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Nazar Singh And Others v. Jagjit Kaur And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Gurdial Singh, a resident of Bhatinda District (Punjab) owning 94 kanals 19 marlas of agricultural land, lived apart from his wife, Smt. Harmel Kaur. In maintenance proceedings under the old Criminal Procedure Code, the parties executed a compromise deed dated 3-12-1963 whereby the entire land was put in Harmel Kaur’s possession in lieu of her maintenance, subject to several restrictive covenants (no sale or mortgage, liability to pay land revenue, etc.). Gurdial Singh died on 30-7-1981.
Between 1983 and 1987, Harmel Kaur sold 70 kanals 19 marlas out of the land to the present appellants (Defendants 1-3), and mutation was effected in their favour. In January 1991, a suit for possession of a 7/8th share of the land was filed by a woman claiming to be Gurdial Singh’s second wife and their three daughters. All three courts below decreed the suit, holding that Harmel Kaur had only a life/restricted estate under Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The defendants’ second appeal was dismissed in limine by the High Court, prompting the present appeal to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the interest created in favour of Harmel Kaur under the 1963 compromise is governed by Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
- If Section 14(1) applies, whether Harmel Kaur became absolute owner of the property, validating her subsequent sales to the appellants and defeating the plaintiffs’ claim to a 7/8th share.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants (Defendants)
- Contended that the property was given to Harmel Kaur in lieu of her pre-existing right of maintenance; hence Section 14(1) applies, converting her limited estate into an absolute one.
- Relied on the principles in V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy and subsequent cases to argue that restrictive covenants in the compromise deed cannot defeat Section 14(1).
Respondents (Plaintiffs)
- Argued, relying on Gumpha v. Jaibai, that the compromise deed is an “instrument” prescribing a restricted estate, thereby attracting Section 14(2).
- Maintained that Harmel Kaur held only a life interest; upon her death, the property reverted to Gurdial Singh’s heirs, entitling the plaintiffs to a 7/8th share.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy (1977) 3 SCC 99 | Section 14(2) applies only where a woman acquires property for the first time without any pre-existing right; property received in lieu of maintenance falls under Section 14(1). | Formed the primary basis for holding that Harmel Kaur’s pre-existing right of maintenance brought the case within Section 14(1), making her absolute owner. |
| Mangat Mal v. Punni Devi (1995) 6 SCC 88 | A limited right to residence granted after 1956 converts into an absolute estate under Section 14(1). | Used illustratively to reinforce that restrictive covenants cannot override Section 14(1) when property is given in lieu of maintenance. |
| Gumpha v. Jaibai (1994) 2 SCC 511 | Property bequeathed under a will falls within Section 14(2). | Distinguished; the Court held it irrelevant because the property here was granted through a compromise, not a will. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court undertook a textual and precedential analysis of Section 14. It reiterated that:
- Section 14(1) converts any property “possessed” by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after 1956, into her absolute property when the acquisition is traceable to a pre-existing right, including a right to maintenance.
- Section 14(2) is an exception, limited to first-time acquisitions without a pre-existing right, where the instrument expressly restricts the estate.
Applying these principles, the Court found that Harmel Kaur’s right to maintenance existed independently of the compromise. The land was therefore granted to satisfy that pre-existing right. Possession under the compromise deed consequently vested absolute ownership in her under Section 14(1), despite the deed’s restrictive clauses forbidding sale or mortgage.
The reliance on Gumpha v. Jaibai by the plaintiffs was rejected because Gumpha dealt with a bequest under a will—an event squarely governed by Section 14(2)—whereas the present case involved a compromise agreement.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; Suit Dismissed. The Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings of the lower courts and upheld the validity of the sales executed by Harmel Kaur. The plaintiffs acquire no share in the disputed property; costs were not awarded to any party.
Implications: The decision reaffirms the established doctrine that property conveyed to a Hindu woman in satisfaction of her maintenance, post-1956, becomes her absolute property under Section 14(1) regardless of restrictive terms in the conveying instrument. While it breaks no new ground, the judgment fortifies the precedential wall around V. Tulasamma and clarifies that Gumpha v. Jaibai has limited application.
B.P Jeevan Reddy, J.— Leave granted. Heard counsel for the parties.
2. This appeal is preferred against the judgment and decree of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the second appeal filed by the defendants-appellants. The suit for “possession of the land (suit lands) to the extent of 7/8th share” has been decreed by the trial court and affirmed in appeal and second appeal.
3. Gurdial Singh was a resident of a village in Bhatinda District in Punjab. He owned 94 kanals and 19 marlas of land in the village. He was working as an employment officer in Madhya Pradesh. The relations between him and his wife, Smt Harmel Kaur, were strained. They were living apart. Harmel Kaur filed a petition under Section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code (old Code) for grant of maintenance. In those proceedings, a compromise was arrived at between Gurdial Singh and Harmel Kaur whereunder the suit lands (94 kanals and 19 marlas in extent) were given to Harmel Kaur in lieu of her maintenance. The compromise entered into between them is evidenced by Exh. P-3. The lands were given to Harmel Kaur subject to the following conditions:
“1. That the possession of the land in dispute was given to Harmel Kaur Defendant 4.
2. That Harmel Kaur would be entitled to get the land cultivated or to lease it out and to utilise its income for herself, wherever she likes.
3. That she would not sell or mortgage this land. She would however be responsible for the payment of land revenue or any other government tax from time to time.
4. If during the lifetime of Harmel Kaur, Gurdial Singh gets back the land from her he would pay her Rs 50 per month as maintenance.
