Bookmark
PDF
Share
CaseIQ

Raj Kumar Khaitan And Others v. Bibi Zubaida Khatun And Another

Supreme Court Of India

Oct 7, 1994

Judgment

CaseIQ

Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant-landlords instituted a suit before the Munsif, Darbhanga, seeking ejectment of the respondent-tenants from the disputed premises. The landlords claimed that they required the premises for their own bona fide use and occupation, specifically to start a business of their own as they had no other means of livelihood.

The Munsif decreed the suit in favour of the landlords on the ground of their bona fide requirement and ordered the ejectment of the tenants.

In revision, the High Court reversed the findings of the Munsif. The High Court held that there were no specific pleadings on the record regarding the landlords' bona fide requirement and, on that short ground, set aside the decree of ejectment.

The landlords then approached the Supreme Court by way of special leave. Special leave to appeal was granted. During the hearing before the Supreme Court, it was noted that respondents 1 and 2 were the original tenants, and their counsel stated that they had vacated the suit premises as far back as 1-11-1989 and presently had nothing to do with the premises.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the pleadings contained in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the plaint were sufficient to constitute a proper and specific plea of the landlords' bona fide requirement of the disputed premises.
Whether, in a suit for eviction based on bona fide requirement for starting a business, it is necessary for the landlords to plead the precise nature of the business they intend to start in the premises.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court examined paragraphs 11 and 12 of the plaint, which stated that:

The plaintiffs had no other means of livelihood.
They wanted to start a business of their own in the suit premises (described as Schedule II), which was a fit and suitable site for business.
They had no other building suitable for that purpose and no means to hire another similar building.
They required the Schedule II property for their personal necessity, and the defendants were deliberately avoiding vacating it, even though other buildings might be available to the defendants for carrying on their business.

On the basis of these averments, the Court concluded that the landlords had clearly asserted that they had no other means of livelihood and therefore needed to set up their own business in the disputed premises. This, in the Court's view, sufficiently pleaded their bona fide requirement and personal necessity.

The High Court had held that, in addition to these pleadings, it was necessary for the landlords to plead the specific nature of the business they intended to start. The Supreme Court held that this approach was erroneous. It reasoned that:

It was not necessary for the landlords to indicate the precise nature of the business they proposed to commence in the premises.
Even if the landlords had pleaded a particular business, they could not be legally bound to start only that business once the premises were vacated.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the High Court had fallen into a “patent error” in treating the absence of a pleaded description of the nature of the business as a fatal defect in the landlords' case on bona fide requirement.

Holding and Implications

The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restored the decree of the trial court (Munsif, Darbhanga), thereby reinstating the order of ejectment in favour of the landlords.

It was further recorded that respondents 1 and 2, the original tenants, had already vacated the premises on 1-11-1989 and presently had nothing to do with the premises. The appeal was allowed in these terms, with no order as to costs.

Implications: The direct consequence is that the trial court's decree for ejectment based on the landlords' bona fide requirement stands restored, though the tenants have already vacated the premises. The opinion does not discuss any broader legal implications or establish any expressly articulated new precedent beyond the resolution of the parties' dispute.

Show all summary ...

Order

1. Special leave granted.

2. The appellant-landlords instituted a suit seeking ejectment of the respondent-tenants from the premises in dispute before the Munsif, Darbhanga. The Munsif decreed the suit on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlords and ordered the ejectment. The High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction reversed the findings of the Munsif on the short ground that there were no specific pleadings on the record regarding the bona fide requirement of the landlords.

3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Paras 11 and 12 of the plaint wherein bona fide requirement has been pleaded are as under:

“11. That the plaintiffs have got no other means of livelihood and want to start a business of their own in the Schedule II premises which is a fit and suitable site for business and has no building other than this for the said purpose and also that the plaintiffs have no means to hire another building of the similar site and as such require the disputed house for bona fide purpose.

12. That the plaintiffs require the Schedule II property for their personal necessity and the defendants are deliberately avoiding to vacate the same in spite of the fact that other building for carrying on the business may be available to the defendants.”

4. It is clear from the averments made in the above-quoted paragraphs that the plaintiffs asserted that there were no other means of livelihood with them and as such they wanted to set up their own business in the premises in dispute. The High Court, however, came to the conclusion that apart from the above-quoted pleadings it was necessary to plead the nature of the business which the appellant-plaintiffs wanted to start in the premises. We are of the view that the High Court fell into patent error. It was not necessary for the appellant-landlords to indicate the precise nature of the business which they intended to start in the premises. Even if the nature of business would have been indicated nobody could bind the landlords to start the same business in the premises after it was vacated.

5. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial court.

6. Respondents 1 and 2 were the original tenants in the premises. Learned counsel appearing for these respondents has fairly stated that the respondents vacated the suit premises as back as 1-11-1989. It is further stated that the respondents have nothing to do with the premises as at present. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. No costs.