- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Mohmed Saleem Alias Chuho Mohmedshakoor v. State Of Gujarat .
Factual and Procedural Background
On 10 July 1992, Jugal Kishore Puran Lal Gupta was stabbed while returning home on his bicycle near Arbuda Mills, within the jurisdiction of Gomtipur Police Station. According to the FIR, an unknown assailant first inflicted a knife wound to the victim’s abdomen; two or three accomplices emerged from a nearby chawl, helping drag the victim inside and inflicting additional knife blows to his neck and back. The complainant escaped, encountered a police patrol jeep, and was taken to hospital where an injury certificate was issued.
During investigation, a co-accused was released on bail but absconded before the charge-sheet was filed. The prosecution case against that person was separated. On 30 July 1993, the present appellant was put on trial before a Designated Court for offences under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), Section 3(1) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA), and Section 135(1) of the Bombay Police Act. The Designated Court:
- Acquitted the appellant under Section 135(1) of the Bombay Police Act.
- Convicted the appellant under Section 324 IPC.
- Convicted and sentenced him to eight years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine under Section 3(1) TADA.
The appellant filed the present appeal under Section 19 of TADA before the Supreme Court of India.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the evidence established that the appellant voluntarily caused hurt with a dangerous weapon, thereby attracting liability under Section 324 IPC.
- Whether the appellant’s conduct satisfied the statutory ingredients of “terrorist act” under Section 3(1) TADA.
- Whether conviction under Section 135(1) of the Bombay Police Act was sustainable (already decided in appellant’s favour by the Designated Court).
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602 | Interpretation of Section 3(1) TADA: conviction requires proof that the act was committed with the specific intent to create terror for objectives enumerated in the section. | The Court relied on this decision to hold that causing fear as a mere consequence is insufficient; absence of evidence of the requisite intent made the TADA conviction unsustainable. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Section 324 IPC: The injury certificate (Ex. P-11) showed sharp-edged weapon wounds—10 cm × 0.75 cm × 0.75 cm on the abdomen and 3 cm × 0.25 cm × 0.25 cm on the back. The defence admitted the certificate, and no infirmity in the prosecution evidence was demonstrated. The Supreme Court agreed with the Designated Court that an offence under Section 324 IPC was proved.
Section 3(1) TADA: The Court examined whether the assault was committed with the intention to “strike terror” or achieve communal disharmony. It noted:
- No evidence indicated the appellant acted with the intention contemplated by Section 3(1).
- The complainant’s trial testimony that he was released after claiming he was a Muslim was treated as an unreliable improvement over the FIR and appeared designed to give the incident a communal colour.
- Applying the test in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur, the Court held that mere resultant fear is insufficient; the specific intent must be proved.
Finding “not an iota of evidence” of the requisite intent, the Court concluded that invoking TADA was a “clear misuse” of the statute.
Holding and Implications
PARTLY ALLOWED. The Supreme Court:
- Set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 3(1) TADA.
- Affirmed the conviction and sentence under Section 324 IPC.
Implications are confined to the parties: the appellant remains liable only for the IPC offence and is relieved of the eight-year TADA sentence. The decision reiterates the stringent intent requirement for TADA’s application but does not create new precedent beyond applying Hitendra Vishnu Thakur.
Order
1. This is an appeal under Section 19 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter TADA).
2. The prosecution story, as emerging from the record is that a complaint was lodged by one Jugal Kishore Puran Lal Gupta-complainant, with Gomtipur Police Station on 10-7-1992 alleging that when he was returning after visiting his brother's Video Cassette Library located near Vivekananda Mills on a bicycle, near Arbuda Mills, he found one unknown person coming towards him. On reaching near the complainant, that person took out a knife and gave him a blow on his abdomen. Two or three more persons came out from a nearby Chawl and asked the assailant to drag the complainant into the Chawl. While being dragged towards the Chawl, he was given one more blow on the left side of his neck. The assailant also inflicted a knife blow on his back. The complainant, however, managed to free himself and started running towards the four cross-roads. He found one police jeep on patrol duty and the police took him to the hospital. A complaint was thereafter lodged and investigation taken in hand. The co-accused of the appellant was released on bail during the investigation but at the time of framing of the charge-sheet, the co-accused did not turn up and even the sureties could not be located. On the request of the Public Prosecutor, the case of the appellant was separated and on 30-7-1993, the appellant was put up for trial for offences under Section 324 IPC, Section 3(1) of TADA and Section 135(1) of the Bombay Police Act. The trial court after recording the evidence led by the prosecution and exhibiting the injury certificate received from the hospital, Ex. P-11 formulated the following three points for consideration:
“(1) Does the prosecution prove that on 10-7-1992 at about 9.30 p.m near Arbuda Mills situated within Gomtipur Police Station limits the present accused along with the absconding accused Saleem Ibrahim Shaikh voluntarily caused hurt on the complainant Jugal Kishore Puran Lal Gupta by means of any instrument for stabbing or cutting, or any instrument, which if used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death and has, thus rendered himself liable for the offence punishable under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code?
