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Managing Director And Others v. K. Ramachandra Naidu And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The first respondent, a private transport operator in Andhra Pradesh, was operating a stage carriage on the inter-State route Chittoor (A.P.) – Salem (T.N.). He filed Writ Petition No. 4343 of 1980 in the Madras High Court seeking to quash a scheme of nationalisation approved under Section 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1959 (G.O.Ms. No. 579 Home, dated 7-4-1975). A learned Single Judge allowed that writ petition, holding the scheme “inconsistent and not capable of implementation,” and directed that the operator’s renewal application be considered accordingly.
The present appellant, shown in the writ petition as the 3rd respondent, filed Writ Appeal No. 675 of 1982 within limitation. The State of Tamil Nadu, also a respondent, filed a separate writ appeal after a delay of more than 150 days and moved for condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. A Division Bench on 4-3-1986 refused to condone the delay and dismissed the State’s appeal. When the appellant’s appeal was later taken up, the same Bench dismissed it on the sole ground that it was barred by res judicata because the State’s appeal had already been dismissed. The appellant has now appealed to the Supreme Court against that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the dismissal of a time-barred appeal filed by one respondent (the State) operates as res judicata so as to bar a timely appeal filed by another respondent (the present appellant) arising from the same writ petition.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar, AIR 1966 SC 1332 | Where separate suits involving a common issue result in multiple decrees, dismissal of some appeals on preliminary grounds can operate as res judicata in subsequent, related appeals. | Distinguished; the Court held the factual matrix of Sheodan was different because it involved different suits and decrees, unlike the single writ petition in the present case. |
| Narhari v. Shanker, AIR 1953 SC 419 | In a single suit followed by multiple appeals, the principle of res judicata does not apply merely because one appeal is dismissed as time-barred; the two decrees are “in substance one.” | Followed; the Court found this precedent squarely applicable and used it to conclude that res judicata did not bar the appellant’s timely appeal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court misapplied the doctrine of res judicata. Key steps in its analysis were:
- Emphasised that res judicata presupposes two distinct proceedings. Here there was only one writ petition, giving rise to separate appeals by different parties, akin to Narhari rather than Sheodan.
- Pointed out that in Sheodan the earlier decisions arose out of four independent suits requiring four appeals, fulfilling the “former suit–subsequent suit” condition for res judicata; that element was absent here.
- Relied on Narhari, where dismissal of one appeal as time-barred did not preclude consideration of another timely appeal emanating from the same suit.
- Observed that dismissal of the State’s appeal for delay could not affect the appellant’s subsisting, admitted appeal, which had been filed within limitation and was pending final hearing.
- Remarked that, pragmatically, the High Court could have exercised discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the State’s delay and heard both appeals together, although the State had not challenged the refusal to condone.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order dismissing the appellant’s writ appeal as barred by res judicata and remitted the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal on the merits.
Implications: The decision clarifies that, where a single proceeding gives rise to multiple appeals, dismissal of one appeal on limitation grounds does not invoke res judicata to defeat another timely appeal. The case is remanded, and the High Court has been requested to dispose of the writ appeal expeditiously, preferably within three months. No new substantive precedent was set beyond reaffirming the principle articulated in Narhari v. Shanker.
Dr A.S Anand, J.— Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Madras dated 19-9-1989 dismissing appellant's Writ Appeal No. 675 of 1982.
3. The first respondent, a private transport operator in the State of Andhra Pradesh who at the material time was operating his stage carriage on the inter-State route Chittoor (in Andhra Pradesh) to Salem (in Tamil Nadu), filed Writ Petition No. 4343 of 1980 in the High Court of Madras seeking quashing of the scheme of nationalisation approved under Section 68(d) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1959 as published in GOMs No. 579 Home dated 7-4-1975 and for certain other reliefs. The learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition holding inter alia that the entire scheme as approved, was inconsistent and not capable of implementation and that the writ petitioner (1st respondent herein) was entitled to have his renewal application considered on the said basis. The appellant who had been impleaded as the 3rd respondent in the writ petition, filed Writ Appeal No. 675 of 1982 within the period of limitation. The State of Tamil Nadu, also a respondent in the writ petition, filed a separate writ appeal but beyond 150 days of the period of limitation, along with an application seeking condonation of delay in preferring the appeal. While notice was issued on the writ appeal filed by the appellant, in the writ appeal filed by the State notice was issued in the condone delay application. On 4-3-1986 a Division Bench of the High Court, declined to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal filed by the State. When the writ appeal filed by the appellant came up for hearing before the Division Bench, the same was dismissed on the sole ground that since the writ appeal filed by the State had already been dismissed by the Division Bench, the writ appeal filed by the appellant was barred by the principle of res judicata and was as such not maintainable. Reliance was placed by the Division Bench upon the judgment in Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar AIR 1966 SC 1332, 1966 All LJ 578, ILR (1966) 2 All 232.
