together—the Court found the defence version plausible and consistent with the newly recorded testimony of the appellant’s wife.
The Court stressed that the insults and lewd demand issued by the deceased exploited the appellant’s dependence on him for employment and occurred moments before the stabbing. These circumstances, coupled with the absence of pre-planning, demonstrated loss of self-control triggered by grave and sudden provocation. Consequently, the Court held that the essential ingredients of murder under Section 302 IPC—particularly the intention to cause death—were not established beyond reasonable doubt. Instead, the facts satisfied Section 304 Part I IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder where intention is provoked on the spot).
Holding and Implications
The conviction under Section 302 IPC is set aside and converted to a conviction under Section 304 Part I IPC, with a sentence of seven years’ rigorous imprisonment.
The appeal is therefore partially allowed. Because the appellant appears to have already served the seven-year term, he would be released unless additional lawful detention applies. The decision chiefly affects the parties in this case and does not create new precedent, but it reinforces the established principle that grave and sudden provocation can downgrade a murder charge to culpable homicide under Section 304 Part I.
Order
1. This is a case of peculiar angularities. The deceased Ramniklal was a middle-aged school Headmaster working at a village known as Akala. In order to go to his place of work he was waiting on the day of occurrence at bus-stand Lathi whereat the appellant herein, Devku Bhikha, a young man, came. They engaged in talks. Apparently, there was a topic and background to the talk. The appellant was unemployed for long and the Headmaster had a job up sleeve which he could give to the appellant. The deceased enquired of the appellant whether he would be able to send his wife to the former's house at night. On that suggestion the accused was taken aback. Then the deceased charged the appellant for being impotent. This further enraged the appellant. The deceased then told the appellant that his wife had sent the former a letter inviting him and that that letter he carried in his handbag. The accused in a rage snatched the bag and frantically searched for the letter, but to no avail. He then took out a knife found in the bag and with that he inflicted five/six blows on the deceased in quick succession in the presence of some witnesses, whereafter he went away. The deceased in an injured condition was removed by those people to the dispensary whereat firstly, the police questioned him about the occurrence. The deceased named the appellant as his culprit, but did not tell the reason for the assault even though asked. He then said that he would tell about the cause of the dispute afterwards. Sometime later, in the hospital the deceased was questioned by an Executive Magistrate before whom he reiterated that the appellant was the culprit of the crime committed on him because he had taken interest in reprimanding the appellant for maltreating his wife and likewise his family members. This, in a nutshell, is the story interwoven between the versions of the prosecution and that of the defence.
2. But for the aforementioned two dying declarations, there is no other stock with the prosecution. All the eyewitnesses and other material witnesses examined by the prosecution turned hostile. They only said that they had seen the deceased lying injured at the bus-stand Lathi. The two dying declarations being the only pieces of prosecution evidence were thus put to the appellant during trial. In his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC, the appellant owned inflicting injuries to the deceased but gave a counter-version the weave and fabric of which we have set out earlier. He stepped into the witness box and owned having caused the injuries to the deceased, but explained the cause as grave and sudden provocation which led him to it. The trial court rejecting the plea convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The High Court on appeal confirmed the conviction and sentence. In appeal to this Court, a remand was effected, for it was thought that a serious case like the present one had not been dealt with properly by the High Court. On remand then, an application was made by the defence for summoning the wife of the appellant as a court witness. The prayer was granted and so Y. Triveni was examined as a court witness. Besides supporting the case of the appellant, she also stated that the deceased had made amorous suggestions to her repeatedly for two or three times prior to the occurrence suggesting to her to live with him as his mistress or concubine.
3. It is settled law that the confession of the accused has to be taken as a whole and the exculpatory part cannot be thrown aside. As said before, the case of the prosecution lies solely on the two dying declarations of the deceased. The appellant instead of projecting a plain denial has on the other hand strengthened those dying declarations by his statement in admitting that he was responsible for the death of the deceased. Yet, his owning the commission of the crime does not lead to the conclusion that he was guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. In his statement as his own defence witness he has narrated the sequence of events by which he was provoked by the deceased. It stands out prominently that the deceased was a member of a high caste and the appellant of a low caste. Unfortunately the appellant was subjected to repeated insults at the end of which, when his tolerance broke down, he made use of the knife and inflicted repeated injuries on the deceased who had unabashedly and lecherously asked the appellant to make available his wife to him for immoral purpose. This part of the statement of the appellant cannot be doubted. It is also in evidence that there was a job available in the school of the deceased Headmaster and that the appellant wanted to apply for the same to the Headmaster. This may have provided enough opportunity to the deceased to exploit the situation, as the appellant was unemployed in those days when the occurrence took place. Thus, from this analysis it becomes abundantly clear that the appellant was driven to the crime which was not premeditated and the occasion had sprung up at the moment, gradually leading to the point when the appellant lost his self-control, and due to grave and sudden provocation, inflicted the injuries on the deceased, successively within seconds. We think, therefore, that the offence made out against the appellant is under Section 304 Part I IPC. Accordingly, the offence is scaled down from one punishable under Section 302 IPC to one under Section 304 Part I IPC for which we impose sentence of seven years' RI on the appellant. Apparently it seems that the appellant has already undergone that sentence. Should there be any difference and he has to be taken back in jail then the law will have its own course. The appeal is, thus, partially allowed with the above result.
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