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Commissioner Of Income Tax v. Pelleti Srideramma, Nellore (Smt) .

Supreme Court Of India
Oct 11, 1995
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Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent-assessee, an individual engaged in mica-mining, property letting and money-lending, made a cash gift of Rs 90,000 to her minor son, Suryanarayana Reddy, during the financial year 1956-57. The entire amount was immediately used to purchase a house at Gudur, which the assessee utilised in her own business. On 5-7-1967, while the son was still a minor, the property was sold to Tirupati Devasthanam for Rs 1,48,000, yielding a capital gain of Rs 58,000.

For Assessment Year 1966-67, the Income-tax Officer invoked Section 64(1)(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to include this capital gain in the assessee’s income. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld the inclusion, but the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal reversed that decision, relying mainly on the Supreme Court ruling in CIT v. Prem Bhai Parekh. At the Revenue’s instance the question was referred to the Andhra Pradesh High Court under Section 256; the High Court answered it in favour of the assessee. The Revenue appealed to the Supreme Court, leading to the present judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the capital gain of Rs 58,000 arising on the sale of the house purchased out of the gifted cash is includible in the assessee’s total income under Section 64(1)(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue’s Arguments

  • The High Court misapplied the ratio in Prem Bhai Parekh; that case dealt with partnership income, not capital gains from a substituted asset.
  • Sevantilal Maneklal Sheth v. CIT (1968) presents facts analogous to the present case and firmly supports inclusion of capital gains derived from gifted assets.
  • Prem Bhai Parekh has been explained and distinguished by the Supreme Court in Mohini Thapar v. CIT; read with those clarifications, the statute clearly covers the impugned capital gain.

No opposing argument was presented because the respondent’s counsel recorded instructions not to contest the appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sevantilal Maneklal Sheth v. CIT (1968) 68 ITR 503; (1968) 2 SCR 360 Capital gain on sale of assets originally transferred to spouse/minor is income arising from the transferred asset; falls within statutory clubbing provision. Treated as directly governing; Court applied its reasoning to hold that capital gain from the substituted house is includible under Section 64(1)(iv).
CIT v. Prem Bhai Parekh (1970) 1 SCC 784; 77 ITR 27 Income must have a proximate, not remote, nexus to the transferred asset to be clubbed. Distinguished. Court held that proximity relates to the nature of the income, not the time-lag; therefore the decision does not assist the assessee here.
Mohini Thapar v. CIT (1972) 4 SCC 493; 83 ITR 208 Income (dividends/interest) earned from investments made out of gifted cash is includible; distinguished Prem Bhai Parekh. Cited to reinforce that income derived from the substituted form of gifted cash is caught by the statute.
CIT v. Keshavlal Lallubhai Patel (1965) 55 ITR 637; (1965) 2 SCR 100 Section creating artificial income must receive strict construction. Referred to within Prem Bhai Parekh; mentioned in passing, not decisive in present case.
CIT v. Smt. V.J. Aleykutti (1991) 189 ITR 711 (Ker) Kerala High Court’s approval of distinction between remote and proximate nexus as explained in Prem Bhai Parekh. Noted for persuasive support of the Revenue’s interpretation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court examined the text of Section 64(1)(iv), which mandates inclusion of “all such income as arises directly or indirectly” to a minor child from assets transferred by the assessee without adequate consideration. The Court found that:

  • The gifted cash and the subsequently purchased house are merely different forms of the same asset; the sale proceeds and resulting capital gain originate from that asset.
  • Capital gain is expressly included in the statutory definition of “income” (Section 2(24)).
  • The ratio of Sevantilal Maneklal Sheth squarely covers situations where the asset changes form and is later sold, generating capital gain.
  • The High Court misinterpreted “proximate connection” in Prem Bhai Parekh as referring to time. The Supreme Court clarified that proximity concerns the causal link between the transferred asset and the income, not the lapse of years.
  • Unlike in Prem Bhai Parekh, where minors’ income emanated from business activities of a partnership, here the income arises directly from the asset purchased with the gifted funds; the nexus is therefore proximate.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; Question Answered in the Affirmative in favour of the Revenue.

Consequently, the capital gain of Rs 58,000 is to be included in the assessee’s total income for Assessment Year 1966-67 under Section 64(1)(iv). The ruling reinforces the principle that capital gains generated from assets purchased with gifted funds to a minor are clubbed with the transferor’s income, irrespective of any time-lag between gift and realisation. No broader doctrinal innovation was made beyond reaffirming existing precedent.

