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Mathevan Padmanabhan Alias Ponnan (Dead) Through Lrs. v. Parmeshwaran Thampi And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondents filed a suit before the Principal Subordinate Judge, Trivandrum, seeking possession of agricultural land on the allegation that the appellant had surrendered his tenancy rights and thereafter trespassed. The appellant denied any surrender, asserting continuous tenancy.
Because tenancy status was in dispute, the trial court invoked Section 125 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964 (“the Act”) and referred the matter to the Land Tribunal. After the suit was instituted, but before the reference, the appellant independently moved the Tribunal under Section 72-B of the Act for permission to purchase the lessor’s interest as an occupancy tenant. The Tribunal found him to be a tenant and allowed the purchase. Relying on that finding, the trial court dismissed the respondents’ suit under Section 125(6) of the Act.
On appeal, the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court (AS No. 45 of 1975, judgment dated 1-2-1984) held that the Tribunal should not have granted purchase permission while the tenancy dispute remained unresolved and further ruled that, on remand, the civil court itself could determine tenancy without making another reference to the Tribunal. The suit was remitted accordingly. Aggrieved, the appellant obtained special-leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Land Tribunal was correct in granting the appellant permission to purchase the land under Section 72-B while the very question of his tenancy was still sub judice.
- Whether the High Court erred in authorising the civil court to decide the tenancy dispute itself, notwithstanding the express bar on civil-court jurisdiction contained in Section 125(1) of the Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The application under Section 72-B was independent of the civil suit; therefore the Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide both tenancy and purchase.
- Once the Tribunal determined that the appellant was a tenant and entitled to purchase, further proceedings in the civil suit should await the outcome of the respondents’ statutory appeal against that Tribunal order.
- Section 125(1) creates an absolute bar on civil-court jurisdiction over tenancy questions; hence the High Court could not empower the trial court to decide tenancy.
- If the High Court found error in the Tribunal’s finding, the proper course would be to remit the issue back to the Tribunal, not to the civil court.
Respondents' Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents’ legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court considered two distinct aspects:
- Purchase permission during pending tenancy dispute: The Court agreed with the High Court that the Tribunal should have refrained from granting purchase permission under Section 72-B until the tenancy issue was finally resolved. Granting purchase could become meaningless if the appellant were later held not to be a tenant.
- Jurisdiction to decide tenancy: Examining Section 125(1), (3) and (6), the Court emphasised the statute’s mandatory language (“No civil court shall have jurisdiction”) and the procedural scheme obliging civil courts to stay proceedings and refer tenancy questions to the Land Tribunal. Any decision by a civil court on such matters would be a nullity. Therefore, the High Court erred in divesting the Tribunal of its exclusive jurisdiction and in directing the trial court to determine tenancy on remand.
Accordingly, while upholding the High Court’s observation that the Tribunal should await tenancy determination before granting purchase, the Supreme Court struck down the portion of the remand order that authorised the civil court to decide the tenancy dispute.
Holding and Implications
HELD: Appeal Allowed. The High Court’s direction giving the civil court power to decide tenancy is set aside. The dispute is remitted to the Land Tribunal, Trivandrum, to determine tenancy in light of the Court’s observations and to submit its finding to the civil court, which must then dispose of the suit in accordance with Section 125 of the Act. No order as to costs.
Implications: The decision reaffirms the absolute statutory bar on civil-court jurisdiction over tenancy matters under the Kerala Land Reforms Act and clarifies that civil courts cannot assume such jurisdiction even through appellate remand orders. It also underscores that applications for purchase under Section 72-B must await a conclusive determination of tenancy status.
Order
1. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in AS No. 45 of 1975, dated 1-2-1984.
2. The respondents laid the suit before the Principal Subordinate Judge, Trivandrum for possession on the ground that the appellant had surrendered his tenancy rights and, thereafter, trespassed into the land, thereby he is in illegal possession. It is the case of the appellant that he never surrendered the land and he continued to be the tenant and that therefore, the respondents are not entitled to the possession of the land. Since there was a controversy as regards the tenancy, by operation of Section 125 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964 (1 of 1964) (for short, ‘the Act’), the Civil Court referred the matter to the Land Tribunal. After the filing of the suit but, before the reference was made, the appellant filed an application under Section 72-B of the Act for permission to purchase the respondent's interest in the land as an occupancy tenant. The Tribunal held that the appellant was a tenant and consequently permission was granted to him to purchase the land. Since the reference was made, the finding was returned to the Civil Court that the appellant is the tenant. Acting upon that finding, by operation of sub-section (6) of Section 125 of the Act, the Civil Court dismissed the suit. The respondents carried the matter in appeal. While disposing of the appeal, the Division Bench held that since the dispute as to whether the appellant is a tenant, is pending adjudication, the Tribunal could not have granted permission to the appellant to purchase the land. It also held that since on reference, the Land Tribunal had recorded the finding, on tenancy, it is not necessary for the Civil Court to make further reference but, it itself can dispose of the suit by recording a finding on tenancy. Accordingly remitted the case as under:
“We have no doubt that this Court has got the power to set aside the finding of the trial court on the question of lease and send the matter back to that court for a fresh finding and there is no necessity thereafter for the trial court to make another reference to the Land Tribunal. The trial court was initially bound by the finding of the Land Tribunal and that is a statutory trust. The trial court subsequently is bound by the remand order and when the remand order directs a fresh finding, that finding has to be given by the trial court and not by the Land Tribunal. A second reference to the Land Tribunal under the circumstances is thus not contemplated under Section 125 of the Act.”
