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Lokraj And Others v. Kishan Lal And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent (plaintiff) instituted O.S. No. 59 of 1968 before the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, seeking partition and a 1/6th share in several properties described in the plaint’s “B” Schedule. That schedule comprised eight items. Item 5 (20 acres 21 gunthas in Attapur Village) had already been acquired by the Government for establishment of a zoo, and compensation had been fixed in O.P. No. 35 of 1963. The remaining seven items were found by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh to be inam lands.
In C.R.P. No. 1215 of 1977 the High Court’s Division Bench held that the suit for partition was maintainable. The present appeal, brought to the Supreme Court by special leave, challenges that finding, contending that the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 (as amended in 1967) divested all pre-existing proprietary interests and ousted the civil court’s jurisdiction over partition of the abolished inam estate.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, after the abolition of inam estates under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955, a civil suit for partition of such lands is maintainable.
- Whether any surviving dispute concerning compensation for Item 5, already acquired by the State, can still be adjudicated by the civil court.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- Section 3 of the Abolition Act vests all inam lands in the State, thereby extinguishing the pre-existing proprietary rights of inamdars and any incidental right to seek partition.
- The Act constitutes a complete code: rights must be worked out exclusively before the statutory authorities created under Sections 4–10, subject to the appellate mechanism in Sections 23–24.
- Reliance was placed on Supreme Court precedents (e.g., Bhubaneshwar Prasad Narain Singh, Shivashankar Prasad Shah, Maddada Chayanna) holding that civil courts lack jurisdiction over partition once an estate is statutorily abolished.
Respondent’s Arguments
- Invoking Kalgonda Babgonda Patil and Shivappa Tammannappa Karaban, counsel contended that abolition of the estate does not necessarily destroy the co-parcenary right to claim partition, particularly where re-grants are contemplated.
- Reliance was also placed on the High Court precedent in Govind Reddy v. Lakshminarayan Reddy to argue that a civil suit remained competent.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bhubaneshwar Prasad Narain Singh v. Sidheswar Mukherjee (1971) 1 SCC 556 | Partition decrees abate after statutory vesting of estates; rights thereafter governed exclusively by the statute. | Relied upon to show that the respondent’s suit could not continue after abolition of the inam. |
| Shivashankar Prasad Shah v. Baikunth Nath Singh (1969) 1 SCC 718 | Post-abolition rights must be worked out under the relevant Reforms Act, not in a civil suit. | Cited to affirm that the Act ousts civil-court jurisdiction over pre-existing proprietary claims. |
| Maddada Chayanna v. Karnam Narayana (1979) 3 SCC 42 | Civil courts cannot adjudicate pre-existing rights once an estate is abolished and vested in the State. | Strengthened the conclusion that the respondent’s suit is barred. |
| Oduru Chenchulakshmamma v. Duvvuru Subrahmanya Reddy (1980) 3 SCC 130 | Similar bar on civil jurisdiction post-abolition; parties must seek remedies within the statutory scheme. | Further support for dismissal of the partition claim. |
| Sheethal Singh v. Mahmood Shariff (1984) 1 Andh WR 406 | Single Judge of A.P. High Court held partition suits not maintainable after abolition. | Approved; Division Bench’s contrary view was found erroneous. |
| Govind Reddy v. Lakshminarayan Reddy (1959) 1 Andh WR | Held partition suit maintainable under a different statute (Aliyat Act) where ultimate jurisdiction lay with civil courts. | Distinguished as inapplicable because the Abolition Act provides a different statutory framework. |
| Kalgonda Babgonda Patil v. Balgonda Kalgonda Patil 1989 Supp (1) SCC 246 | After watan abolition and re-grant, property became joint-family property capable of partition. | Distinguished; here no re-grant had occurred, so the ratio offered no assistance to the respondent. |
| Shivappa Tammannappa Karaban v. Parasappa Hanammappa Kuraban 1995 Supp (1) SCC 162 | Similar to Kalgonda; re-grant restores right to partition. | Also distinguished on the ground that no re-grant existed in the present case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court began with the admitted fact that the suit properties (excluding Item 5) were inam lands. Section 3(1) of the Abolition Act unequivocally abolished all inams and vested them in the State “notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order.” Because the Act simultaneously created new rights (Sections 4–9) and a dedicated adjudicatory mechanism (Sections 10, 23–24), it constituted a “complete code” for determining entitlements post-abolition.