Show all summary ...

B.P Jeevan Reddy, J.— This appeal is preferred against the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court answering the question referred to it in the negative, i.e, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. The question referred is “whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the capital gain of Rs 58,000 was assessable in the hands of the assessee in terms of Section 64(1)(iv) of the Income Tax Act, 1961”. The assessment year concerned herein is 1966-67. Section 64(1)(iv), as it stood at the relevant time, read thus:

“64. (1) In computing the total income of any individual, there shall be included all such income as arises directly or indirectly—
(iv) subject to the provisions of clause (i) of Section 27, to a minor child, not being a married daughter of such individual, from assets transferred directly or indirectly to the minor child by such individual otherwise than for adequate consideration.”

Reference to clause (i) of Section 27 is not necessary since it has no relevance to the facts of this case.

2. The respondent-assessee is an individual. She was carrying on the business of mica-mining and was also having income from property and moneylending. During the Financial Year 1956-57, the respondent made a cash gift of Rupees ninety thousand to her minor son, Suryanarayana Reddy. This amount was immediately utilised for purchasing a house property at Gudur. The said house property was being utilised for the purpose of the assessee's business. Eight years after the purchase of the house, i.e, on 5-7-1967, the said house property was sold to Tirupati Devasthanam for a consideration of Rs 1,48,000. On the date of this sale also, Suryanarayana Reddy was a minor. The Income Tax Officer included the capital gain of Rs 58,000 in the assessee's income in terms of Section 64(1), which was objected to by the assessee. Her appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was dismissed. Her second appeal was, however, allowed by the Tribunal relying mainly upon the decision of this Court in CIT v. Prem Bhai Parekh (1970) 1 SCC 784, (1970) 77 ITR 27. Thereupon, the said question was referred for the opinion of the High Court at the instance of the Revenue. The High Court too held in favour of the assessee, again relying mainly upon the decision in Prem Bhai Parekh (1970) 1 SCC 784, (1970) 77 ITR 27.

3. Shri J. Ramamurti, learned counsel for the Revenue, submits that the High Court has misunderstood the ratio of Prem Bhai Parekh (1970) 1 SCC 784, (1970) 77 ITR 27. He submits that the ratio of the said decision has no application herein. On the contrary, the learned counsel submits, the facts of Sevantilal Maneklal Sheth v. CIT (1968) 68 ITR 503, (1968) 2 SCR 360, AIR 1968 SC 697 are quite similar to the facts of this case and that the ratio of the said decision squarely governs it and concludes the issue in favour of the Revenue. Learned counsel also pointed out that the decision in Prem Bhai Parekh (1970) 1 SCC 784, (1970) 77 ITR 27 was explained and distinguished by this Court in Mohini Thapar v. CIT (1972) 4 SCC 493, (1972) 83 ITR 208. Counsel submits that though both these decisions were brought to the notice of the High Court, it has erred in distinguishing these two decisions and in following Prem Bhai Parekh (1970) 1 SCC 784, (1970) 77 ITR 27. We are inclined to agree with Shri Ramamurthy.

4. Let us first see what does clause (iv) of Section 64(1) say. In computing the total income of an individual, it says, there shall be included all such income as arises directly or indirectly to a minor child (not being a married daughter of such individual) from assets transferred directly or indirectly to the minor child by such individual otherwise than for adequate consideration. The facts of this case squarely fall within the said rule. The respondent-assessee made a gift of Rupees ninety thousand to her minor son, Suryanarayana Reddy. The said money was utilised immediately for purchasing a house property. As a matter of fact, the said house property was also being utilised for the purpose of the assessee's business until it was sold eight years later. Even at the time of the said sale, Suryanarayana Reddy was a minor. It is true that what was gifted by the assessee to her minor son was the cash of Rupees ninety thousand but it cannot be forgotten that that money was utilised for purchasing the said house property. It was only a case of substitution of one form of property by another form of property. When the said house property was sold, a capital gain of Rupees fifty-eight thousand was made. Capital gain is undoubtedly a type of income. The definition of ‘income’ in Section 2(24) includes “capital gains”. It was, therefore, liable to be included in the income of the assessee.