(2) Does the prosecution prove that on the aforesaid date, time and place the present accused by carrying with him any weapon in violation of any prohibitory order issued by any competent authority has committed the offence punishable under Section 135(1) of the Bombay Police Act?
(3) Does the prosecution prove that on the aforesaid date, time and place the present accused with intent to strike terror in the people or any section of the people or to alienate any section of the people or to adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people did any act or thing by using lethal weapon like knife or razor in such a manner as to cause, or as is likely to cause death of, or injuries to, any person or persons and has committed a terrorist act as defined in Section 3(1) of the TADA (Prevention) Act punishable under Section 3(2) of the said Act?”
3. The trial court found that the charge against the appellant for the offence under Section 135(1) of the Bombay Police Act was not made out and consequently the appellant was acquitted of the said charge.
4. The injuries which were disclosed in the injury certificate (Ex. P-11), upon admission by the defence, indicated that the complainant sustained an injury of 10 cms × 0.75 cm × 0.75 cm on his abdomen apart from an injury on his back of the size 3 cms × 0.25 cm × 0.25 cm. The injuries received by the complainant undoubtedly show that those had been caused to him by a sharp knife and the Designated Court, in our opinion, was right in coming to the conclusion that an offence under Section 324 IPC had been made out against the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant was unable to point out any infirmity in the finding of the trial court. The appreciation of the evidence insofar as the offence under Section 324 IPC is concerned, is proper and we agree with the conclusion arrived at by the Designated Court with regard to the offence of the appellant punishable under Section 324 IPC.
5. The Designated Court convicted the appellant for an offence under Section 3(1) of TADA also and sentenced him to 8 years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 1500 and in default thereof 3 months' rigorous imprisonment. In our opinion, the Designated Court fell in error in finding that the offence under Section 3(1) of TADA had been made out against the appellant. In the established facts and circumstances of the case recourse to Section 3(1) of TADA discloses a clear misuse of the provisions of that Act. There is not an iota of evidence that the injury was caused to the complainant with the intention contemplated by Section 3(1) to achieve the objective envisaged by the said section. The complainant, at the trial, as a definite improvement over his statement in the FIR, while narrating the manner of assault added that after he said to the assailants that he was a “Muslim”, he was let off. Apart from the fact that such an improved version does not inspire confidence because there was no occasion for the complainant to say so, it appears to us that the prosecution introduced this statement with a view to show that the objective of the assailants was to create communal disharmony so as to invoke the provisions of Section 3(1) of TADA. The complainant has not stated anywhere in his statement, that at any point of time, any of the assailants belaboured him only because they believed him to be a “non-Muslim” or had attacked him for that reason. That apart, the complainant on his own admission “managed to escape from the clutches of the assailants and ran towards the four cross-roads”. This would not have been his conduct, if the assailants on coming to know that he is a “Muslim” had let him off! In the absence of any evidence from which even an inference could be drawn that the assault was made with the requisite intention as envisaged by Section 3(1) of TADA, this attempt on the part of the complainant to give a communal colour to the occurrence was futile and the Designated Court could not have convicted the appellant for an offence under Section 3(1) of TADA. While dealing with the ambit and scope of Section 3(1) of TADA in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra (1994) 4 SCC 602, this Court opined :
“Thus the true ambit and scope of Section 3(1) is that no conviction under Section 3(1) of TADA can be recorded unless the evidence led by the prosecution establishes that the offence was committed with the intention as envisaged by Section 3(1) by means of the weapons etc. as enumerated in the section and was committed with the motive as postulated by the said section. Even at the cost of repetition, we may say that where it is only the consequence of the criminal act of an accused that terror, fear or panic is caused, but the crime was not committed with the intention as envisaged by Section 3(1) to achieve the objective as envisaged by the section, an accused should not be convicted for an offence under Section 3(1) of TADA. To bring home a charge under Section 3(1) of the Act, the terror or panic etc. must be actually intended with a view to achieve the result as envisaged by the said section and not be merely an incidental fall-out or a consequence of the criminal activity. Every crime, being a revolt against the society, involves some violent activity which results in some degree of panic or creates some fear or terror in the people or a section thereof, but unless the panic, fear or terror was intended and was sought to achieve either of the objectives as envisaged in Section 3(1), the offence would not fall stricto sensu under TADA.”
In view of the law laid down as above, we find that the conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 3(1) TADA is not at all sustainable. The conviction and sentence of the appellant for the offence under Section 3(1) TADA is consequently set aside.
6. As a result of the above discussion, this appeal succeeds in part. The conviction and sentence of the appellant for an offence under Section 3(1) TADA is set aside but his conviction and sentence for the offence under Section 324 IPC is upheld.
7. With the aforesaid modification, this appeal is partly allowed.
Alert