4. In our opinion, the view taken by the High Court is not sustainable and the reliance placed by it on Sheodan case AIR 1966 SC 1332, 1966 All LJ 578, ILR (1966) 2 All 232 is misplaced.
5. In Sheodan case AIR 1966 SC 1332, 1966 All LJ 578, ILR (1966) 2 All 232 the facts were entirely different. In that case the trial court had decided common issue relating to title which was a common issue in four different suits. Four separate decrees had been prepared. Two of the appeals, arising out of two suits, were dismissed on a preliminary ground with the result that the decrees in those two suits became final. In the two appeals filed subsequently, the earlier order dismissing the two appeals was held to operate as res judicata and the two subsequent appeals were accordingly dismissed.
6. In the present case the factual and legal situation is entirely different. The State as well as the appellant were respondents in one and the same writ petition, against the decision of which they had filed separate appeals. The dismissal of the writ appeal filed by the State on the ground of delay not being condoned could not in law affect the maintainability of the writ appeal which had been filed by the appellant within time and was pending final hearing in the High Court. The order in the writ petition could have been challenged by one appeal only unlike in Sheodan Singh case AIR 1966 SC 1332, 1966 All LJ 578, ILR (1966) 2 All 232 where four appeals were required to be filed in law against the four decrees even though deciding the common issue relating to title. We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the view of the High Court that the dismissal of State's appeal, in the facts and circumstances of the case could operate as res judicata and bar the maintainability of the appeal filed by the appellant.
7. In Narhari v. Shanker AIR 1953 SC 419, 1950 SCR 754 on the suit of the plaintiff being decreed in the trial court, two separate appeals were taken by two set of defendants. The appellate court allowed both the appeals and dismissed the plaintiff's suit by one judgment and ordered a copy of the judgment to be placed on the file of the connected appeal. The plaintiffs preferred two separate appeals. One of the appeal was held time-barred and invoking the principle of res judicata the High Court dismissed the other appeal also. Reversing the decision of the High Court, this Court observed:
“The question of res judicata arises only when there are two suits. Even when there are two suits, it has been held that a decision given simultaneously cannot be a decision in the former suit. When there is only one suit, the question of res judicata does not arise at all and in the present case, both the decrees are in the same case and based on the same judgment, and the matter decided concerns the entire suit. As such, there is no question of the application of the principle of res judicata. The same judgment cannot remain effective just because it was appealed against with a different number or a copy of it was attached to a different appeal. The two decrees in substance are one.”
8. It is relevant to notice here that in Sheodan case AIR 1966 SC 1332, 1966 All LJ 578, ILR (1966) 2 All 232, the Bench considered the judgment in Narhari case AIR 1953 SC 419, 1950 SCR 754 and pointed out the distinguishing features in the two cases. This Court referring to Narhari case AIR 1953 SC 419, 1950 SCR 754 observed:
“That case however has no application to the facts of the present case, because there the suit was only one which was followed by two appeals. The appeals were heard together and disposed of by the same judgment though separate decrees were prepared. An appeal was taken against one of the decrees. In those circumstances this Court held that as there was only one suit, it was not necessary to file two separate appeals and the fact that one of the appeals was time-barred did not affect the maintainability of the other appeal and the question of res judicata did not at all arise. In the present case there were different suits from which different appeals had to be filed. The High Court's decision in the two appeals arising from Suit Nos. 77 and 91 was undoubtedly earlier and therefore the condition that there should have been a decision in a former suit to give rise to res judicata in a subsequent suit was satisfied in the present case.”
(emphasis supplied)
The law laid down in Narhari case AIR 1953 SC 419, 1950 SCR 754 squarely applies to the facts of the present case and the High Court, therefore, fell in error to hold that the appeal filed by the appellant was not maintainable being barred by res judicata.
9. We are also of the opinion that since the writ appeal filed by the appellant, within time, had been admitted and was pending hearing, it would have been more appropriate for the High Court to give the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and condone the delay in filing the appeal by the State and heard both the appeals together on merits. However, since the State has not come up in appeal, we may say nothing more regarding the same.
10. Since, the High Court dismissed the appeal as not maintainable, without going into the merits of the case, we set it aside and remit the case back to the High Court for a fresh disposal of the appeal on merits in accordance with law. It shall be open to the parties to raise all such pleas as are available to them in law in respect of their respective claims before the High Court during the hearing of the appeals. We request the High Court to dispose of the writ appeal expeditiously and as far as possible within three months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order.
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