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Shiv Shankar And Others v. Board Of Directors, U.P.Srtc And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants, having been placed on a duly prepared select list for the post of conductor in the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, filed Writ Petition No. 24200 of 1988 before the Allahabad High Court alleging arbitrary “pick-and-choose” appointments by the Corporation. On 4-5-1990, while merely issuing notice, a Division Bench of the High Court passed an order directing the Corporation to absorb the petitioners within three months. The Corporation complied and the appellants were taken into service.
When the writ petition was listed for final hearing on 22-1-1992, the petitioners’ counsel—apparently on the premise that the petitioners were already employed—stated that he did not wish to press the matter, leading the learned Single Judge to dismiss the petition as infructuous. Applications to recall this order were dismissed, and a special appeal against that dismissal likewise failed by order dated 24-3-1993. On 24-5-1993 the Corporation issued notices to the appellants stating that, in view of the dismissal, the interim order of absorption had become null and void. The appellants then approached the Supreme Court by special leave; leave was granted and the present appeal ensued.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court’s interim direction of 4-5-1990, which ordered immediate absorption of the petitioners, was legally permissible without adjudication on the merits.
- Whether the subsequent dismissal of the writ petition as “not pressed” could stand when it effectively nullified the absorption granted under the interim order without a decision on merits.
- What consequential orders were required to achieve justice between the parties.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court observed that the High Court’s order of 4-5-1990, although labelled “interim,” effectively granted final relief by directing absorption. Such relief could be granted only after a full adjudication. Once the petition was later dismissed as infructuous, the interim order merged into that final order, rendering the absorptions legally unsustainable and placing the appellants in an anomalous position. The Court held that the anomaly resulted from the High Court’s failure to decide the writ petition on merits and emphasized that interim orders are intended merely to preserve rights pending final determination.
In light of these considerations, the Court concluded that justice required setting aside both the Single Judge’s dismissal and the Division Bench’s appellate order. The matter should be remitted to the High Court so that the writ petition could be determined on merits in accordance with law. The Court further clarified that, if the appellants were no longer in service, they would not be reinstated merely by virtue of the Supreme Court’s order; their employment status would abide by the final outcome before the High Court.
Holding and Implications
Order: The Supreme Court set aside the orders of both the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court and remitted Writ Petition No. 24200 of 1988 to the learned Single Judge for decision on merits. The appeal was disposed of with no order as to costs.
Implications: The appellants’ continued employment remains uncertain and subject to the High Court’s final decision. No new legal precedent was established; the Supreme Court primarily corrected a procedural irregularity to ensure adjudication on the merits.
Order
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against order dated 24-3-1993 passed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in a special appeal under rules of the Court upholding the order dated 11-1-1992 passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing Writ Petition No. 24200 of 1988 as not pressed.
3. The writ petition was filed for a direction to the State Road Transport Corporation to absorb the appellants as conductors as they were placed in a select list prepared by a duly constituted Selection Committee. The grievance of the appellants was that the Corporation was acting arbitrarily and appointing persons by practising pick and choose. It appears after exchange of affidavits the Division Bench while issuing notice on the writ petition passed following interim order:
“The respondents are directed to absorb the petitioners to the posts of conductors within a period of three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order.”
4. The order was complied with. And the appellants were absorbed. It is stated in the special leave petition, filed in this Court, that when the writ petitions came up for hearing the Court felt that notices may be issued to all the 291 persons who had been appointed by the Corporation. But the counsel of the appellants did not inform nor he filed any application for impleadment and when the petition came up for final hearing on 22-1-1992 the learned counsel, without any instructions, presumably, because the petitioners had been absorbed made a statement which resulted in dismissal of the writ petition. The order is extracted below:
“Learned counsel does not want to press this petition. In view of the Court's order dated 4-5-1990 this petition has become infructuous.
The petition is dismissed as infructuous.”
It is claimed that when petitioners came to know of the order they engaged another counsel and filed an application for recalling of the order. But it was dismissed and the special appeal filed against it also failed. In consequence of dismissal of the writ petition and special appeal the Corporation issued notice to the appellants on 24-5-1993. It reads as under:
“In pursuance of the interim order passed by the High Court on 4-5-1990 in the above writ petition, you had been taken in the service on the post of conductor. But now since the High Court, by its order dated 22-1-1992, has dismissed the writ petition, the interim order has automatically, become null and void.”
Faced with this situation the appellants filed the appeal in this Court.
5. We have heard learned counsel for parties. We do not propose to enter into merits of the matter as we are satisfied that the case shall have to be sent back to the High Court for deciding it in accordance with law. But we consider it necessary to observe that the piquant situation arose because of the order dated 4-5-1990 passed by the High Court. Although that order is not under challenge but the Division Bench which issued notice purported to grant by way of interim order a relief to the petitioners which could not have been granted to them without adjudication on merits. The direction by the High Court to absorb within a period of three months amounted to disposal of the writ petition and yet the High Court had issued notice only. Once the affidavits were exchanged it would have been appropriate for the High Court to decide the dispute. The issue of notice at this stage unless there were other necessary parties to be heard was not of any purpose. Be that as it may, once the High Court issued directions to the respondent to absorb the petitioners they had no option but to comply with the order. And once they were absorbed then the counsel could not be blamed for making a statement that the petition may be dismissed. At the same time once the petition was dismissed without any adjudication on merits the effect of dismissal was that interim order stood merged in the final order and the order of absorption stood nullified. This anomalous situation was brought into effect as a result of the interim order granted by the High Court. An interim order is granted by the court to protect the right or interest of a party approaching the court till the claim is adjudicated finally. It is temporary in nature and is made in the meantime. But the order of the High Court directing the respondents to absorb the appellants could not be termed as interim order. Such order could be granted only by way of final adjudication as a result of decision on merits.
6. However, to do justice between the parties we set aside the order passed by the Division Bench and the learned Single Judge and remit the matter to the learned Single Judge of the High Court to decide the writ petition of the appellants on merits in accordance with law. We may also make it clear that in case the appellants are not working or they have been ceased then they shall not be entitled to work till the matter is finally disposed of by the High Court.
7. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. Parties shall bear their own costs.
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