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Mangoo v. State Of M.P

Supreme Court Of India
Jan 17, 1995
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

Mangoo (Accused 1) and Hanumant Singh (Accused 3) were tried alongside two others for offences under Sections 302 and 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code in connection with the murder of Pooran Lal on 19 August 1969 in Village Maharajpur. The prosecution case relied almost entirely on the testimony of the deceased’s 16-year-old son, Dev Dutta (PW 2), who stated that all four accused surrounded his father on their way home from a betel-leaf plantation. According to PW 2, the accused restrained the victim, and Accused 3 used a pharsa first with its blunt side and then with its sharp side to sever both of the victim’s hands, causing instantaneous death.

The trial court acquitted all four accused, finding PW 2’s evidence unreliable due to alleged medical contradictions, possible tutoring, and discrepancies. On the State’s appeal, the High Court re-evaluated PW 2’s testimony, declared the trial court’s reasoning unsound, and convicted all four accused. Accused 4 died, and Accused 2 did not appeal. Mangoo and Hanumant Singh filed the present appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 2(a) of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court erred in relying on the sole eyewitness testimony of PW 2, despite the trial court’s findings of unreliability, to convict the appellants under Section 302 IPC.
  2. Whether the alleged discrepancies between PW 2’s account and the medical evidence, and the possibility of tutoring, rendered his testimony insufficient for sustaining the convictions.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • PW 2’s description of Accused 3 first striking with the blunt side of a pharsa conflicted with medical findings that showed no blunt-force injuries.
  • The witness admitted hiding during part of the attack, indicating he did not see the entire occurrence.
  • Being a child witness who spent approximately 12 days at district headquarters before testifying, PW 2 was susceptible to police tutoring.
  • Given these factors and the trial court’s detailed reasons for rejecting PW 2’s evidence, the High Court should not have treated his testimony as wholly reliable.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court conducted an independent appraisal of PW 2’s testimony and the surrounding circumstances.

  • Ext. P-1, the first information report lodged within half an hour of the occurrence, contained detailed facts that could only have come from an eyewitness; this strongly corroborated PW 2’s presence at the scene.
  • The minor inconsistencies regarding the number of blows and the portion of the pharsa used were deemed immaterial and did not undermine PW 2’s overall credibility.
  • The Court found no indicators of tutoring: PW 2’s narrative was natural, internally coherent, and promptly communicated to PW 1.
  • The medical evidence was not considered in “entire conflict” with the ocular testimony, as the decisive injuries (severed arms) aligned with PW 2’s account.
  • The trial court’s reasons for acquittal were characterised as “wholly unsound,” and the High Court’s appreciation of evidence was affirmed.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed; convictions upheld.

The Supreme Court’s dismissal maintains the High Court’s conviction of Mangoo and Hanumant Singh for murder under Section 302 IPC. The decision directly affects only the parties by affirming their sentences and sets no new legal precedent beyond reinforcing that minor discrepancies do not necessarily vitiate the testimony of a single credible eyewitness.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an appeal under Section 2(a) of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970. Mangoo, original Accused 1 and Hanumant Singh, original Accused 3 are the appellants. They along with two others Baldeo Singh (A-2) and Sardar Singh alias Daulatawala (A-4) were tried for offences under Sections 302 and 302 read with Section 34 IPC.

2. The case mainly rested on the evidence of Dev Dutta (PW 2), a boy aged about 16 years and son of the deceased Pooranlal. The trial court acquitted all the four accused holding that the evidence of the sole witness, namely, PW 2 was not wholly reliable. The learned trial Judge discarded his evidence on the ground that the medical evidence is in conflict and that there is possibility of the witness having been tutored and that there are certain discrepancies in material particulars in his evidence.

3. The State preferred an appeal and the High Court having examined PW 2's evidence in the light of surrounding circumstances carefully considered all the reasons given by the trial court and held that the reasoning given by the trial court is wholly unsound and allowed the appeal convicting all the four accused. It is stated that A-4 died and that A-2 did not prefer any appeal. Hence, the present appeal by A-1 and A-3.

