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Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. Thakoredas, Major And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Feb 8, 1994
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

Four connected appeals challenge a judgment of the Karnataka High Court dated 16 September 1976 in C.R.P. Nos. 1577 etc. of 1976. The Deputy Commissioner (Collector) passed an award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which was served on the land-owners (respondents) on 2 August 1970. Within the statutory 90-day period, on 1 September 1970, the respondents applied to the Deputy Commissioner under Section 18 for a reference to the civil court. No reference was made. More than five years later the respondents moved the civil court for a direction to compel the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference. The civil court allowed that application. The State (appellant) challenged the order in revision before the High Court, arguing that the application was time-barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Relying upon Town Municipal Council v. Presiding Officer, the High Court dismissed the State’s revision. The present appeals arise from that decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an application made to a civil court under Section 18(3)(b) of the Land Acquisition Act (as amended by Mysore Act 17 of 1961) is governed by the three-year residuary limitation period in Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
  2. If Article 137 applies, whether the respondents’ application—filed more than three years after the cause of action accrued—was barred by limitation.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The application to the civil court, filed after a lapse of more than five years, was barred by the three-year period prescribed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act.

Respondents' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments, but the High Court’s reliance on Town Municipal Council v. Presiding Officer indicates that the respondents maintained the application was not subject to Article 137.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Town Municipal Council v. Presiding Officer, Labour Courts (1969) 1 SCC 873; (1970) 1 SCR 51 Previously interpreted Article 137 as inapplicable to certain applications to civil courts. High Court relied on this ruling, but the Supreme Court observed that it stood overruled and declined to follow it.
Nityananda M. Joshi v. LIC of India (1969) 2 SCC 199; (1970) 1 SCR 396 Questioned the correctness of the Town Municipal Council decision on Article 137. Cited to demonstrate that Town Municipal Council was already under doubt.
Kerala SEB v. T.P. Kunhaliumma (1976) 4 SCC 634; (1977) 1 SCR 996 Authoritatively held that Article 137 applies to “any application” filed in a civil court under any statute; ejusdem generis limitation rejected. Formed the primary basis for applying the three-year residuary period of Article 137 to the respondents’ application.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first noted that Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, as amended by Mysore Act 17 of 1961, grants a claimant two sequential procedural rights: (i) to apply to the Deputy Commissioner for a reference within 90 days of receiving the award (Section 18(1) and 18(2)); and (ii) if no reference is made within a further 90 days, to approach the civil court for a direction compelling the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference (Section 18(3)(b)).

No express limitation period is prescribed for the second-stage application to the civil court. Invoking Kerala SEB v. T.P. Kunhaliumma, the Court held that the residuary Article 137 governs “any application” to a civil court when no specific period is provided. Consequently, the application must be filed within three years from the date on which the cause of action accrues.

The cause of action accrued on the expiry of 90 days after 1 September 1970—the date on which the respondents requested the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference. Therefore, the limitation period expired in early December 1973. The respondents’ application, filed more than five years later, was clearly out of time.

The High Court’s contrary view, premised on Town Municipal Council, was rejected because that precedent has been overruled. Applying Article 137, the Court concluded that the civil court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the belated application and that the High Court erred in affirming it.

Holding and Implications

Appeals Allowed; respondents’ application to the civil court is rejected as time-barred.

Immediate Impact: The direction to the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference under Section 18 is set aside, ending the respondents’ claim to have the compensation reassessed.

Broader Implications: The judgment reiterates that Article 137 applies to all applications filed in civil courts under special statutes unless a specific limitation period is provided, reinforcing the authority of Kerala SEB v. T.P. Kunhaliumma and further displacing the earlier contrary view in Town Municipal Council.

Show all summary ...

