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State Of Maharashtra v. Dr. Budhikota Subbarao .
Factual and Procedural Background
The Additional Sessions Judge framed charges against the accused on 24/27 July 1990. After several unsuccessful attempts to secure a discharge on the merits, the accused filed an application before the High Court seeking a declaration that those charges were “null and void” on the ground that the State had procured them by fraud. A learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the application solely because the State did not file a counter-affidavit, without entering any finding that fraud had in fact been committed. The State appealed, pointing out that a Division Bench order dated 25/26 March 1991 had already held that the framing of charges had become final and could not be reopened. The present judgment resolves the State’s appeal against the Single Judge’s order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court was justified in declaring the charges framed on 24/27 July 1990 a nullity merely because the State failed to file a counter-affidavit, without first recording a finding of fraud.
- Whether the pleadings in the accused’s application were legally sufficient to allege and prove fraud so as to vitiate the order framing charges.
- Whether the High Court could reopen and nullify earlier judicial orders by invoking Section 44 of the Indian Evidence Act on the basis of the fraud alleged.
Arguments of the Parties
Accused’s Arguments
- The Panchnama dated 30 May 1988 was fabricated, lacked his signature, and was ante-dated, demonstrating fraud by the State.
- For approximately three months the prosecution withheld copies of the police remand application and related orders, evidencing deceit.
- Statements in the complaint allegedly contradicted witness testimony, suggesting the State misled the court.
- The State’s submissions concealed material facts, thereby inducing the trial court to frame charges it would not otherwise have framed.
- Because relevant documents were not deposited in the Sessions Court when charges were framed, the prosecution’s arguments in February 1989 were fraudulent.
State’s Arguments
- The Division Bench order of 25/26 March 1991 had already ruled that the framing of charges was final and could not be reopened.
- The earlier Single Judge order dated 3/4 April 1990, directing that charges be framed under Sections 3 and 5, was within jurisdiction and could not be impeached.
- The allegations of fraud did not go to the substratum of the prosecution’s case and were therefore irrelevant to discharge or framing of charges.
- An application alleging fraud cannot be allowed without strict pleadings and strict proof; mere absence of a counter-affidavit is insufficient.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first expressed surprise that the High Court granted relief solely because the State did not file a reply, noting that a finding of fraud is indispensable before nullifying judicial orders. It observed that a Division Bench had already held the framing of charges to be final and had rejected any fraud allegation as extraneous to the discharge issue.
Explaining the concept of fraud, the Court cited dictionary definitions and Section 17 of the Contract Act, emphasising that fraud requires deliberate deception and strict pleading and proof. It examined the accused’s application and concluded that the averments—chiefly allegations about fabricated documents, withheld material, and “fraudulent submissions”—were merely disagreements with the prosecution’s legal arguments and evidence, not factual assertions capable of establishing deceit.
The Court held that legal submissions, even if erroneous, do not constitute misrepresentation. Extracts from prior judgments and procedural grievances could not, by themselves, give rise to an inference of fraud. Consequently, the High Court erred both procedurally (in granting relief for want of a counter-affidavit) and substantively (in treating the prior proceedings as vitiated under Section 44 of the Evidence Act without proof).
Holding and Implications
The appeal is allowed, the High Court’s order dated 14 October 1991 is set aside, and the accused’s application to declare the charges void on grounds of fraud is dismissed.
Immediate consequence: the charges framed by the Additional Sessions Judge remain valid and the criminal proceedings against the accused continue. The judgment reinforces that allegations of fraud require precise pleading and affirmative proof; mere non-filing of a counter-affidavit by the State cannot, by itself, vitiate prior judicial orders. No new legal precedent was created beyond reaffirming this established principle.
R.M Sahai, J.— The short question that arises for consideration in this appeal is if the High Court was justified in allowing the application filed by the accused for declaring that the charges framed by the Additional Sessions Judge by order dated July 24/27, 1990 were null and void as they were obtained by fraud, practised by the State.
