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Paras Ram v. State Of Haryana .
Factual and Procedural Background
On 7 April 1988, Sub-Inspector Rohtas Singh and Head Constable Ram Krishan apprehended the appellant near the Hilton factory on the G.T. Road in Haryana. An envelope of wax paper carried by the appellant contained a .12-bore country-made pistol for which he possessed no licence or permit. The District Magistrate, Sonepat, issued sanction on 26 April 1988 for prosecution under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959.
While the case was pending before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sonepat, the Magistrate observed on 7 December 1989 that the matter should be tried by the Designated Court under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA). He transferred the file the same day, directing the accused to appear before the Designated Court.
The Additional Sessions Judge, acting as the Designated Court, framed a charge on 18 December 1989 under Section 5 of the TADA Act. After trial, the court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to five years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 200 (with a default sentence of three months’ rigorous imprisonment). The present appeal challenges that conviction and sentence.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Designated Court had jurisdiction to try the appellant under the TADA Act despite the original charge under Section 25 of the Arms Act.
- Whether possession of a country-made pistol without ammunition attracts liability under Section 5 of the TADA Act, 1987.
- If Section 5 is inapplicable, whether the appellant could nevertheless be convicted for an offence under Section 25(1-B)(a) of the Arms Act on the evidence led.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The prosecution itself had not initially regarded the case as one fit for trial under the TADA Act, making the subsequent trial and conviction under Section 5 improper.
- Section 5 of the TADA Act was inapplicable because:
- a country-made pistol does not fall under Category III(a) of Schedule I to the Arms Rules, 1962, and
- the appellant possessed no ammunition; the statute requires possession of both “arms and ammunition”.
- The evidence of two police witnesses, unsupported by an independent witness, was insufficient to sustain any conviction.
Respondent’s Arguments
- The prosecution had always considered the matter fit for trial under Section 5 of the TADA Act and had requested the Magistrate to transfer the case.
- Under the applicable notification extending TADA to the whole of Haryana, the Designated Court had exclusive jurisdiction once Section 5 was invoked.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jaloba v. State of Haryana, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 197 | Sections 6 and 9 of the earlier TADA Act (equivalent to Sections 5 and 11 of the 1987 Act) render offences under other statutes, committed in a notified area, triable exclusively by a Designated Court. | The Court relied on this decision to uphold the jurisdiction of the Designated Court to try the present appellant even though the substantive offence was under Section 25 of the Arms Act. |
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
1. Jurisdiction of the Designated Court. Relying on Jaloba, the Supreme Court held that because Haryana was a notified area under TADA (vide notification dated 18 November 1987), an Arms Act offence committed there became triable exclusively by the Designated Court. Hence, the transfer ordered by the Magistrate and the subsequent trial were within jurisdiction.
2. Interpretation of Section 5, TADA Act, 1987. Section 5 criminalises unauthorised possession of “any arms and ammunition” specified in Category III(a) of Schedule I to the Arms Rules in a notified area. The Court reasoned that “arms and ammunition” must be read conjunctively: both must be possessed together to constitute the offence. This construction aligns with the legislative object, as a person with only a firearm or only ammunition is not equally capable of terrorist activity. Because the appellant possessed a country-made pistol but no ammunition, Section 5 did not apply.
3. Punishment under the Arms Act. Section 12 of TADA empowers a Designated Court to convict an accused of any offence proved during trial, even if it falls under another law. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence—principally the testimony of the two arresting police officers—and found no reason to doubt the Designated Court’s factual finding that the appellant possessed an unlicensed firearm. Absence of corroboration by a private witness did not, on these facts, undermine credibility.
4. Quantum of Sentence. For an offence under Section 25(1-B)(a) of the Arms Act, the statutory minimum is one year’s imprisonment, extendable to three years, plus fine. Considering the circumstances, the Court deemed a sentence of one year’s rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 200 appropriate.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed in Part. The conviction under Section 5 of the TADA Act and the sentence of five years’ rigorous imprisonment are set aside. The appellant is instead convicted under Section 25(1-B)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959, and sentenced to one year’s rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 200 (already paid). He must surrender to serve the balance of the reduced sentence; his bail is cancelled.
Implications: The judgment clarifies that Section 5 of the TADA Act, 1987 requires concurrent possession of both a firearm and its ammunition. It also reaffirms the Designated Court’s jurisdiction over Arms Act offences committed in a notified area, while demonstrating the Court’s authority under Section 12 TADA to record convictions under other statutes.
S.P Bharucha, J.— This is an appeal against the judgment and order of the Additional Judge, Rohtak, being the Designated Court under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (for short ‘TADA Act, 1987’) whereby the appellant was convicted of an offence punishable under Section 5 thereof and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs 200 or, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of three months.
2. The appellant was apprehended by Sub-Inspector Rohtas Singh and Head Constable Ram Krishan near the Hilton factory on G.T Road in the State of Haryana on April 7, 1988 on suspicion. In the envelope of wax paper that the appellant was carrying was found a .12 bore country-made pistol for which he had no licence or permit. After the necessary formalities, sanction was issued on April 26, 1988 by the District Magistrate, Sonepat, for prosecuting the appellant for an offence under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959. On December 7, 1989, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sonepat, before whom the appellant was being prosecuted for the said offence, passed the following order:
“Present A.P.P for the State.
Accused on bail.