3. In the light of that finding, a direction was given that “the trial court shall dispose of the suit without any reference to the Land Tribunal and based on the evidence already on record and also any additional evidence which it may allow the parties to adduce, including the cross-examination of PW 1”. The appeal was accordingly allowed and matter was remitted to the trial court for determination of the question of tenancy raised by the appellant. Thus, this appeal by special leave.
4. It is contended by Shri G. Viswanatha Iyer, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that both the findings recorded by the High Court are clearly wrong. On the question of right of the tenant to purchase the land, it is stated that independent of the suit an application under Section 72-B was filed before the Land Tribunal and the Land Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide the question of dispute as regards the tenancy as well. He further contends that having decided that the appellant is a tenant and was entitled to purchase the land, the need to await the decision does not arise. The respondents had carried the matter in appeal against that order which is pending decision, the High Court was not justified in interfering with that order and remitting the suit to the civil court to decide that question. It is further contended that Section 125(1) of the Act creates a total embargo on the jurisdiction of the civil court to settle, decide or deal with any question or to determine any matter which is by or under the Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with or to be determined by the Land Tribunal. The High Court cannot confer jurisdiction on the civil court to decide the dispute of tenancy. The High Court being an appellate court is entitled only to consider whether the Tribunal was right in its finding or had committed any error in determining the question. When the High Court comes to the positive conclusion that any error had been crept in either on fact or in law in determining the issue, the appropriate course open to the High Court would be to direct the civil court to remit the dispute to the Tribunal for fresh determination and seek a reference in that behalf and then the civil court will have to decide the suit in accordance with the findings recorded by the Land Tribunal.
5. The first question is whether the High Court was justified in holding that the Land Tribunal would have kept the application filed under Section 72-B pending till the dispute of the tenancy is finally determined. On a conspectus of the relevant provisions, the scheme of the Act and on the facts and circumstances of the case, we consider that the High Court is right in its approach. The very dispute whether the appellant is a tenant and is entitled to purchase the property by virtue of that capacity, hinges upon the determination of the question whether he is a tenant. When that dispute is pending adjudication, the Tribunal was not right in directing the appellant to purchase the property. Ultimately, if the High Court on appeal, finds that the appellant is not a tenant, his entitlement to purchase the property also is lost. Under those circumstances, the appropriate course for the Tribunal would have been to keep the application filed under Section 72-B pending till the dispute is resolved in the court. Therefore, the High Court is right in recording a finding in this behalf.
6. The crucial question is whether, the High Court, while remitting the suit to the trial court for fresh decision, could confer jurisdiction on the trial court to decide the dispute on tenancy by itself.
7. Sub-sections (1), (3) and (6) of Section 125 of the Act are relevant which read thus:
“125. Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts.— (1) No civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question or to determine any matter which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with or to be determined by the Land Tribunal or the appellate authority or the Land Board or the Taluk Land Board or the Government or an officer of the Government.
(3) If in any suit or other proceeding any question regarding rights of a tenant or of a kudikidappukaran (including a question as to whether a person is a tenant or a kudikidappukaran) arises, the civil court shall stay the suit or other proceeding and refer such question to the Land Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the land or part thereof is situate together with relevant records for the decision of that question only.
(6) The decision of the Land Tribunal on the question referred to it shall, for the purposes of appeal, be deemed to be part of the finding of the civil court.”
Sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 125 are not material for the purpose of this case, hence omitted.
8. A reading thereof clearly indicates that if in any suit or other proceeding, any question regarding right of a tenant etc. arises, the civil court should stay the suit or other proceeding and refer such dispute to the Land Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the land or part thereof is situated together with the relevant records for the decision of that dispute in question. Sub-section (1) in that behalf creates a total bar on the jurisdiction of the civil court enjoining that the civil court “shall have no jurisdiction” to settle, decide or deal with any question or to determine any matter which is by or under the Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with or to be determined by the Land Tribunal. On receipt of the decision of the Land Tribunal referred to by the civil court for the purpose of appeal, it must be deemed that the decision of the Land Tribunal be part of the finding of the civil court. Thereby, the civil court, is enjoined to accept the finding recorded by the Tribunal and dispose of the suit in the light of the finding recorded. In case the Tribunal records the finding positively in favour of the tenant or kudikidappukaran, then the suit is required to be dismissed. But the findings recorded by the Tribunal form part of the record of the trial court. As a consequence the appellate court gets power to go into that question, the High Court itself can decide that question or remit it for fresh decision. In that view of the scheme of the Act the High Court is clearly in grave error in divesting the jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal to determine the dispute of tenancy etc. as engrafted in sub-section (1) of Section 125 of the Act and confer jurisdiction on the civil court which it inherently lacks and any decision by the civil court by itself is a nullity. The interpretation given by the High Court is in the teeth of the peremptory language used by Section 125(1) of the Act and so is clearly unsustainable. The High Court, therefore, was clearly in grave error in divesting the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and conferring the same on the civil court to settle, decide or deal with any question or determine any matter which is by or under the Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with or to be determined by the Land Tribunal.
9. The direction issued by the High Court in remand order conferring jurisdiction of the civil court is set aside. However, the observations made by the High Court in the ultimate paragraph of its remand order, extracted hereinbefore, are upheld. The dispute is remitted to the Land Tribunal, Trivandrum, which would determine the matter in the light of these observations and submit its report to the civil court for decision according to law. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. No costs.
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