2. Merits or otherwise of the application, alleging fraud against the State, apart, what has left us completely surprised is not so much the entertaining of the application filed by the accused, for declaration that the charges framed against him were nullity having been procured by fraud, as the procedure adopted by the learned Single Judge of granting the prayer merely for failure of the State to file any reply by way of counter-affidavit than by recording any finding that the State was guilty of procuring the order framing the charges by fraud. One of the objections raised by the State was that since the High Court by its order passed on March 25/26, 1991 in Criminal Writ Petition No. 966 of 1990 had specifically held that the question of framing charge had become final, therefore, it could not be reopened, cannot be said to be without substance as the Division Bench had clearly held that it was not open to go behind the order passed by the learned Single Judge on April 3/4, 1990 directing that the charges be framed against the accused not only under Section 3 but under Section 5 as well. Nor can any exception be taken to the finding of the Bench that the said order could not be said to have been passed without jurisdiction in as much as the learned Single Judge had jurisdiction to decide the revision application preferred under the provisions of the Code. Even the question of fraud raised by the accused was negatived by the Division Bench and it was held that it was not capable of being gone into as it did not form part of the substratum of the case of the prosecution and was not germane to the question of deciding as to whether he was entitled to be discharged or not.
3. However, it is not necessary to rest the decision on this ground as the learned Single Judge having allowed the application as being vitiated by fraud it appears necessary to examine if the pleading on fraud in the application filed by the accused was sufficient in law to empower the High Court to take cognizance of it and even if it was, did the accused succeed in proving it as even if the State did not file any counter-affidavit the application could not be allowed unless it was found as a fact that the State by its acts or omissions acted deceitfully or it misled the court. ‘Fraud’ is false representation by one who is aware that it was untrue with an intention to mislead the other who may act upon it to his prejudice and to the advantage of the representor. It is defined in Oxford Dictionary as, ‘using of false representations to obtain an unjust advantage or to injure the rights or interests of another’. In Webster it is defined as, ‘deception in order to gain by another's loss; craft; trickery; guile; any artifice or deception practiced to cheat, deceive, or circumvent another to his injury’. It has been defined statutorily in Section 17 of the Contract Act as including certain acts committed with connivance or with intent to deceive another. In Administrative Law it has been extended to failure to disclose all relevant and material facts which one has a positive duty to disclose. It is thus understood as deliberate act or omission to mislead the other to gain undue advantage. ‘It consists of some deceitful practice or wilful device resorted to with intent to deprive another of his right or in some manner to do him an injury’ (Black's Law Dictionary). Effect of fraud on any proceeding, or transaction is that it becomes nullity. Even the most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Such being the nature and consequence of it the law requires not only strict pleading of it but strict proof as well.
4. Did the averments in the application make out a case of fraud? Were the statements of fact capable of giving rise to an inference in law that the State was guilty of misleading the court? From the charge-sheet it is clear that it complied with the requirements of law and mentions not only the offence and the section but the particulars as to time, place and person. Whether prosecution was possessed of sufficient evidence to prove each of the charges is a different matter, but they were framed on basis of documents seized from possession of the accused at the airport, search of his residence, on the next day, interrogations of the accused and examination of prosecution witnesses. In the connected appeal No. 276 of 1993 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 986 of 1992] directed against the discharge of the accused for failure to obtain sanction a very brief summary has been given of various attempts made by the accused to get an order of discharge, on merits, without success. It is not necessary to recount all that here. Ultimately when the accused was discharged for failure of the State to obtain sanction under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in brief ‘the Code’) and the State challenged the correctness of the order by way of revision the accused filed the application for the declaration that the charge-sheet be declared null and void. In paragraph 3 of the application it was stated that the charges were vitiated by fraud as the Panchnama dated May 30, 1988 was fabricated as it did not contain his signature and it was ante-dated. It was further averred that for three months even the copies of the remand application filed by the police were denied to the applicant and the orders thereon were not supplied to him. It was also claimed that the complaint was in contradiction with the statement of witnesses. May or may not be so but that could be relevant when the merits were gone into. It certainly, could not be taken as a ground for claiming that the framing of charge was fraudulent, especially, when these aspects had been thrashed out once before the learned Single Judge who by his order dated April 3/4, 1990 held that the charges against the accused were made out not only under Section 3 but under Section 5 of the Act.
