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Mohan Pandey And Another v. Usha Rani Rajgaria (Smt) And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Aug 19, 1992
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Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent 1 is the owner of a house in Delhi. She alleges that the premises were originally let to one Shri B.K. Pandey, who unlawfully transferred possession to Appellant 1. A civil suit for eviction of the appellants from the building is already pending. Respondent 1 further contends that the appellants subsequently trespassed into an additional portion of the property not covered by the pending suit and engaged in various wrongful acts. Instead of filing an amended plaint or a fresh civil action, Respondent 1, acting through her power-of-attorney holder (Respondent 2), filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Delhi High Court. She sought (i) directions restraining the appellants from interfering with her possession and (ii) orders against the Delhi Administration and the Commissioner of Police to prevent alleged police harassment instigated by the appellants. The High Court, despite noting the pending civil suit, issued an order directing the removal of a grill to restore Respondent 1’s access to the backyard on a specified date. The appellants obtained special leave to appeal from the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can be invoked to enforce a private right to immovable property as between private individuals when ordinary civil remedies are available.
  2. Whether the Delhi High Court erred in granting mandatory relief (removal of the grill) in the face of a pending civil suit covering the same property dispute.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Denied all factual allegations of trespass or misconduct.
  • Contended that the writ petition was not maintainable because the dispute concerned private property rights between private parties, for which the proper remedy lay in a civil suit.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Through counsel Mr. Arun Jaitley, supported the High Court’s order, asserting that the writ petition was justified because Respondents also sought directions against governmental authorities (Delhi Administration and Commissioner of Police) who were allegedly acting in a partisan manner.
  • Argued that urgent relief was necessary to curb the appellants’ high-handed behaviour and misuse of police machinery.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court emphasized that Article 226 is a “special and extraordinary” jurisdiction, not intended to displace ordinary remedies available under civil or criminal law. The Court observed:

  • The underlying dispute concerns property rights between two private individuals; no statutory duty of a public authority is at issue.
  • A civil suit covering the property (or at least part of it) is already pending, providing an adequate forum for adjudication.
  • Even if the respondents’ grievance pertained to police action or criminal proceedings, appropriate remedies exist under the Criminal Procedure Code.

Accordingly, the High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition and in issuing a mandatory direction against the appellants. Exercising writ jurisdiction “casually or lightly” in such private disputes would undermine the purpose of Article 226.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment set aside; writ petition dismissed; no order as to costs.

Immediate Effect: The mandatory order directing removal of the grill stands annulled, and the parties must pursue their remedies in the pending civil suit or under ordinary criminal law.

Broader Implication: The decision reaffirms that Article 226 cannot be invoked for private property disputes absent a breach of statutory duty by a public authority, thereby preserving the distinction between ordinary civil remedies and extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction.

Show all summary ...

L.M Sharma, J.— Heard the learned counsel for the parties. Special leave is granted.

2. The respondents in this appeal have successfully invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for enforcement of a private right to immovable property against the appellants who are two brothers and who are resisting the claim. The question is as to whether the writ jurisdiction in the High Court is available for the enforcement of such a right claimed by and against private individuals.

3. The dispute relates to a house-property in Delhi. A suit for eviction of the appellants from the building is pending in the trial court. According to the case of the respondent 1, who is the owner of the property, she had let out the same to one Shri B.K Pandey who later illegally handed over the possession thereof to appellant 1. According to the further case of the respondent, the portion of the said house property which is the subject matter of the present case is beyond the purview of the pending suit. The occasion for initiating the present proceeding with respect to this portion arose, it is said, on account of the high-handedness of the appellants who illegally trespassed beyond the area which is the subject matter of the pending suit, and indulged in several illegal activities. In other words, the appellants are trespassers and are guilty of mischievous conduct. However, instead of filing a suit in the civil court or making an appropriate prayer for amendment of her plaint in the pending suit, she through respondent 2 holding power of attorney, approached the High Court directly by a writ petition under Article 226 for issuance of appropriate direction restraining the appellants from disturbing the lawful possession of the respondents. The Delhi Administration and the Commissioner of Police, Delhi, were also impleaded as parties with a prayer that appropriate order should be issued against them also and they should be directed not to register any further false and vexatious complaint against them at the instance of the appellants. It is her case that the appellants have been getting undue police help and are being encouraged to commence frivolous criminal cases against respondent 1 and her agent.

4. The appellants denied the allegations of fact made against them and also challenged the maintainability of the writ petition.

5. Although the fact that a suit between the parties was already pending in the civil court was known to the High Court, it proceeded to pass a short order stating:

“There is already a civil suit pending between the parties. Except the prayer in regard to access to the backyard, no other relief can be granted in this writ petition.
We direct respondents 3 and 4 to remove the grill for access to the backyard in the presence of the police and representatives of the petitioners on Sunday, February 23, 1992 at 11.00 a.m so that the access of the petitioner to the servants quarters is not stopped.”

6. Mr Arun Jaitley, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent 1 has supported the impugned judgment on the ground that prayer for issuing a direction against Delhi Administration and Commissioner of Police who were respondents 1 and 2 was also made. It has to be appreciated that the present appellants were respondents 3 and 4 before the High Court; and the High Court has by the impugned order, considered it fit to allow the prayer of the respondents against them for removal of the grills for access to the backyard. According to the stand of the landlord-respondent, since the police were taking a partisan attitude against her, the filing of a writ petition became necessary. We are unable to follow this argument. There is no doubt that the dispute is between two private persons with respect to an immovable property. Further, a suit covering either directly a portion of the house-property which is in dispute in the present case or in any event some other parts of the same property is already pending in the civil court. The respondent justifies the step of her moving the High Court with a writ petition on the ground of some complaint made by the appellants and the action by the police taken thereon. We do not agree that on account of this development, the respondent was entitled to maintain a writ petition before the High Court. It has repeatedly been held by this Court as also by various High Courts that a regular suit is the appropriate remedy for settlement of disputes relating to property rights between private persons and that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not be available except where violation of some statutory duty on the part of a statutory authority is alleged. And in such a case, the Court will issue appropriate direction to the authority concerned. If the real grievance of the respondent is against the initiation of criminal proceedings, and the orders passed and steps taken thereon, she must avail of the remedy under the general law including the Criminal Procedure Code. The High Court cannot allow the constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies, under the general law, civil or criminal, are available. It is not intended to replace the ordinary remedies by way of a suit or application available to a litigant. The jurisdiction is special and extraordinary and should not be exercised casually or lightly. We, therefore, hold that the High Court was in error in issuing the impugned direction against the appellants by their judgment under appeal. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the impugned judgment is set aside and the writ petition of the respondents filed in the High Court is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.