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S.P.S Balasubramanyam v. Suruttayan Alias Andali Padayachi And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Manthi had three sons, including Chinathambi, whose legally wedded wife was one Pavayee. Chinathambi also lived with another woman, likewise named Pavayee (“Pavayee No. 2”), with whom he had a son, Ramaswamy. In 1971 Ramaswamy sold to the present appellant the one-third share that Chinathambi had obtained from his father. Descendants of Manthi’s other two sons challenged the sale, prompting the appellant to file a suit for declaration of title and possession.
The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that (i) Ramaswamy was illegitimate because Pavayee No. 2 was merely a concubine, and (ii) the 1968 settlement deed executed by Chinathambi in favour of Pavayee No. 2 and her children was invalid as it concerned joint family property. The First Appellate Court reversed both findings, recognised a legal presumption of marriage between Chinathambi and Pavayee No. 2 based on their long cohabitation, and upheld the settlement deed on the ground that Chinathambi had obtained an exclusive share under a compromise partition decree. The High Court, in second appeal, set aside the First Appellate Court’s judgment, ruling that the presumption of marriage had been rebutted and reinstating the trial court’s dismissal. The present appeal challenges the High Court’s interference.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court was justified in overturning the First Appellate Court’s presumption of a valid marriage arising from long cohabitation between Chinathambi and Pavayee No. 2.
- Whether the 1968 settlement deed executed by Chinathambi validly conveyed title to Ramaswamy, enabling him to transfer the property to the appellant.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Long and continuous cohabitation between Chinathambi and Pavayee No. 2 since 1920 raises a legal presumption of marriage, which the High Court erred in treating as rebutted.
- Once the partition compromise conferred an exclusive one-third share on Chinathambi, the property ceased to be joint family property; hence the 1968 settlement deed was valid and capable of passing good title to Ramaswamy and, through him, to the appellant.
Respondent's Arguments
- Even if cohabitation is admitted, evidence allegedly shows that Pavayee No. 2’s first husband was alive when she began living with Chinathambi, rendering the relationship adulterous and incapable of giving rise to any presumption of lawful marriage.
- The absence of any reference to Pavayee No. 2 or her children in Manthi’s will and the family compromise indicates that no legal marriage existed, thereby rebutting any presumption.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumari, AIR 1952 SC 231; 1952 SCR 825 | Long cohabitation of a man and woman as husband and wife raises a presumption of lawful marriage, though the presumption is rebuttable. | Relied upon to affirm that the relationship between Chinathambi and Pavayee No. 2, spanning from 1920, generated a presumption of valid marriage unless effectively rebutted. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court reaffirmed the legal principle that prolonged cohabitation gives rise to a presumption of lawful marriage, citing Gokal Chand. It scrutinised each circumstance the High Court relied on to rebut the presumption:
- Omission from Manthi’s Will: Given prevailing social attitudes, a father’s failure to mention a son’s alleged concubine and her children in his will is not probative of the non-existence of a valid marriage.
- Absence in Compromise Decree: The compromise concerned partition among Manthi’s three sons based on the will; Pavayee No. 2 and her children were not necessary parties because they held no independent claim at that stage. Their exclusion was therefore irrelevant.
- Testimony of PW 6 and DW 4: Their evidence did not establish that Chinathambi and Pavayee No. 2 had not lived together as husband and wife, nor did it negate Ramaswamy’s parentage.
Collectively, these factors were deemed insufficient to rebut the presumption. The Court further noted that the respondents’ argument regarding an adulterous relationship was not pleaded, no issue was framed on it, and no factual finding existed; hence it could not be invoked at the appellate stage.
Turning to the property issue, the Court held that once the compromise decree effected partition, Chinathambi’s share became his separate property. Consequently, the 1968 settlement deed validly transferred rights to Pavayee No. 2 and her children, enabling Ramaswamy to convey good title to the appellant.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is allowed; the High Court’s judgment and decree are set aside, and the First Appellate Court’s judgment restoring the trial court decree in favour of the appellant is reinstated.
The decision confirms the appellant’s entitlement to declaration and possession of the disputed land and reaffirms that long cohabitation can establish a presumption of lawful marriage, which courts should not lightly deem rebutted without cogent evidence. No broader precedent appears to have been set beyond this clarification of existing principles, and each party is to bear its own costs.
R.M Sahai, J.— The short question that arises for consideration in this plaintiff's appeal directed against the judgment and order of the Madras High Court allowing the appeal, setting aside the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court restoring that of the trial court and dismissing the suit of the appellant for declaration and possession over the land in dispute, is if the High Court was justified in interfering with the presumption drawn by the Appellate Court of valid marriage arising out of prolonged living together of a man and woman as husband and wife.