On abolition, the original proprietary title of the inamdar and any derivative right—such as a co-sharer’s right to partition—stood extinguished until a statutory re-grant, if any, occurred. In the absence of such re-grant, the civil court had no jurisdiction to grant a partition decree. The Court derived this conclusion from its own prior decisions dealing with analogous abolition statutes, emphasising that civil proceedings abate or become infructuous once the estate vests in the State.
The Division Bench’s reliance on Govind Reddy was held misplaced because that case arose under a different legislative scheme that expressly preserved civil-court jurisdiction. Likewise, the respondent’s reliance on the Kalgonda and Shivappa decisions was rejected: those cases turned on re-grants already made, whereas no re-grant had been pleaded or proved here.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed. The partition suit is dismissed for all items of the “B” Schedule except Item 5. As regards Item 5—which had been acquired and compensated under separate proceedings—the civil court may proceed to apportion the compensation among the parties according to their respective shares. Each party will bear its own costs.
Implications: The decision re-affirms that, upon statutory abolition and vesting of inam lands in the State, civil courts lack jurisdiction to entertain suits based on the former proprietary regime unless and until a re-grant is made. No new precedent was created, but existing Supreme Court jurisprudence on estate-abolition statutes was reinforced.
Order
1. This appeal by special leave arises from the Division Bench judgment dated 22-1-1986 made in CRP No. 1215 of 1977 of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The respondent-plaintiff laid the suit OS No. 59 of 1968 in the Court of the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad for partition of the plaint schedule properties and for 1/6th share therein. We are concerned in this appeal with the properties mentioned in ‘B’ Schedule of the plaint. It consists of 8 items, of which item 5 relates to lands bearing Survey Nos. 174, 175, 179, 192, 193 and 205 admeasuring 20 acres 21 gunthas situated in Attapur Village. The said land was acquired by the Government to establish a zoo. The compensation was determined in OP No. 35 of 1963 by the First Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. The rest of the properties are now found to be inam lands as per the finding of the High Court:
“Thus, there does not appear to be any controversy between the parties on the question whether the plaint ‘B’ Schedule properties are inam lands or not. Therefore, it becomes an admitted fact that the plaint ‘B’ schedule lands are inam lands.”
2. On those admitted facts, the Division Bench proceeded to consider whether the suit for partition is maintainable. Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 as amended in 1967 (for short, ‘the Act’), deals with the abolition and vesting of the inam lands. Section 3(1) is relevant, which reads thus:
“Abolition and vesting of inams and the consequences thereof.— (1) Notwithstanding to the contrary contained in any usage, settlement, contract, grant, sanad, order or other instrument, Act, regulation, rules or order having the force of law and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of a Civil, Revenue or Atiyat Court, and with effect from the date of vesting, all inams to which this Act is made applicable under sub-section (2) of Section 1 of this Act shall be deemed to have been abolished and shall vest in the State.”
3. Therefore, notwithstanding any contra-usage, settlement etc. enumerates Section 3(1), on and from the date of the Act the inams were abolished and inam lands stood vested in the State. Section 3 expressly saves certain properties from the vesting as enumerated in clauses (a) to (i) of sub-section (2) thereof, with which we are not presently concerned. Section 4 gives right to registration by the inamdar as occupant. As per this section, every inamdar shall, with effect from the date of vesting, be entitled to be registered as an occupant of all inam lands other than the lands enumerated in clauses (a) to (c) therein. Sections 6 to 8 deal with registration of permanent tenants as occupants, either protected tenants or non-protected tenants etc. Section 5 deals with registration of Kabiz-e-kadim tenants as occupants. Section 9 deals with vesting of certain buildings and inam lands used for non-agricultural purposes. Section 10 creates forum for determination of the entitlements in Sections 4 to 9. Section 11 saves certain rights created under the Act before the date of vesting as inamdars. Section 23 deals with constitution of special tribunals and their power to deal with the questions arose therein. Section 24 gives right of appeal against the order passed by the authorities constituted under Section 10 to determine the questions enumerated in Sections 4 to 9. Thus the Act is a complete code, abolished the inam, vested the land in the Government and conferred rights on the persons in occupation enumerated, subject to the right of appeal and the decision thereon. The Act abolished existing rights and created new rights. Created forum to determine the rights and liabilities arising therefrom. The question, therefore, is whether the civil suit for partition is maintainable, after the estate was abolished.