At this stage it has come to my notice that this case should have been tried by the learned Designated Court under Section 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. Consequently this case is sent to learned Designated Court (Shri B.R Gupta learned Addl. Sessions Judge), Sonepat. Accused is directed to appear in that court at 12.00 noon today itself. File completed in all respects. Be sent immediately.
Sd/- J.M.I.C Sonepat
Announced
December 7, 1989.”
3. The appellant was then tried by the said Additional Judge under Section 5 of the TADA Act, 1987. The judgment under appeal noted that the appellant was charged on December 18, 1989 by the said Additional Judge for the offence punishable under Section 5 of the TADA Act, 1987, to which the appellant pleaded not guilty. Upon the evidence led, the said Additional Judge found that the prosecution had brought home the offence to the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the appellant was convicted and sentenced as aforesaid.
4. The appellant has in his grounds of appeal taken, inter alia, the plea that the prosecution itself had not considered the case against him to be a fit case to frame a charge and proceed under the TADA Act, 1987 and that it was, therefore, not proper that he should have been tried and convicted thereunder. In the counter filed by Khajan Singh, Sub-Inspector, Police Station Rai, it is submitted in reply that the prosecution had considered this to be a fit case to frame a charge and proceed against the appellant under Section 5 of the TADA Act, 1987 and had requested the learned Magistrate to transfer the case to the Designated Court for trial.
5. It is not in dispute that the provisions of the TADA Act, 1987 had been extended to cover the whole of the State of Haryana by a notification dated November 18, 1987.
6. This Court in the judgment in Jaloba v. State of Haryana 1989 Supp (2) SCC 197 considered the submission that the Designated Court had no jurisdiction to try the appellant Jaloba because he had not been charged with having committed any offence under the TADA Act, 1985. He had been charged under Section 25 of the Arms Act. This Court rejected the submission noting Sections 6 and 9 of the TADA Act, 1985 (equivalent to Section 5 and 11 of the TADA Act, 1987). Section 6 laid down that if in any area notified by the State Government under the TADA Act, 1985, a person contravened any provision or rule made, inter alia, under the Arms Act, then he was liable to the enhanced punishment provided for in the section. Section 9 of the TADA Act, 1985 laid down that, notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, every offence punishable under that Act or a rule made thereunder was triable only by the Designated Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. It, therefore, followed that though the offence committed by the appellant was in contravention of Section 25 of the Arms Act, it became exclusively triable by the Designated Court because of the notification made by the State Government and the operation of Section 6 of the TADA Act, 1985. It was, therefore, futile for the appellant to contend that the Designated Court did not have jurisdiction to try him for the offence for which he stood charged.
7. Upon the authority of the judgment in Jaloba case 1989 Supp (2) SCC 197 it must be held that the appellant before us was rightly tried by the Designated Court under the provisions of the TADA Act, 1987.
8. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that, in any event, the provisions of Section 5 of the TADA Act did not apply to the appellant. These provisions applied where “any person is in possession of any arms and ammunition specified in … Category III(a) of Schedule I to the Arms Rules, 1962, unauthorisedly in a notified area”. Category III(a) of Schedule I to the Arms Rules reads thus:
“III Firearms other than those in categories I, II and IV, namely Ammunition for fire-arms other than those in categories I, II and IV, namely: (a) Revolvers and pistols Ammunition for fire-arms of category III(a).”
9. It was pointed out that the appellant was found to be carrying a country-made pistol and submitted that a country-made pistol fell outside the ambit of the said Category III(a). That category speaks in broad terms of “revolvers and pistols” and there is no reason to exclude a country-made revolver or pistol therefrom.
10. It was then argued, and, we think, with substance, that Section 5 of the TADA Act, 1987 applied only when a person was in possession of “arms and ammunition” and that the appellant, while he had been found in possession of a country-made pistol, had not been found in possession of any ammunition. We think that the words “arms and ammunition” in Section 5 should be read conjuctively. This is not merely a matter of correct grammar but also subserves the object of the TADA Act, 1987. A person in possession of both a firearm and the ammunition therefor is capable of terrorist and disruptive activities but not one who has a firearm but not the ammunition for it or vice versa. It is, therefore, our view that the provisions of Section 5 of the TADA Act, 1987 could not have been applied to the appellant.
11. This is not to say that the appellant should necessarily have been acquitted. Section 12 of the TADA Act, 1987 empowers the Designated Court to convict a person of any offence under any other law if he is found to have been guilty of the same during the course of a trial under that Act and to punish appropriately.
12. It was submitted that the evidence against the appellant did not establish that he was guilty of an offence under Section 25(1-B)(a) of the Arms Act, namely, of having in his possession an unlicenced firearm. We have examined the evidence and found no reason to question the conclusion of the Designated Court that the appellant was so guilty. That the evidence relied upon was of two police officials does not ipso facto give rise to doubt about its credibility. There is nothing on record to show that these police officials were hostile to the appellant and their evidence was not shaken in cross-examination. That the private party who was called as a witness by the prosecution did not support it does not, in the circumstances, lead to the conclusion that the appellant was innocent.
13. The appellant being guilty of an offence under Section 25(1-B)(a) of the Arms Act is punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to three years and he is also liable to fine. In the circumstances of the case, we think that the appellant must undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of one year and pay a fine of Rs 200.
14. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed in the aforesaid terms. The appellant has already paid the fine of Rs 200 and has served a part of the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon him. He is presently on bail. The bail now stands cancelled and the appellant shall surrender to serve the balance of the sentence of imprisonment.
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