2. Manthi, admittedly, had three sons one of them being Chinathambi. His legally wedded wife was one Pavayee. He also lived with another woman, whose name, too, was Pavayee. From the second Pavayee he had issues one of them being Ramaswamy. He sold his one-third share, which he received from his father, in 1971 to the appellant. This was resisted by descendants of other two branches. The appellant therefore filed suit for declaration and recovery of possession. Two main questions arose first — if Ramaswamy was legitimate child of Chinathambi, second — the property being ancestral and coparcenary property bequeathed by Manthi in favour of his sons and grandsons but excluding Ramaswamy, could any valid title vest in him under deed of settlement executed by his father in 1968.
3. The trial court accepted the claim of defendants that Ramaswamy was an illegitimate child of Chinathambi as second Pavayee was only a concubine and not a legally wedded wife of Chinathambi. It was also found that the deed of settlement made by Chinathambi could not convey any right, title or interest in favour of Ramaswamy or his mother as it was in respect of coparcenary property or joint family property and, therefore, the deed of settlement was invalid. In appeal both the findings were set aside. The Appellate Court found that Chinathambi and Pavayee No. 2 having lived together as husband and wife since 1920 a presumption arose in law that they were husband and wife. The Appellate Court further found that in the compromise entered between the three sons of Manthi in the suit filed by Chinathambi there was a partition and the parties agreed that the compromise arrived at by them may be given effect to without effecting any partition by metes and bounds as they were in possession of their separate share. It was, therefore, held that Chinathambi got exclusive right over his share under the compromise and he was entitled to execute the deed of settlement in 1968. In second appeal the presumption drawn by the Appellate Court was found to have been rebutted as if Pavayee No. 2 would have been the legally married wife of Chinathambi, her name or the name of her sons would have found mention in the will executed by Manthi, the father of Chinathambi. It was also found that when compromise was arrived between the members of the family on a suit filed by Chinathambi no reference was made either to Pavayee or to her offspring, namely, Ramaswamy. Reliance was also placed on the depositions of PW 6 and DW 4 in support of the conclusion that no legal marriage had come into being between Chinathambi and Pavayee No. 2.
4. What has been settled by this Court is that if a man and woman live together for long years as husband and wife then a presumption arises in law of legality of marriage existing between the two. But the presumption is rebuttable (see Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumari AIR 1952 SC 231, 1952 SCR 825). It has been found by all the courts including the High Court that Chinathambi and Pavayee No. 2 lived together since long. But the High Court held that the presumption stood rebutted for reasons stated earlier. The question is if any of the circumstances taken individually or together were sufficient to warrant the finding that the presumption stood rebutted. Taking each one of them it may be stated that the omission to mention the name of a woman who was living as a concubine and her offspring in the will executed by the father-in-law could not destroy the presumption which otherwise arose in law. In the Hindu society no father would, normally, tolerate behaviour of his son of having a concubine, therefore, the mere fact that Manthi while executing the will did not mention the name of Pavayee No. 2 or her offspring was of no consequence. Similarly the absence of any reference to Pavayee and her children in the compromise entered into between Chinathambi and his brothers was totally irrelevant circumstance. The suit was filed for partition by one of the members of joint Hindu family for his share on strength of will executed by his father. Since his children were not given any share by his father they could not have been party either in the suit or in the compromise decree. The absence of their name therefore could not be taken adversely for destroying the presumption. As regards evidence of PW 6 or DW 4 their depositions are on record. It does not indicate that they stated that Chinathambi and Pavayee did not live together. Since it was not disputed that Ramaswamy was born of Chinathambi and Pavayee who lived together as husband and wife since 1920 each of these circumstances was irrelevant and could not have resulted in rebutting the presumption. In our opinion the High Court was not justified in interfering with the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court arrived at after appreciating the evidence on record.
5. In order to overcome the difficulty it was vehemently argued by the learned counsel for respondent that even if it is assumed that Pavayee was living with Chinathambi since 1920 there being evidence on record to establish that her husband was alive when she came to live with Chinathambi, she was leading an adulterous life and no law recognizes such relationship as valid, consequently the presumption, if any, in favour of a legal marriage stood rebutted. Reliance has been placed on observations made in the judgments at various places and even the statement of Pavayee herself that she had left her husband and had come to live with Chinathambi. It appears unnecessary to express any opinion as to whether the relationship between Chinathambi and Pavayee was adulterous and if it was sufficient to destroy the presumption in law as this plea does not appear to have been raised in the written statement nor any issue was framed on it nor any of the courts have recorded any finding on it.
6. As regards the deed of settlement executed by Chinathambi it having been found that Chinathambi got his share by way of partition decree, the ancestral or coparcenary nature of property came to an end and Chinathambi became its exclusive owner. Consequently he could execute a deed of settlement in favour of his wife and children. Since Ramaswamy derived his title from the settlement deed it was valid and he could convey his interest in favour of the appellant.
7. In the result this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree of the High Court is set aside and that of the First Appellate Court is restored. The parties shall however bear their own costs.
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