4. Consequent to the abolition, the pre-existing right, title and interest of the inamdar or any person having occupation of the inam lands stood divested and vested the same in the State until re-grant is made. The inamdar, thereby lost the pre-existing right, title and interest in the land. The right to partition itself also has been lost by the statutory operation unless re-grant is made. We are not concerned with the consequences that would ensue after re-grant of this appeal. Therefore, it is not necessary for us to go into the question that may arise after the re-grant.
5. In Bhubaneshwar Prasad Narain Singh v. Sidheswar Mukherjee (1971) 1 SCC 556, (1971) 3 SCR 639 this Court held that after the estate was abolished under Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, the decree for partition stood abated as the lands stood vested with all assets in the State of Bihar. This Court pointed out that the object of the Act was to cause transference to the State of the interest of the proprietors and tenure-holders in land as also of the mortgagees and lessees of such interests including interest in the lands etc. etc. Though the plaintiffs therein had a share in the lands as a ryat after the re-grant, but they had lost the right as a tenure-holder or proprietor. In Shivashankar Prasad Shah v. Baikunth Nath Singh (1969) 1 SCC 718, (1969) 3 SCR 908 this Court held that after the estate is abolished, the rights created under Section 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act has to be worked out in accordance with the provisions of the Act. In Maddada Chayanna v. Karnam Narayana (1979) 3 SCC 42 and Oduru Chenchulakshmamma v. Duvvuru Subrahmanya Reddy (1980) 3 SCC 130, (1980) 1 SCR 1006 this Court held that after the abolition of the estate and vesting of the land in the State, while the new rights were created under the Act, the civil court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the pre-existing rights. The parties have to work out the rights under the Act before the forums created thereunder.
6. In Sheethal Singh v. Mahmood Shariff (1984) 1 Andh WR 406 a Single Judge of the High Court considered the effect of the abolition and following the judgments of this Court held that the suit is not maintainable. The Division Bench overruled the judgment on the sole ground that the ratio in Govind Reddy v. Lakshminarayan Reddy (1959) 1 Andh WR (sic) was not considered, therefore, it was not good law. The Division Bench obviously overlooked the fact that under Aliyat Act the ultimate jurisdiction for deciding the question has been vested only in the civil court. Therefore, the Division Bench in Govind Reddy case (1959) 1 Andh WR (sic) had held that suit for partition was maintainable. But that ratio bears no relevance to the consequence that would ensue under the Act. The Division Bench, therefore, was not right in holding that the suit for partition is maintainable, even though inam has been abolished under the Act and the lands stood vested in the State.
7. Shri Madhava Reddy, the learned Senior Counsel, placing reliance on Kalgonda Babgonda Patil v. Balgonda Kalgonda Patil 1989 Supp (1) SCC 246, and Shivappa Tammannappa Karaban v. Parasappa Hanammappa Kuraban 1995 Supp (1) SCC 162, (1994) 4 Scale 750 contended that the right to claim partition has not been lost, though inam has been abolished. We find no force in the contention. Therein, after abolition of the watan re-grants were made in favour of watandars. In view of the pre-existing watans burdened with service of watandar as per pre-existing law, excluded the junior members of the family to claim partition, was abolished and re-grant was made to the watandar, after the re-grant the property became the joint family property. So the coparceners of the Hindu joint family were held entitled to lay the suit for partition and civil court has jurisdiction to grant decree of partition by metes and bounds pro rata. That ratio has no application to the facts of this case. When re-grant is made and in what capacity the re-grant would be made is a matter to be considered and decided in terms of the re-grant.
8. The appeal is accordingly allowed in respect of all the items except Item 5 of the ‘B’ Schedule. The suit stands dismissed. With respect to Item 5, the civil court would proceed for deciding the controversy relating to the compensation awarded by the civil court between the parties in terms of shares to which parties are entitled to. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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