5. In Sevantilal Maneklal Sheth (1968) 68 ITR 503, (1968) 2 SCR 360, AIR 1968 SC 697, the facts were the following: in the year 1951, the assessee, Maneklal, gifted 1184 ordinary and 155 preference shares of particular sugar mills to his wife, Bai Laxmibai. On the date of transfer, their total value was Rs 69,730. Subsequent to the said gift, the sugar mills converted the preference shares into ordinary shares giving eight ordinary shares for each preference share, with the result that on 31-12-1954 Bai Laxmibai held a total of 2424 ordinary shares of the said sugar mills. Out of those 2424 ordinary shares, Bai Laxmibai sold 2400 shares on 1-8-1956 for a sum of Rs 1,54,800, resulting in a capital gain of Rs 70,860, as computed under Section 12-B of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. The whole amount so realised was deposited by Bai Laxmibai in a particular firm in which her husband, Maneklal, as well as her son, Sevantilal, were partners. The said deposit earned yearly interest of Rs 9288. In the assessment of Maneklal for the Assessment Year 1957-58, the Income Tax Officer included the aforesaid capital gain of Rs 70,860 under Section 16(3)(a)(iii) of the Indian Income Tax Act [which corresponds to Section 64(1)(iv) concerned herein]. Similarly, in the assessment of Maneklal for the Assessment Years 1958-59 and 1959-60, the Income Tax Officer included the interest amount of Rs 9288 again applying the said provision. This was objected to by the assessee. The matter was ultimately carried to this Court. The following observations in the judgment are relevant:

“In our opinion, there is no logical distinction between income arising from the asset transferred to the wife and arising from the sale of the assets so transferred. The profits or gains which arise from the sale of the asset would arise or spring from the asset, although the operation by which the profits or gains is made to arise out of the asset is the operation of the sale…. There is hence no warrant for the argument that the capital gain is not income arising from the assets, but it is income, which arises from a source which is different from the asset itself…. the object of the enactment of the section is to prevent avoidance of tax or reducing the incidence of tax on the part of the assessee by transfer of his assets to his wife or minor child. It is a sound rule of interpretation that a statute should be so construed as to prevent the mischief and to advance the remedy according to the true intention of the makers of the statute.”

6. Now, let us see the facts and ratio of Prem Bhai Parekh (1970) 1 SCC 784, (1970) 77 ITR 27. The assessee was a partner in a firm having seven annas share therein. He retired from the firm on 1-7-1954. Thereafter, he gifted Rupees seventy-five thousand to each of his four sons, three of whom were minors. There was a re-constitution of the firm with effect from 2-7-1954 whereunder the major son became a partner and the three minor sons were admitted to the benefits of partnership. It is on these facts that the question arose whether the income accruing to the minors by virtue of their admission to the benefits of partnership could be included in the total income of the assessee under Section 16(3)(a)(iv). The said provision read thus at the relevant time:

“In computing the total income of any individual for the purpose of assessment, there shall be included — (a) so much of the income of a wife or minor child of such individual as arises directly or indirectly… (iv) from assets transferred directly or indirectly to the minor child, not being a married daughter, by such individual otherwise than for adequate consideration.”

The question that required to be answered by this Court was:

“Whether it can be said that the income with which we are concerned in this case arises directly or indirectly from the assets transferred by the assessee to those minors.”

The Court answered it in the negative, in the following words:

“The connection between the gifts mentioned earlier and the income in question is a remote one. The income of the minors arose as a result of their admission to the benefits of the partnership. It is true that they were admitted to the benefits of the partnership because of the contribution made by them. But there is no nexus between the transfer of the assets and the income in question. It cannot be said that that income arose directly or indirectly from the transfer of the assets referred to earlier. Section 16(3) of the Act created an artificial income. That section must receive strict construction as observed by this Court in CIT v. Keshavlal Lallubhai Patel (1965) 55 ITR 637, (1965) 2 SCR 100, AIR 1965 SC 866. In our judgment before an income can be held to come within the ambit of Section 16(3), it must be proved to have arisen — directly or indirectly — from a transfer of assets made by the assessee in favour of his wife or minor children. The connection between the transfer of assets and the income must be proximate. The income in question must arise as a result of the transfer and not in some manner connected with it.”

