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R.M Gurjar And Another v. High Court Of Gujarat And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Aug 11, 1992
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Factual and Procedural Background

R.M. Gurjar and D.N. Jadhav, junior clerks in the Civil Courts at Broach (Gujarat), were charged with falsely identifying three individuals before a Judicial Magistrate. In the disciplinary enquiry they admitted the misconduct and sought leniency. On 5 June 1974 the District Judge—acting as their disciplinary authority—imposed the penalty of permanently withholding future promotions.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1971 (“the Rules”), the High Court of Gujarat, after giving the clerks an opportunity to be heard, reviewed the District Judge’s order and enhanced the penalty to removal from service. Gurjar and Jadhav challenged this enhanced punishment by a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. A learned Single Judge, constrained by an earlier Division Bench ruling in Ramesh C. Mashruwala v. State (1975 16 Guj LR 277), referred two legal questions to a larger Bench. A Full Bench answered both questions against the petitioners. The present appeal by special leave is directed against that Full Bench judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on its administrative side, the High Court has jurisdiction to enhance a penalty imposed by the District Judge on ministerial staff of the subordinate courts by exercising review powers under Rule 23 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1971.
  2. Whether the “control” vested in High Courts under Article 235 of the Constitution extends only to members of the State’s judicial service as defined in Article 236(b) or also includes ministerial officers and servants employed in subordinate courts.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramesh C. Mashruwala v. State (1975) 16 Guj LR 277 Division Bench view that Article 235 control is confined to judicial officers, not ministerial staff. Cited to explain why the Single Judge felt constrained to make a reference; later acknowledged as overruled.
State of Gujarat v. Ramesh Chandra Mashruwala (1977) 2 SCC 12 Supreme Court held Registrar, Small Causes Court, is within Articles 235 & 236; broadened scope of “judicial service.” Noted by the Full Bench as having set aside the earlier Division Bench decision, thereby supporting a wider interpretation of Article 235.
State of W.B. v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi (1966) 1 SCR 771; AIR 1966 SC 447 Defines nature and extent of High Court’s control under Article 235. Relied upon to identify the High Court as the “immediately superior authority” to the District Judge for purposes of appeals under the Rules.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court first examined Rules 7(3), 18, 21 and 23 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1971. Under Rule 7(3), the District Judge, as Head of Office and appointing authority, is the disciplinary authority competent to impose penalties on ministerial staff. Rules 18(1) and 18(2) confer a right of appeal against such penalties to “an officer immediately superior to the officer who made the order.” Because the District Judge functions under the administrative control of the High Court, precedent (Nripendra Nath Bagchi) establishes the High Court as that immediately superior authority.

Rule 23 empowers the appellate authority to review any disciplinary order “as if the Government servant had preferred an appeal.” Consequently, the High Court—while acting administratively—was authorized to review and, if thought fit, enhance the penalty originally imposed by the District Judge. The Court underscored that the High Court complied with the procedural safeguard of giving the employees an opportunity to be heard before enhancing the punishment.

Addressing the broader constitutional question, the Court approved the Full Bench’s interpretation that Article 235 control extends beyond judicial officers to include ministerial staff of subordinate courts. The earlier restrictive view taken in Mashruwala (1975) having been set aside by the Supreme Court in 1977, no impediment remained to adopting this broader interpretation.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed that:

  • The High Court, acting on its administrative side, possessed jurisdiction under Rule 23 of the 1971 Rules to enhance the penalty imposed by the District Judge.
  • Article 235 control of the High Court encompasses ministerial officers and servants attached to subordinate courts.

Implications: The decision confirms the High Court’s supervisory and disciplinary jurisdiction over ministerial staff of subordinate courts in Gujarat, reinforcing administrative coherence between judicial officers and supporting staff. The ruling applies existing principles and does not create new precedent beyond clarifying their application to similar factual contexts.

Show all summary ...

Kuldip Singh, J.— R.M Gurjar and D.N Jadhav were working as junior clerks in the civil courts under the administrative control of District Judge, Broach, Gujarat. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against them on the charge that they falsely identified three persons before a Judicial Magistrate. At the enquiry both of them admitted the charge and prayed for mercy. The District Judge by the order dated June 5, 1974 imposed the penalty of withholding their future promotions with permanent effect. The High Court in exercise of its powers under Rule 23 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1971 (the Rules) enhanced the penalty and imposed the punishment of removal from service. It is not disputed that the High Court enhanced the penalty after affording opportunity to the two officials in accordance with law. Gurjar and Jadhav challenged the order of their removal by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court. The learned Single Judge after considering the relevant provisions including the historical background of various constitutional reforms appears to have been of the view that the source of power to pass the impugned order lay in the constitutional control of the High Court under Article 235. However, the difficulty which came in the way of the learned Single Judge to hold so was on account of the judgment of a Division Bench in Ramesh C. Mashruwala v. State (1975) 16 Guj LR 277 wherein the Division Bench had given a restricted interpretation to Article 235 and had confined its applicability to persons in the judicial service of the State only. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge referred the following two questions to be decided by a larger bench:

“(1) Whether the High Court on its administrative side has jurisdiction to enhance the penalty imposed by the District Judge upon a member of the ministerial staff of the subordinate court in exercise of the powers of review conferred by Rule 23 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971?
(2) Whether the control vested in the High Courts under Article 235 of the Constitution is exercisable only over members of the judicial service of the State as defined in Article 236(b) or whether the ministerial officers and servants on the establishment of the subordinate courts are also ultimately subject to such control?”

