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Surya Narain Upadhyaya v. Ram Roop Pandey And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant entered into an agreement of sale dated 25-1-1969 for urban property valued at Rs 12,000, paying Rs 3,000 as earnest money. The vendor (Respondent 1) was obliged to execute a sale deed within one year but instead executed a gift deed dated 24-1-1969 in favour of Respondents 2 and 3, who later alienated the property to Respondent 8 and others. The appellant sued all respondents for specific performance. The trial court decreed the suit, and the first appellate court affirmed. In Second Appeal No. 2385 of 1974, the High Court of Allahabad reversed the concurrent decrees, dismissing the suit on the ground that the appellant had initially under-paid court fees, allegedly demonstrating lack of capacity and willingness to perform. The present appeal by special leave challenges that High Court judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellant was “ready and willing” to perform his part of the contract as required by Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
- Whether initial deficiency in court-fee payment is a valid basis to infer incapacity or unwillingness to perform the contract.
- Whether the High Court erred in overturning concurrent factual findings of the trial and first appellate courts regarding the appellant’s readiness and willingness.
- How judicial discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act should be exercised in granting specific performance.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court held that Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act mandates both an averment and proof that the plaintiff has always been ready and willing to perform the contract. The appellant satisfied this requirement by:
- Pleading readiness and willingness in the plaint.
- Offering to deposit the balance consideration of Rs 9,000.
- Actually depositing that amount within the time fixed by the trial court, a fact acknowledged by the High Court itself.
The Court emphasized that a decree for specific performance is discretionary under Section 20 but that discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. It found the High Court’s reliance on the initial deficit in court fees to be an “irrelevant consideration” and a “manifest illegality,” especially in light of concurrent findings that the appellant had the financial capacity and intent to perform.
Recognizing the long lapse of time and escalation in property value, the Court used its equitable discretion to require the appellant to deposit an additional Rs 12,000 within two months. Upon such deposit, the appellant is entitled to have the sale deed executed within three months; failing cooperation from the respondents, execution may proceed through the trial court.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; decree for specific performance restored subject to additional payment of Rs 12,000.
The decision reinstates the trial and first appellate court decrees, enabling the appellant to obtain title upon depositing the additional sum. It underscores that minor procedural deficiencies, such as delayed payment of court fees, do not automatically negate readiness and willingness under Section 16, and it reaffirms appellate limitations on disturbing concurrent factual findings. No broader precedent is declared beyond these clarifications.
Order
1. This appeal by special leave arises against the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad in Second Appeal No. 2385 of 1974 dated 26-9-1979. A suit was filed for the specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 25-1-1969. The total consideration for the contract was Rs 12,000 and a sum of Rs 3000 was paid as earnest money. The contract was to be executed within a period of one year thereafter. Instead of executing the sale deed in favour of the appellant, the first respondent started disposing of the properties. He executed a gift deed on 24-1-1969 in favour of Respondents 2 and 3, who in turn seem to have further alienated the properties in favour of Respondent 8 and others. All the respondents were impleaded and a suit for specific performance was filed by the appellant. The trial court decreed the suit and the first appellate court confirmed the same.
2. In the second appeal, the High Court reversed the judgment and decree and dismissed the suit on the main ground that the appellant did not pay sufficient court fee on the date of presenting the plaint and the deficit was not made good for some time thereafter. It would show that the appellant had no capacity to pay the consideration and willing to perform his part of the contract.
3. We are wholly unable to subscribe to the views expressed by the High Court. Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 mandates the plaintiff to aver in the plaint and establish as a fact by evidence aliunde that he has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The failure thereof is fatal to maintain the suit and entails its dismissal. It is seen that the appellant has specifically pleaded in his plaint that he has been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. He also further stated that he was ready to deposit the balance consideration of Rs 9000 and get the sale deed executed and registered in his favour in terms of the contract. The High Court also found that the appellant had deposited Rs 9000 within the time allowed by the trial court and the suit was decreed. That would clearly show that the appellant had the capacity to pay the balance consideration and he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.
4. Though the decree for specific performance is a discretionary power, yet the court is not bound to grant such a relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary, but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles of law and capable of correction by a court of appeal. Therefore, the discretion should be properly exercised keeping in view the settled principles of law as envisaged in Section 20 of the Act. This case demonstrates that the High Court took irrelevant consideration into account to refuse to grant the decree for specific performance. It also committed manifest illegality in reversing the concurrent finding of facts recorded by the trial court as well as the first appellant court, namely the appellant has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.
5. However, in view of the long lapse of time, and appreciation of the value of the property (in this case urban property) it was suggested to the appellant and the appellant had agreed, very fairly, to pay a further sum of Rs 12,000. Accordingly, the appellant is directed to deposit a further sum of Rs 12,000 to the credit of the suit in the trial court within a period of two months from today and on the deposit so made, the appellant shall be entitled to have the sale deed executed within a period of three months thereafter. In case the respondents refuse to execute the sale deed, it is open to the appellant to get the sale deed executed through the trial court. The direction to pay a sum of Rs 12,000 is in addition to the sum already deposited and lying in the court.
6. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. But in the circumstances the parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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