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Jugraj Singh And Another v. Labh Singh And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The first defendant, Jasbir Singh, executed an agreement of sale dated 30-08-1984 in favour of the plaintiffs, Labh Singh and Surinder Singh. The petitioners—defendants 2 and 3—entered into a subsequent agreement of sale with Jasbir Singh on 04-01-1985. The plaintiffs sued Jasbir Singh for specific performance of the earlier agreement. All courts below concurrently held that defendants 2 and 3 were not bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the prior agreement and decreed specific performance in favour of the plaintiffs. The present special leave petition (SLP) before the Supreme Court was filed by defendants 2 and 3 challenging those concurrent findings.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether defendants 2 and 3, as subsequent purchasers, could invoke the plaintiff’s alleged lack of readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, to defeat the decree for specific performance.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners’ Arguments (Defendants 2 & 3)
- The trial court, after holding them to be necessary parties, erred in rejecting their plea that plaintiff Labh Singh was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.
- The High Court committed a similar error in upholding the decree without considering this defence.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Sasson, AIR 1928 PC 208 | In a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff must aver and prove continuous readiness and willingness until the decree. | Cited to restate the requirement under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. |
| Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar, AIR 1967 SC 868; (1967) 1 SCR 227 | Approved Ardeshir, holding that failure to prove continuous readiness and willingness is fatal to specific performance. | Quoted to reinforce the above principle and clarify that the plea is personal to the vendor. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court noted that Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act mandates the plaintiff to plead and prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform his contractual obligations. Drawing on Ardeshir H. Mama and Gomathinayagam Pillai, the Court reaffirmed that this requirement is a defence available to the vendor or his legal representatives. Subsequent purchasers, such as the petitioners, may only defend on the ground that they are bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the prior agreement.
The Court held that because defendants 2 and 3 were found not to be bona fide purchasers, they could not rely on the plaintiff’s alleged lack of readiness and willingness. Accordingly, the High Court was correct in rejecting their contention, and no ground for interference under Article 136 was made out.
Holding and Implications
The Special Leave Petition was dismissed.
As a result, the decree for specific performance in favour of the plaintiffs stands affirmed. The decision underscores that the defence of lack of readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) is personal to the vendor and cannot be invoked by subsequent purchasers who have notice of an earlier agreement. No new precedent is set, but the ruling reinforces existing principles concerning specific performance and the rights of subsequent purchasers.
Order
1. The petitioners are defendants 2 and 3. The first defendant, Jasbir Singh, had executed an agreement of sale dated 30-8-1984 in favour of the plaintiffs Labh Singh and his brother Surinder Singh. The petitioners had an agreement of sale on 4-1-1985. The plaintiffs filed the suit against Jasbir Singh, the first defendant. All the courts have concurrently found that the petitioners/defendants 2 and 3 are not bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the prior agreement dated 30-8-1984 and accordingly, decreed the suit. Thus, this SLP.
2. It is contended for the petitioners that the trial court having found the petitioners to be necessary parties was not right in negativing the plea of the petitioners that Labh Singh, plaintiff, was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and that the High Court equally committed an error of law in rejecting that plea. We find no force in the contention.
3. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that the plaintiff must plead and prove that he has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the essential terms of the contract. The continuous readiness and willingness at all stages from the date of the agreement till the date of the hearing of the suit need to be proved. The substance of the matter and surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the plaintiff must be taken into consideration in adjudging readiness and willingness to perform the plaintiff's part of the contract.
4. The Privy Council in Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Sasson AIR 1928 PC 208 has held that in a suit for specific performance the averment of readiness and willingness on plaintiff's part up to the date of the decree is necessary.
5. This Court in Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar AIR 1967 SC 868, (1967) 1 SCR 227 quoting with approval Ardeshir case AIR 1928 PC 208 had held as follows:
“But the respondent has claimed a decree for specific performance and it is for him to establish that he was, since the date of the contract, continuously ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. If he fails to do so, his claim for specific performance must fail.”
That plea is specifically available to the vendor/defendant. It is personal to him. The subsequent purchasers have got only the right to defend their purchase on the premise that they have no prior knowledge of the agreement of sale with the plaintiff. They are bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration. Though they are necessary parties to the suit, since any decree obtained by the plaintiff would be binding on the subsequent purchasers, the plea that the plaintiff must always be ready and willing to perform his part of the contract must be available only to the vendor or his legal representatives, but not to the subsequent purchasers. The High Court, therefore, was right in rejecting the petitioners' contention and rightly did not accept the plea. We do not find any ground warranting interference.
6. The SLP is accordingly dismissed.
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