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Brighu Nath Sahay Singh And Others v. Md. Khalilur Rahman And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants asserted ownership and possession over 4 bighas, 15 kathas and 10 dhurs of land forming part of old Tauzi No. 1298 (new Tauzi No. 8655) in Saraunja Village, District Begusarai, Bihar. The trial court decreed their suit for possession, and the first appellate court affirmed the decree. In second appeal, however, the Patna High Court reversed the findings on 7 November 1983, holding that after the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 came into force on 25 September 1950, the appellants’ title had been extinguished. Aggrieved, the appellants obtained special leave, resulting in the present Supreme Court appeal. During the hearing, the State placed on record a Gazette notification dated 26 January 1955 showing that the disputed land had vested in the State under Section 4 of the Act.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in view of the vesting of estates under Section 4 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, the appellants retained any title or right to recover possession of the disputed land from the respondents.
- Whether the appellants were in “khas possession” within the meaning of Sections 2(k) and 6 of the Act so as to be entitled to retain the land as raiyats after vesting.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- Claimed proprietary title to the land and asserted prior possession.
- Contended that the respondents had no right to remain in possession.
Respondents’/State’s Arguments
- Produced a State Government notification (published on 26 January 1955) showing that the land had vested in the State under Section 4 of the Act, thereby extinguishing the appellants’ interest.
- Relied on findings of the subordinate courts that the respondents were in self-cultivation (khas possession) of the land.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Labanya Bala Devi v. State of Bihar, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 725 | Effect of Section 4 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act: on vesting, all estates and intermediary interests (other than those saved by Section 6) vest absolutely in the State free from encumbrances. | Used to confirm that, upon vesting, an intermediary retains an interest only if he was in khas possession as defined in Section 2(k); otherwise, all rights cease. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined Sections 4, 6, and 2(k) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. Section 4 causes automatic vesting of estates in the State from the notified date, while Section 6 allows an intermediary to retain land only if, on that date, it was in his “khas possession,” meaning actual cultivation by himself, his servants, or hired labour. The Gazette notification established that the land vested on 26 January 1955. The lower courts’ concurrent findings that the respondents were in self-cultivation meant the appellants were not in khas possession. Consequently, any proprietary interest of the appellants ceased on the vesting date. As their right and title were extinguished, they could not succeed in an action for possession against the respondents.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed. No order as to costs.
Direct Effect: The appellants lose all claim to the disputed land; the property stands vested in the State, subject to whatever rights, if any, may be determined in favour of the respondents by the Government. The decision applies settled principles of the Bihar Land Reforms Act and does not create new precedent beyond reaffirming the effect of statutory vesting.
Order
1. Substitution allowed.
2. Leave granted.
3. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment and decree dated 7-11-1983 of the Patna High Court made in AAD No. 132 of 1973. The appellants claimed themselves to be the proprietors of the land of 4 bighas, 15 kathas and 10 dhurs of an old Tauzi No. 1298 (New Tauzi No. 8655) situate in Saraunja Village in District Begusarai in Bihar. Their plea was that they had title to and were in possession of the said land and that the respondents have no right to the possession of the said land. The trial court decreed the suit for possession holding that they had the title. On appeal, it was confirmed but in the second appeal, the High Court reversed the same holding that after the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (for short “the Act”) had come into force on 25-9-1950, the appellants had no title to the property and, consequently, they cannot recover possession from the respondents. Thus, this appeal by special leave.
4. Pursuant to the notice issued by this Court on 8-12-1994, Shri B.B Singh, learned counsel for the State, has placed before us the notification issued by the State Government acquiring the lands in question by publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Act in the Gazette. Consequently, it is clear that the lands in question have been vested in the State free from all encumbrances but subject to the provision of the Act from the date of the notification, viz., 26-1-1955.
5. The question thus arises whether the appellants can claim title to the property and recover possession thereof from the contesting respondents. The effect of the vesting under the Act was considered by this Court in Labanya Bala Devi v. State of Bihar Patna Secretariat 1994 Supp (3) SCC 725. It was held that by operation of Section 4 such estates or tenures including the interests of the proprietor in such an estate or tenure and his interests in trees, forests, fisheries etc. and all other sairati interests as also his interest in all subsoil, rights including any rights in mines and minerals etc. other than the interests of the raiyats or under-raiyats shall with effect from the date of vesting, vest absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances and such proprietor or tenure-holder shall cease to have any interest in such estate or tenure other than the interests expressly saved by or under the provisions of Section 6 of the Act which provides that “on and from the date of vesting, all lands used for agriculture or horticulture purposes which were in khas possession of an intermediary on the date of such vesting, including land used for agriculture and held in direct possession of a temporary lessee of an estate or tenure and cultivated by himself with his own stock or by his own servants or by hired labour or with hired stock … shall, subject to the provisions of Sections 7-A and 7-B be deemed to be settled by the State with such intermediary and he shall be entitled to retain possession thereof and hold them as raiyat under the State having occupancy rights in respect of such lands subject to the payment of such fair and equitable rent as may be determined by the Collector in the prescribed manner”.
6. Khas possession has been defined under Section 2(k) of the Act which reads as under:
“ ‘2. (k) khas possession’ with reference to the possession of a proprietor or tenure-holder of any land used for agricultural or horticultural purposes means the possession of such proprietor or tenure-holder by cultivating such lands or carrying on horticultural operations thereon himself with his own stock or by his own servants or by hired labour or with hired stock.”
7. A reading of Section 2(k) read with Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, clearly envisages that the intermediary must, as on the date of vesting, be in possession of the land used for agricultural purpose or horticulture purpose as a tenure-holder by cultivating such land or carrying on horticulture operations thereon by himself with his own stock or by his own servants or by hired labour or with hired stock.
8. In view of the findings recorded by the courts below that the respondents have been in self-cultivation of the land, the appellants cannot claim any rights as they were not in khas possession of the lands vested in the State under Section 4 of the Act. Therefore, the appellants cannot claim to be in khas possession of the lands in question. As a consequence, they cannot claim any rights in the land. The rights of the appellants, if any, on the date of the vesting, i.e, 26-1-1955, shall cease in them and shall stand vested in the State free from all encumbrances subject to the rights, if any, held by the contesting respondents that would be decided by the Government in an appropriate form.
9. The appeal is accordingly dismissed but without costs.
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