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Shiv Lal v. Sat Parkash And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The landlord initiated eviction proceedings against the respondents on the statutory ground that the tenants had ceased to occupy the premises for a continuous period of more than four months without reasonable cause. The trial court granted eviction, and the first appellate court affirmed. The tenants then invoked the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction under Section 15(5) of the Rent Control Act, which reversed the concurrent findings and dismissed the landlord’s applications. The landlord sought special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. After service of fresh notice, the respondents chose not to appear; special leave was granted, and the matter was heard ex parte against them.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Section 13(2)(v) of the Rent Control Act requires proof that the tenant intended to surrender or “bring to an end” the tenancy, in addition to non-occupation of the premises for four consecutive months without reasonable cause.
- Whether the High Court, while exercising limited revisional powers under Section 15(5) of the Act, exceeded its jurisdiction by re-appraising evidence and overturning concurrent factual findings of the lower courts.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court held that the plain language of Section 13(2)(v) imposes only one substantive requirement for eviction: the tenant’s non-use of the premises for a continuous four-month period without reasonable cause. The statute does not mandate proof that the tenant intended to terminate the tenancy (cession). The High Court erred in reading such an additional element into the provision.
Because of this mistaken legal premise, the High Court embarked on a de-novo evaluation of the evidence, overturning findings that both the trial court and the first appellate court had reached concurrently. The Supreme Court emphasized that, under Section 15(5), the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction is circumscribed; it is not a third appellate forum empowered to reassess facts absent jurisdictional error or perversity.
Concluding that the High Court’s fact-reappraisal was unjustified and predicated on an erroneous interpretation of Section 13(2)(v), the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and restored the eviction decrees.
Holding and Implications
Appeals Allowed; High Court judgment set aside; decrees of the trial court restored; no order as to costs.
The decision reaffirms that under Section 13(2)(v) of the Rent Control Act, mere non-occupation for the statutory period suffices for eviction; proof of intention to surrender the tenancy is unnecessary. It also underscores the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 15(5), signaling that High Courts should refrain from re-appraising evidence unless a jurisdictional ground exists. No new precedent is announced, but the ruling clarifies statutory interpretation and the boundaries of revisional review.
Order
1. After service of notice, the respondents appeared through Mr N.K Agarwal, Advocate. However, when the matter was listed on August 19, 1991 Mr N.K Agarwal stated that as desired by the respondents, he should be relieved from representing them. The prayer was allowed and fresh notice was issued to the respondents indicating that the matter would be finally disposed of at the notice stage.
2. The office report indicates that fresh notice was duly served on the respondents stating that the matter would be finally disposed of at the present stage, but they have chosen not to appear.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant. Special leave is granted.
4. The appeals arise out of proceedings for eviction of the respondents from the premises in question on the ground that they had ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of more than four months without reasonable cause. The trial court allowed the applications by orders which were affirmed on appeal by the first appellate court. The respondents challenged the decree before the High Court by revision applications under Section 15(5) of the Rent Control Act which were allowed by the impugned judgment reversing the decree and dismissing the applications. The High Court has held that the landlord has to prove that the tenant by his conduct has brought the tenancy to an end and with that intention discontinued the occupation of the demised premises, and since this has not been done the applications have to be dismissed. The relevant clause of Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act states that a tenant will be liable to eviction if he ceases to occupy the building for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause. The section does not require the cession of tenancy in question. The only condition which has to be satisfied is the non-user of the building for the requisite period. The principle underlying the provisions is that if a premises is not required by the tenant, it should become available to another person who may be in need thereof. The High Court, therefore, was clearly in error in assuming that unless the cession of the tenancy is proved, eviction cannot be ordered.
5. Proceeding further, the High Court has on a reappraisal of the evidence without any justification reversed the finding of facts concurrently arrived at by the trial court and the first appellate court. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 15(5) of the Act the Court does not act as a regular third appellate court and can interfere only within the scope of the sub-section, discussed and defined in many reported cases by this Court. An examination of the facts and circumstances of this case indicates that the reconsideration of the evidence by the High Court was not justified. It appears that on being misled by its view that the cession of tenancy is a necessary element of Section 13(2)(v), the High Court proceeded to re-examine the evidence on the records, leading to the impugned judgment. We, therefore, set aside the judgment under appeal and restore the decrees passed by the trial court. The appeals are accordingly allowed, but without costs.
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