5. In the same paragraph the accused extracted certain observations made by a learned Single Judge, in one of the orders and claimed that they furnished guidelines to distinguish between offences under Sections 3 and 5 of the O.S Act. According to him if honest and fair answer to the question, if any charge was made out, was given by the State it would have exonerated the applicant but the State committed fraud by keeping the trial Judge in the dark of real facts and induced him to entertain erroneous opinion and pass order on July 24, framing charges against him. In paragraphs 4 to 8 various sentences from one or the other judgment rendered for or against the accused by different courts at one or the other stage were extracted and it was claimed that the State either knowingly did not place correct facts to substantiate those observations or deliberately concealed the truth and made fraudulent submissions inducing the trial Judge thereby to frame the charges. Emphasis was laid on the submissions advanced by the State and it was stated that it was result of fraudulent submissions that the trial court was induced to frame charges against the accused. No foundation giving rise to fraud was laid. Facts which could be fished out from paragraphs averring fraudulent submissions could not in our opinion be said to be relevant for alleging fraud. For instance in paragraph 4 it was stated,—
“[T]he learned Additional Session Judge was deceived by the aforesaid fraudulent and false submission of the respondent in February 1989 during the judicial proceedings and the learned Additional Session Judge was induced to believe that the applicant was also found and caught carrying books on May 30, 1988 at the Sahar Airport Bombay which books, as alleged by the respondent, could not have come into possession of the applicant even in the ordinary course, when the applicant was holding the office of the Captain of Navy. The respondent knew very well that in the record of the Sessions Case No. 1084 of 1988 there were no books as alleged by the respondent and moreover the disputed documents were not deposited in the Sessions Court in February 1989 when the learned Additional Session Judge was induced to believe the fraudulent submissions of the respondent in February 1989. The above-mentioned fraudulent submissions of the respondent were clearly meant to deceive the Session Court in February 1989 and to see that the applicant was not discharged under Section 227 CrPC.”
Similarly in paragraph 5 it was stated:
“It is significant to note that in February 1989 the documents were not deposited in the Sessions Court though it was mandatory under Section 209(c) CrPC to deposit the documents in the Sessions Court after the case was committed to the Sessions on September 22, 1988 by the learned Magistrate. Thus in actual position, there were no documents in February 1989 for ‘consideration’ of the learned Additional Session Judge as prescribed under the provisions of Section 227 CrPC and the respondent took advantage of that situation and intentionally made the aforesaid fraudulent submissions in February 1989 during the judicial proceedings before the learned Additional Session Judge Shri Patel and caused circumstances to induce the learned Session Judge Shri Patel to entertain erroneous opinions and pass orders resulting in miscarriage of justice.”
In paragraph 7 it was stated as under:
“The learned Additional Session Judge Shri Patel passed two orders dated September 11, 1989 and October 11, 1989 to compel the respondent to deposit the documents in the Sessions Court and accordingly the documents were deposited in the Sessions Court only on October 11, 1989; which conclusively establishes that in February 1989 when ‘charges’ were framed the ‘documents’ were not with the Sessions Court and the fraudulent and false evidence advanced in February 1989 by the respondent alone became the basis to frame ‘charges’ in February 1989.”
6. We must confess our inability to appreciate the worth of such averments to establish fraud. Legal submissions cannot be equated to misrepresentation. In our opinion the pleadings fell short of legal requirements to establish fraud. Various sentences extracted from different judgments between the accused and State in various proceedings could not give rise to an inference either in law or fact that the State was guilty of fraud. Suffice it to say that it was complete misapprehension under which the accused was labouring and it was indeed unfortunate that the High Court not only entertained such application but adopted a course which amounted to reviewing and setting aside orders of his predecessor without sufficient material and accepted the claim that all earlier judgments were liable to be ignored under Section 44 of the Evidence Act as the proceedings were vitiated by fraud. We are constrained to say that the learned Judge not only committed an error of procedure but misapplied the law.
7. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order dated October 14, 1991 in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 2260 of 1991 is set aside and the application of the accused for declaring the order dated February 24/27, 1990 framing the charges against him as vitiated by fraud, is dismissed.
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