2. While the reference was pending before the Full Bench, the decision in Mashruwala case (1975) 16 Guj LR 277 was set aside by this Court in State of Gujarat v. Ramesh Chandra Mashruwala (1977) 2 SCC 12 and it was held that the Registrar of the Small Causes Court was a judicial officer in the judicial service of the State and came within the scope and intendment of Articles 235 and 236 of the Constitution of India.

3. The Full Bench of the High Court speaking through the Acting Chief Justice primarily dealt with question No. 2 and came to the conclusion that the “control” under Article 235 of the Constitution of India extends to the ministerial officers and servants on the establishment of the subordinate courts also. The second question was, accordingly, answered against the petitioners. On the interpretation of Article 235 and the Rules the first question was also decided against the petitioners. This appeal by way of special leave is against the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court.

4. From the judgment of the Full Bench it transpires that though the bench entered into lengthy discussion on the interpretation of the constitutional provisions contained in Chapter VI of the Constitution it did not elaborately deal with the relevant Rules which have a direct bearing on the first question. We, therefore, consider it desirable, at this stage, to first deal with the relevant provisions of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971. The relevant Rules are extracted hereunder.

5. Rules 7, 18, 21 and 23 of the Rules are as under:

“7. Disciplinary Authority.— (1)***
(2)***
(3) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-rules (1) and (2), Heads of Departments and Heads of Offices may impose any of the penalties mentioned in Rule 6 upon any Government servant of subordinate or inferior service serving under them whom they have power to appoint.
(4)***
18. Orders against which appeal lies.— (1) Subject to the provisions of Rule 22, a Government servant may prefer an appeal against all or any of the following orders, namely:—

(i) an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under Rule 5.

(ii) an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 6 whether made by the Disciplinary Authority or by any appellate or reviewing authority.

(iii) an order enhancing any penalty, imposed under Rule 6.

(a) to (c)***

(d) has the effect of his non-promotion to a higher post, or

(2) An appeal referred to in sub-rule (1) shall lie to an officer immediately superior to the officer who made the order:
21. Consideration of appeals.— (1)***
(2) In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 6, or enhancing any penalty imposed under the said rule, the appellate authority shall consider—

(d) whether the penalty imposed is excessive, adequate or inadequate, and, after consultation with the Commission, if such consultation is necessary in the case, pass orders—

(i) setting aside, reducing, confirming or enhancing the penalty, or

Provided that—

(ii) no order for enhancing the penalty shall be passed unless the appellant is given an opportunity of making any representation which he may wish to make against such enhanced penalty, and

23. Review of orders in disciplinary cases.— The authority to which an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 6 lies may, of its own motion or otherwise, call for the record of any proceeding under these Rules and review any order passed in such a case and, may, after consultation with the Commission where such consultation is necessary, pass such order as it deems fit as if the Government servant had preferred an appeal against such order:
Provided that no action under this Rule shall be taken after the expiry of a period of more than six months from the date of such order.”

6. The District Judge, being the Head of Office and the appointing authority of the appellants, was the disciplinary authority under Rule 7(3) of the Rules. The District Judge imposed the punishment of stoppage of promotion on permanent basis. Reading Rules 18(1) and 18(2) of the Rules together it is obvious that an order imposing the penalty of stoppage of promotion is appealable and the appeal lies before an officer immediately superior to the officer who made the order. In this case the order having been made by the District Judge, the appeal would lie to an officer/authority immediately superior to the District Judge. The District Judge is under the administrative control of the High Court. The nature and extent of control which vests in the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution of India has been authoritatively determined by this Court in State of W.B v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi (1966) 1 SCR 771, AIR 1966 SC 447. Therefore, undisputably, the High Court is the immediate superior authority to the District Judge and the appeal against the order of the District Judge in this case would lie to the High Court. Rule 23 of the Rules empowers the appellate authority to exercise the power of review. It is, thus, clear on the plain reading of the Rules that the High Court being the appellate authority had the power to review the order of the District Judge. Admittedly, the High Court passed the order enhancing the punishment in exercise of its powers under Rule 23 of the Rules. Therefore, we hold that the High Court was within its jurisdiction on the administrative side to enhance the punishment of the appellants in exercise of its powers under Rule 23 of the Rules.

7. On the interpretation placed by us on the Rules, the answer to the first question has to be in the affirmative. We are also of the opinion that the answer to the second question as rendered by the Full Bench of the High Court is unexceptionable and does not call for any interference. The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed but with no order as to cost.