7. It would immediately be seen that the income that arose to the minors arose on account of their being admitted to the benefits of partnership firm and not from the assets transferred by the assessee to them. As pointed out by this Court, it is true that they were admitted to the benefits of partnership because of their contribution of the said capital but the income received by them was not directly relatable to or proportionate to the said investment. The income of the partnership arises from its business. It may be a loss or it may be extraordinary profits; it may also be a case of no profit at all. The loss or profit of the firm depends upon the nature and circumstances of the business carried on by it. It is in this connection that this Court held that the connection between the transfer of assets and the income received was a remote one and not proximate. The proximity referred to by this Court was not proximity in point of time but proximity between the transfer of assets and the income in question. This Court repeatedly pointed out that the income derived by the minors was the result of their admission to the benefits of partnership and that the connection, if any, between their investment and the income derived by them was remote and not proximate.

8. Indeed, it is in this manner that this decision was understood and distinguished in the subsequent decision of this Court in Mohini Thapar (1972) 4 SCC 493, (1972) 83 ITR 208. (It would be relevant to note that the decision in Prem Bhai Parekh (1970) 1 SCC 784, (1970) 77 ITR 27 and the decision in Mohini Thapar (1972) 4 SCC 493, (1972) 83 ITR 208 were both delivered by K.S Hegde, J.) We may note the facts in Mohini Thapar (1972) 4 SCC 493, (1972) 83 ITR 208. The assessee made certain cash gifts to his wife. From out of those cash gifts, she purchased shares and invested the balance amount in deposits. The question was whether the income derived by the assessee's wife from the deposits and shares is liable to be included in the income of the assessee-husband under Section 16(3) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. Hegde, J. observed:

“(T)he assets transferred in this case is the gift of the cash amounts made by the assessee to his wife. The transfers in question are direct transfers. But those assets, as mentioned earlier, were invested either in shares or otherwise. Hence it was urged on behalf of the Revenue that the income realised either as dividends from shares or as interest from deposits are income indirectly received in respect of the transfer of cash directly made. This contention of the Revenue appears to be sound. That position clearly emerges from the plain language of the section.”

When the learned counsel for the assessee relied upon the decision in Prem Bhai Parekh (1970) 1 SCC 784, (1970) 77 ITR 27 in support of his contention that there was no nexus between the income earned and the transfer of assets, it was repelled holding that in Prem Bhai Parekh (1970) 1 SCC 784, (1970) 77 ITR 27, “the connection between the gifts made by the assessee and the income of the minors from the firm was a remote one and that it could not be said that the income arose directly or indirectly from the assets transferred”. It was pointed out that it is for this reason, it was held in that case that the income of the minors cannot be included in the total income of the assessee. Hegde, J. then quoted the very same paragraph from Prem Bhai Parekh (1970) 1 SCC 784, (1970) 77 ITR 27 which we have quoted hereinabove and held that the said decision has no application to the facts in Mohini Thapar (1972) 4 SCC 493, (1972) 83 ITR 208.

9. Now, coming to the judgment under appeal, the main basis upon which the High Court held in favour of the assessee is the time-lag of eight years between the date of cash gift and the subsequent sale of the house property. Because of the said time-lag, it was held that there was no proximate relationship between the cash gift and the income arising from the sale of the house. In other words, the expression ‘proximate’ occurring in Prem Bhai Parekh (1970) 1 SCC 784, (1970) 77 ITR 27 was understood as proximity in point of time which, in our respectful opinion, is not a correct understanding of the ratio of the said judgment. The proximity referred to in Prem Bhai Parekh (1970) 1 SCC 784, (1970) 77 ITR 27, as already pointed out hereinabove, is the proximity between the assets transferred and the income in question. The time-lag, if any, is of no significance under Section 64(1)(iv).

10. It is brought to our notice that a Bench of the Kerala High Court in CIT v. V.J Aleykutti (1991) 189 ITR 711 (Ker) (K.S Paripoornan and Jagannadha Raju, JJ.) has distinguished the decision in Prem Bhai Parekh (1970) 1 SCC 784, (1970) 77 ITR 27 on these very lines.

11. Before parting with this case, we may mention that when this appeal came up for hearing, it was stated by Shri T.A Ramachandran, learned counsel, that the Advocate-on-Record for the respondent, Smt Janki Ramachandran, has been instructed by the client not to oppose the appeal and for that reason, she would not be participating in the hearing of the appeal. The said statement was recorded by us in the proceeding dated 29-9-1995.

12. For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the question referred under Section 256 is answered in the affirmative, i.e, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No costs.