4. The accused, the material witnesses and the deceased Pooranlal belong to Village Maharajpur. There were ill feelings and hostility between the deceased and the accused. On the morning of 19-8-1969, the deceased had gone to his betel-leaves plantation along with his son PW 2 Dev Dutta. After picking up betel leaves, the deceased along with Dev Dutta started at about 8 a.m On his way back it is alleged that the deceased was surrounded by the four accused persons. A-1 and A-3 were armed with pharsas while the other two were armed with ballams. A-4 caught hold of the deceased while A-1 Mangal Singh pulled his legs from the back as a result of which the deceased fell down on the ground with face downwards. Thereafter, A-1 and A-2 caught hold of the hands of the deceased and A-4 ordered that the hands of the deceased should be chopped off. Thereafter, A-3 inflicted three blows upon the back of the deceased with pharsa first with the blunt side and later chopped off both the hands of the deceased.

5. PW 2 after having witnessed the occurrence, left the place crying aloud. On the way, he came across PW 1 to whom he narrated the incident. PW 1 went to the police station which is about half a mile away and lodged Ext. P-1 at about 8.30 a.m ASI, PW 14, reached the spot, held the inquest on the dead body and sent the same for post-mortem. The doctor, PW 13, who conducted the post-mortem found six injuries. The sixth injury was a superficial scratch on the right iliac region on the back. Other injuries were all incised injuries, Injuries 2 and 3 were described as amputation of the left and right upper arms. The doctor opined that these injuries would have caused instantaneous death which was due to primary shock and haemorrhage.

6. The accused were arrested and after completion of the investigation the charge-sheet was laid. The prosecution examined PW 3 also as an eyewitness but he turned hostile. Therefore, the case rested entirely on the evidence of PW 2.

7. The learned counsel for the appellants submits that if PW 2 has really seen the occurrence, he would not have given such a discrepant version with regard to the blows given by A-3 and as regards which portion of the weapon was used in inflicting such blows. PW 2 no doubt in his deposition stated that A-3 first inflicted blows with pharsa on the back of the deceased with its blunt side and then inflicted a blow with the sharp side on his father's arm. Having seen this, he entered into Bareja and hid himself and heard the cries. Commenting on this, it is said that the medical evidence does not show any injury having been caused by the blunt side of the pharsa and at any rate PW 2 on his own admission would not have seen the entire occurrence and in such a situation the evidence of the sole witness ought not to have been relied upon by the High Court particularly in the view that the trial court rejected the same by giving good reasons.

8. We have carefully gone through the evidence of PW 2. He has deposed that after having seen such a ghastly occurrence, he ran crying and on the way he met PW 1 to whom he narrated the woeful tale. From the record we find that PW 1 has given Ext. P-1 within half an hour. In Ext. P-1 it is mentioned that PW 1 met PW 2, son of the deceased, who was weeping bitterly and informed him that the four accused had assaulted his father with pharsa and ballam and had severed both the hands. PW 1 on the basis of this information, gave Ext. P-1. This is how the law has been set into motion. Unless PW 2 was an eyewitness, these details could not have found place in Ext. P-1. Therefore, we have to accept that PW 2 was present and witnessed the occurrence. If that is so, these discrepancies pointed out by the learned counsel regarding the number of blows inflicted and which side of the pharsa was used in the first instance, are not at all material and at any rate they do not affect his veracity. Viewed from this angle, we would not agree that the medical evidence is in entire conflict with the ocular version of PW 2.

9. The learned counsel also pointed out that PW 2 being a child witness, there was every scope of tutoring and the fact that he has admitted that he was in the district headquarters for about 12 days before adducing the evidence, also shows that he must have been with the police for the purpose of tutoring. The mere fact that he might have been taken by the police to be produced as a witness, is not a ground to come to the conclusion that the witness must have been tutored but on examining the evidence and from the contents, we have to see whether there are any traces of tutoring. We find that the version given by PW 2 appears to be quite natural and there is a ring of truth in the same. The evidence of PW 1 further corroborates the evidence of PW 2, namely, to the extent that immediately after the occurrence PW 2 mentioned the names of the accused and the manner in which his father had been done to death.

10. We have also gone through the judgment of the trial court and we entirely agree with the High Court that the reasons given by the trial court for acquitting the accused are wholly unsound. For all these reasons, we find no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed accordingly.