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Managing Director, E.C.I.L, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar (Ii) .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent, an Engineer with Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. (ECIL), was charged with passing off a spurious television set under ECIL’s brand “Ajanta.” After a departmental enquiry, he was dismissed from service on 27-04-1987. He challenged the dismissal in a writ petition before the High Court, contending that the complainant (Shri Raj Kumar) had not been tendered for cross-examination. The Single Judge dismissed the petition, finding no prejudice because the respondent had already obtained an affidavit from the complainant retracting the original allegation.
The respondent then filed a writ appeal and, for the first time, argued that the enquiry report had not been supplied to him, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan. The Division Bench allowed the appeal and permitted ECIL to recommence the enquiry from the tainted stage. ECIL appealed to the Supreme Court. During the pendency of the appeal, a Constitution Bench in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar clarified the law on supply of enquiry reports, and the present matter was reposted for decision in light of that ruling.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the dismissal order dated 27-04-1987 was vitiated because the enquiry officer’s report had not been furnished to the respondent.
- Whether, apart from the alleged procedural lapse, the findings of guilt recorded in the departmental enquiry warranted interference by the Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent’s Arguments
- The enquiry was vitiated as he was never supplied a copy of the enquiry officer’s report, violating principles laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khan.
- Earlier, he had also argued that the complainant was not tendered for cross-examination.
ECIL’s Arguments
- The requirement to supply the enquiry report became obligatory only after the judgment in Mohd. Ramzan Khan (20-11-1990) and could not invalidate a dismissal made in 1987.
- The respondent suffered no prejudice regarding cross-examination because he already possessed an affidavit retracting the complainant’s earlier statement.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727 | Held that supply of the enquiry officer’s report to the delinquent is part of natural justice, but the obligation is prospective. | The Court applied the prospective element to hold that the respondent’s 1987 dismissal was unaffected by non-supply of the report. |
| Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan (1991) 1 SCC 588 | First recognized the right of a charged employee to receive the enquiry report before a penalty is imposed. | Used only to mark the cut-off date (20-11-1990); since the dismissal pre-dated this, the right was inapplicable. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court reasoned that, in light of the Constitution Bench ruling in Karunakar, the requirement to furnish the enquiry officer’s report operates only prospectively from 20-11-1990. The respondent’s dismissal on 27-04-1987 therefore could not be invalidated on that ground. On the merits, the Court agreed with the Single Judge that the non-production of the complainant for cross-examination did not prejudice the respondent because he had already procured an affidavit retracting the original allegation. Consequently, the factual findings of guilt recorded in the departmental enquiry remained undisturbed.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; Division Bench judgment set aside; Single Judge judgment (upholding dismissal) restored.
ECIL indicated it would neither recover the back wages already paid (50%) nor reclaim emoluments drawn by the respondent during the period of reinstatement ordered by the Division Bench. No costs were awarded. The decision applies the prospective rule on supply of enquiry reports, reaffirming that dismissals preceding 20-11-1990 are not vitiated for that omission; it sets no new precedent beyond implementing the Constitution Bench’s guidance.
Order
1. This appeal is posted before us pursuant to the opinion rendered by the Constitution Bench in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727, (1993) 25 ATC 704, JT (1993) 6 SC 1. In this case, the respondent was an Engineer working in the ECIL. He was charged with passing of a spurious EC. T.V as one made by the Electronics Corporation (employer) under the brand name ‘Ajanta’. On the basis of the complaint made by the purchaser, an inquiry was instituted against the respondent. At the conclusion of the inquiry, he was dismissed from service by the Corporation by its order dated 27-4-1987. The respondent challenged the same by way of a writ petition in the High Court. The ground taken by him in the writ petition was that the complainant, Shri Raj Kumar was not tendered for cross-examination though his testimony was relied upon by the Corporation and the Enquiry Officer against him. The learned Single Judge negatived the same by holding that while it is true that the said witness was not tendered for cross-examination by the respondent, it cannot be said to have prejudiced him inasmuch as he has obtained an affidavit from the said person retracting his earlier statement. The learned Single Judge remarked that even if the witness had been tendered for cross-examination, he could not have made more beneficial statements than those contained in the said affidavit in favour of the respondent. The learned Single Judge, evidently with a view to satisfy himself as to the truth of the charges, noted the essential features of the case against the respondent and held that the defence put forward by the respondent was rightly rejected. Accordingly, he dismissed the writ petition. The respondent thereupon filed a writ appeal wherein he urged, for the first time that the enquiry report not having been supplied to him, the enquiry is vitiated. Indeed, this appears to be the only point urged in the appeal. The Division Bench purporting to follow the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan (1991) 1 SCC 588, (1991) 16 ATC 505, 1990 Supp (3) SCR 248, allowed the appeal and made the following observation: “We make it clear that the respondent is at liberty to continue the inquiry against the appellant from the stage not held to be vitiated.” A further observation was made that the Corporation may consider whether it is just, expedient and worthwhile to proceed with the inquiry at this distance of time. It is against the said judgment that the present appeal was preferred and actually this was the leading case in which the opinion of the Constitution Bench was rendered. It has been held by the Constitution Bench that the principles of natural justice do require that a copy of the enquiry report is supplied to the charged officer though it is not necessary to give him a notice indicating the proposed penalty. But, it has been held, this requirement will be held obligatory only from the date of the judgment in Ramzan Khan case (1991) 1 SCC 588, (1991) 16 ATC 505, 1990 Supp (3) SCR 248, viz., 20-11-1990. In this case, it may be noted, the order of dismissal of the respondent is far earlier to the said date. In the circumstances, the dismissal order cannot be said to be vitiated by non-furnishing of the Enquiry Officer's report. So far as the merits are concerned, the only contention urged before the Single Judge was in our opinion, rightly repelled and, therefore, there is no ground for interference with the order of dismissal.
2. In the circumstances, the appeal is allowed. The order of the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside and the order of learned Single Judge is restored.
3. It is brought to our notice that pursuant to the judgment of the Division Bench, the respondent was restored to service and that he was also paid 50% of the back wages. Shri H.N Salve, learned counsel for the Corporation fairly stated that the Corporation is not interested in recovering the back wages already paid nor is it going to make a claim with respect to emoluments paid for the period the respondent served subsequent to the order of the Division Bench of the High Court.
4. There shall be no order as to costs.
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