5. If Gurdial Singh died before Harmel Kaur, then, in that case, Harmel Kaur would be entitled to get her share from the said land as a legal heir in accordance with the law.
6. The maintenance allowance of Rs 25 per month already being paid to her, shall be stopped.
7. Harmel Kaur shall also be entitled to keep her residence at V. Mehraj in the house belonging to Gurdial Singh.
8. Harmel Kaur also thumbmarked this agreement/compromise and agreed that in case the land is taken away back by Gurdial Singh, then she would get Rs 50 per month as maintenance from him.”
Exh. P-3 is dated 3-12-1963.
4. Gurdial Singh died on 30-7-1981.
5. Harmel Kaur executed four sale deeds in November 1987 and August 1983 in favour of Defendants 1 to 3 (appellants herein) whereunder she sold 70 kanals and 19 marlas of land out of the suit lands for a consideration of Rs 1,62,200. On that basis, mutation was also effected in the name of the appellants.
6. In January 1991 the present suit was filed. The first plaintiff claimed to be the wife (second wife) of Gurdial Singh while Defendants 2 to 4 claimed to be their daughters. According to the plaintiffs, the first plaintiff was married to Gurdial Singh on 21-3-1946. They claimed a 7/8th share in the suit lands (including 70 kanals and 19 marlas sold to the appellants) under and in accordance with the Hindu Succession Act. According to them, Harmel Kaur was entitled only to a 1/8th share. The defendants denied that the first plaintiff was married to Gurdial Singh or that Plaintiffs 2 to 4 are the daughters of Gurdial Singh. This issue is, however, concluded by the finding of the first appellate court to the effect that the first plaintiff was indeed married to Gurdial Singh and that Plaintiffs 2 to 4 are their daughters.
7. The courts below have decreed the suit holding that under the compromise aforementioned, only a life interest was created in Harmel Kaur and not an absolute interest. According to them (the High Court dismissed the second appeal in limine), it is sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act that applies herein and not sub-section (1). The correctness of the said view is questioned by the defendants-appellants. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 reads as follows:
“14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property.— (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.
Explanation.— In this sub-section ‘property’ includes both moveable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.”
8. According to sub-section (1), any property possessed by a female Hindu shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner irrespective of the fact whether the said property was acquired by her before the commencement of the Act or after the commencement of the Act. Explanation to sub-section (1) elaborates the meaning and content of the expression ‘property’ in sub-section (1). It includes property given in lieu of maintenance.
9. Section 14 and the respective scope and ambit of sub-sections (1) and (2) has been the subject-matter of a number of decisions of this Court, the most important of which is the decision in V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy. The principles enunciated in this decision have been reiterated in a number of decisions later but have never been departed from. According to this decision, sub-section (2) is confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property. It has also been held that where the property is acquired by a Hindu female in lieu of right of maintenance inter alia, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of sub-section (2) even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property to her prescribes a restricted estate in the property. Applying this principle, it must be held that the suit lands, which were given to Harmel Kaur by Gurdial Singh in lieu of her maintenance, were held by Harmel Kaur as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner notwithstanding the several restrictive covenants accompany-ing the grant. [Also see the recent decision of this Court in Mangat Mal v. Punni Devi (1995) 6 SCC 88 where a right to residence in a house property was held to attract sub-section (1) of Section 14 notwithstanding the fact that the grant expressly conferred only a limited estate upon her.] According to sub-section (1), where any property is given to a female Hindu in lieu of her maintenance before the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, such property becomes the absolute property of such female Hindu on the commencement of the Act provided the said property was ‘possessed’ by her. Where, however, the property is given to a female Hindu towards her maintenance after the commencement of the Act, she becomes the absolute owner thereof the moment she is placed in possession of the said property (unless, of course, she is already in possession) notwithstanding the limitations and restrictions contained in the instrument, grant or award whereunder the property is given to her. This proposition follows from the words in sub-section (1), which insofar as is relevant read: “Any property possessed by a female Hindu … after the commencement of this Act shall be held by her as full owner and not as a limited owner.” In other words, though the instrument, grant, award or deed creates a limited estate or a restricted estate, as the case may be, it stands transformed into an absolute estate provided such property is given to a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance and is placed in her possession. So far as the expression ‘possessed’ is concerned, it too has been the subject-matter of interpretation by several decisions of this Court to which it is not necessary to refer for the purpose of this case.
10. The learned counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs relied upon a recent decision of this Court in Gumpha v. Jaibai (1994) 2 SCC 511 in support of his contention that in the facts of this case, it is sub-section (2) of Section 14 and not sub-section (1) that is attracted. But that was a case where certain property was given to a Hindu female under a will. The Bench held that since will is referred to only in sub-section (2) and not in sub-section (1), it is sub-section (2) that is attracted in the case of a property bequeathed under a will. Since the suit lands were given to Harmel Kaur under a compromise — and not under a will — the principle of the said decision has no application herein.
11. For the above reasons, we hold that the said lands became the absolute property of Harmel Kaur the moment she was placed in possession thereof. (It is not disputed that the said property was indeed placed in her possession and that she was in possession and enjoyment thereof from the date of the aforesaid compromise.) Once this is so, the suit must fail. The courts below were in error in holding that because the compromise whereunder the said lands were given to Harmel Kaur towards her maintenance, created a life estate and a restricted estate, sub-section (1) of Section 14 is not attracted and that it is sub-section (2) that is attracted here.
12. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the trial court as affirmed by the first and second appellate courts are set aside and the suit is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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