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Shyam Sunder Prasad And Others v. Raj Pal Singh And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal by special leave arose from the High Court at Patna’s judgment in Second Appeal No. 262/90 dated 29-8-1993, which dismissed the second appeal in limine. The appellant-plaintiff had filed Title Suit No. 238/26 of 1962-65 seeking (i) declaration of title to and possession of Plots Nos. 1093 and 1094 as owner, and (ii) possession of Plot No. 1095 as an Ijradar. The trial court decreed the suit. On appeal, the appellate court held that although the plaintiff had title and possession at one point of time, there was no definite date of dispossession or discontinuance, and the plaintiff failed to prove possession within 12 years of the suit; the suit was therefore held barred by limitation under Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and was dismissed.
Legal Issues Presented
- In a suit for possession based on title under Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908, on whom lies the burden of proving possession and dispossession/discontinuance within 12 years of filing the suit?
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court set out the limitation framework under the old and new Limitation Acts. Under the Limitation Act, 1908, Article 142 governed suits “for possession of immovable property” where the plaintiff, while in possession, had been dispossessed or had discontinued possession; limitation ran for 12 years from the date of dispossession or discontinuance. Article 144 applied residually to suits for possession not otherwise specially provided for, with limitation running from when the defendant’s possession became adverse.
Under the Limitation Act, 1963, Article 64 applies to suits based on previous possession (not title) and runs from the date of dispossession, while Article 65 applies to suits based on title and runs from when the defendant’s possession becomes adverse. The Court explained that under the old Act, where the suit is for possession and involves the plaintiff’s dispossession or discontinuance, Article 142 applies; suits based on title alone (and not on dispossession/discontinuance) would fall under Article 144 unless covered elsewhere.
Addressing the core question—burden of proof in a title-based suit for possession—the Court held that, in view of Article 142 of the old Act, the burden rests on the plaintiff to establish: (i) title, (ii) prior possession, and (iii) dispossession or discontinuance within 12 years preceding the suit. The Court emphasized that when the suit is laid on title under Article 142, the plaintiff must prove possession within 12 years and the fact of dispossession/discontinuance within limitation; the burden does not shift to the defendant.
The Court noted that the defendant had not come to establish adverse possession by prescription, and therefore the burden did not rest on the defendant. It concluded that the appellate court correctly placed the burden on the plaintiff and found no error of law warranting interference, notwithstanding that the High Court had dismissed the second appeal in limine.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal (without costs).
The direct effect was to uphold the appellate court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit as barred by limitation under Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908 due to failure to prove dispossession/discontinuance and possession within 12 years prior to suit. The opinion does not indicate any broader implications beyond clarifying, for the case at hand, that the burden under Article 142 remains on the plaintiff and does not shift to the defendant where adverse possession is not being established by the defendant.
Order
1. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the High Court at Patna in Second Appeal No. 262/90 dated 29-8-1993 dismissing the Second Appeal in limine. The appellant-plaintiff filed Title Suit No. 238/26 of 1962-65 for declaration of title to and possession of Plots Nos. 1093 and 1094 as owner and for possession of Plot No. 1095 as Ijradar. The trial court decreed the suit, the appellate court found that though the plaintiff had title and possession at one point of time but there is no definite date of dispossession or discontinuation of the plaint-schedule property. The plaintiff had failed to prove possession of the suit land within 12 years of the suit when the possession was discontinued. It is not known as to when he came into possession. The suit was, therefore, barred by limitation under Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908 for short “the old Act”. It was accordingly dismissed.
2. Article 142 of the First Schedule and First Division to the old Limitation Act, provides that “for possession of immovable property when the plaintiff, while in possession of the property, has been dispossessed or has discontinued the possession”, the period of 12 years begins to run from the date of dispossession or discontinuation. Article 144 adumbrates that “for possession of immovable property or any interest therein not hereby otherwise specially provided for”, the suit shall be laid within 12 years when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.
3. Article 64 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, “the new Act”) provides that “for possession of immovable property based on previous possession and not on title, when the plaintiff while in possession of the property has been dispossessed”, the period of limitation of 12 years begins to run from the date of dispossession. Article 65 provides that “for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title, the period of limitation of 12 years begins to run when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff”. Under the old Limitation Act, all suits for possession whether based on title or on the ground of previous possession were governed by Article 142 wherein the plaintiff while in possession was dispossessed or discontinued in possession. Where the case was not one of dispossession of the plaintiff or discontinuance of possession by him, Article 142 did not apply. Suits based on title alone and not on possession or discontinuance of possession were governed by Article 144 unless they were specifically provided for by some other articles. Therefore, for application of Article 142, the suit is not only on the basis of title but also for possession.
4. The question, therefore, is on whom the burden of proof lies in a suit based on title and for possession. In view of Article 142 of the old Act, the burden, undoubtedly, is on the plaintiff-appellant to prove that he has title to and has been in possession and he was dispossessed and discontinued his possession within 12 years from the date of the filing of the suit. It is necessary for the plaintiff, therefore, when the suit is laid on the basis of title, to establish not only that he has title to the property but also he was dispossessed or discontinued his previous possession within 12 years on the date of the filing of the suit. If the suit is merely based on adverse possession, then Article 144 gets attracted. The defendant did not come to the court to establish his adverse possession by prescription. The burden of proof, therefore, does not rest on him. It is, therefore, for the plaintiff/appellant to prove that not only he had title to the plaint schedule property but also he had possession within 12 years and he was dispossessed or discontinued his possession within the period of limitation prescribed under Article 142. The burden, therefore, is always on him to prove that he had possession within 12 years from the date of the filing of the suit and he has title to the property. The burden does not shift on the defendant. The burden of proof, therefore, has rightly been placed on the appellant by the appellate court. We do not find any error of law in the findings recorded by the appellate court warranting interference, though the High Court dismissed the appeal in limine. The appeal is accordingly dismissed but without costs.
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