Order

1. All these four appeals arise from a judgment of the High Court of Karnataka rendered on 16-9-1976, in CRPs Nos. 1577 etc. of 1976. The facts are not in dispute. As concluded by the High Court, the award having been made by the Deputy Commissioner (the Collector) under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (‘the Act’) it was served on the respondents as required under Section 12(2) on 2-8-1970. The respondents are said to have made an application on 1-9-1970 before the Deputy Commissioner seeking the making of a reference to the civil court under Section 18, after they required the compensation under protest. The Deputy Commissioner did not make any reference to the civil court. However, the respondents filed application to the civil court after the lapse of the period of 5 years, for getting a direction issued to the Deputy Commissioner for making the references. That application has come to be allowed by the civil court. Calling in question that order of the civil court, the appellant filed a revision petition in the Karnataka High Court. The appellant contended that the respondents, when had made the application after the expiry of the period of five years from the date of receipt of the award, it should have been dismissed as barred by time allowed under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. However, the High Court following the decision in Town Municipal Council v. Presiding Officer, Labour Courts (1969) 1 SCC 873, (1970) 1 SCR 51 rejected the contention and upheld the order of Civil Judge directing the sending of the reference. The correctness of the case of Municipal Council (1969) 1 SCC 873, (1970) 1 SCR 51 was doubted in Nityananda M. Joshi v. LIC of India (1969) 2 SCC 199, (1970) 1 SCR 396. In Kerala SEB v. T.P Kunhaliumma (1976) 4 SCC 634, (1977) 1 SCR 996 this Court held that Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act applies to any petition or any application filed under any Act in a civil court. It also held that the words “any other application” under Article 137 of Schedule to Limitation Act cannot be said, on the principle of ejusdem generis to be applicable only to applications made under the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, it becomes clear that this Court had ruled that any application filed under any other special statute, to the civil court would be governed by the limitation prescribed by Article 137, whereunder an application should be made within three years from the date when cause of action to file the application arises.

2. Land Acquisition (Mysore Extension and Amendment) Act 17 of 1961, by its Section 4, which came into force on 24-8-1961 amended Section 18, thus:

“(1) after the word ‘award’ where it occurs for the first time insert the words ‘or amendment thereof’ and after the said word, wherever it occurs thereafter, insert the words ‘or the amendment’;
(2) in sub-section (2), substitute for the proviso the following proviso, namely:
‘Provided that every such application shall be made within ninety days from the date of service of the notice from the Deputy Commissioner under sub-section (2) of Section 12.’
(3) after sub-section (2), add the following sub-section, namely,—
‘(3)(a) The Deputy Commissioner shall, within ninety days from the date of receipt of an application under sub-section (1), make a reference to the court.
(b) If the Deputy Commissioner does not make a reference to the court within a period of ninety days from the date of receipt of the application the applicant may apply to the court to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference, and the court may direct the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference within such time as the court may fix.’
(4) for the word ‘Collector’, wherever it occurs, substitute the words ‘Deputy Commissioner’.”

3. Admittedly, the cause of action for seeking a reference had arisen on the date of service of the award under Section 12(2) of the Act. Within 90 days from the date of the service of the notice, the respondents made the application requesting the Deputy Commissioner to refer the cases to the civil court under Section 18. Under the amended sub-section 3(a) of the Act, the Deputy Commissioner shall, within 90 days from 1-9-1970 make reference under Section 18 to the civil court which he failed to do. Consequently by operation of sub-section 3(b) with the expiry of the aforestated 90 days, the cause of action had accrued to the respondents to make an application to the civil court with a prayer to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference. There is no period of limitation prescribed in sub-section 3(b) to make that application but it should be done within limitation prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Since no article expressly prescribed the limitation to make such application, the residuary article under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act gets attracted. Thus, it could be seen that in the absence of any special period of limitation prescribed by clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Act, the application should have been made within three years from the date of expiry of 90 days prescribed in Section 18(3)(b) i.e the date on which cause of action had accrued to the respondent-claimant. Since the applications had been admittedly made beyond three years, it was clearly barred by limitation. Since, the High Court relied upon the case in Municipal Council (1969) 1 SCC 873, (1970) 1 SCR 51 which has stood overruled, the order of the High Court is unsustainable. The appeals are accordingly allowed, and the application made to the Court by the respondent stands rejected.