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Unit Trust Of India v. T. Bijaya Kumar Patra
Factual and Procedural Background
The first respondent was offered the post of Manager (Finance) on 5-4-1984 and joined service on 16-5-1984 with a probation period of one year, extendable at the appellant-Trust’s discretion. Performance assessments dated 14-12-1984, 10/13-5-1985 and 25-10-1985 consistently rated his work as below average. His probation was extended by six months on 15-5-1985 to allow improvement, but no progress was recorded. Consequently, by order dated 29-10-1985 (effective 15-11-1985) the Trust issued an order of “discharge simpliciter” ending his employment.
The first respondent challenged the termination before the Calcutta High Court. A learned Single Judge, affirmed by a Division Bench, held the order stigmatic and set it aside. The Trust sought relief in the Supreme Court of India by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an order terminating a probationer for “unsatisfactory performance” constitutes a penal, stigmatic dismissal requiring prior notice and an opportunity to be heard.
- Whether the impugned termination was vitiated by bias, mala fides or extraneous considerations.
Arguments of the Parties
First Respondent’s Arguments
- The termination order is penal and stigmatic because it is founded on allegations of unsatisfactory performance, thus attracting constitutional and natural-justice protections.
- The decision to terminate was influenced by bias and mala fides on the part of Trust officers, warranting judicial interference.
Appellant-Trust’s Submissions
- The order is one of discharge simpliciter issued during probation; it contains no stigma and therefore does not amount to punishment.
- Performance assessments demonstrated unsuitability; no extraneous or biased considerations entered the decision-making process.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das, AIR 1961 SC 177; (1961) 1 SCR 606 | A probationer has no right to the post; services may be terminated in accordance with rules without treating it as punishment. | Relied upon to affirm that termination of the first respondent, a probationer, could be effected without a hearing and did not constitute punishment. |
| Madan Mohan Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1973) 4 SCC 166 | Reiterates that discharge of a probationer simpliciter is not punitive when no stigma is attached. | Cited to show the present view aligns with settled law. |
| Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831; (1975) 1 SCR 814 | Distinction between punitive dismissal and termination simpliciter during probation. | Referenced to support the conclusion that the impugned order is termination simpliciter. |
| Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India, (1984) 2 SCC 369; (1984) 2 SCR 453 | No contrary principle to the above authorities; maintains the same legal position. | Used to demonstrate consistency of current decision with prior jurisprudence. |
| Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 217; (1983) 2 SCR 517 | Considered but held factually distinguishable and inapplicable. | Court found the precedent irrelevant to the instant facts. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court scrutinised the language of the 29-10-1985 order and found it to be a discharge simpliciter, devoid of any words casting stigma. Reviewing the confidential assessment reports and internal office notes, the Court observed:
- Assessments uniformly recorded unsatisfactory performance, justifying non-confirmation.
- The decision-making process was confined to evaluating suitability; no extraneous or mala fide factors were evident.
- Communicating reasons separately in a confidential letter did not convert the discharge into punitive action.
- Under settled law, notably State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das, a probationer can be removed without a hearing when the order is non-stigmatic.
The High Court’s approach of “lifting the veil” was rejected because the record disclosed no bias and no stigma arose from the order itself.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; High Court judgment set aside; writ petition dismissed.
Immediate Effect: The first respondent’s termination stands reinstated as valid, with no order as to costs.
Broader Implications: The decision reaffirms settled principles governing termination of probationers—discharge simpliciter based on unsuitability is not punitive, and courts will not interfere absent proof of stigma or mala fides. The ruling does not formulate new precedent but fortifies existing jurisprudence on probationary employment in public bodies.
1. By a letter dated 5-4-1984, the first respondent was offered the post of Manager (Finance) on the terms and conditions set out therein. The letter of offer says that the first respondent will be placed on probation for one year extendable up to two years at the discretion of the Trust. Pursuant to the said offer, the first respondent joined service on 16-5-1984. He was placed on probation and it appears from the letter of 15-5-1985 that his performance was reported to be below average. He was advised to show improvement in the next six months, by which period his probation was extended. The assessment reports made during this period on 14-12-1984, 10-5-1985/13-5-1985 and 25-10-1985 also disclose that his performance was not satisfactory and, therefore, the management took the decision to terminate his service by the order of 20-10-1985 which reads as under:
“Shri T.B.K Patra, Manager (Finance) on probation attached to Calcutta Regional Office would cease to be in the employment of the Trust with effect from close of business on 15-11-1985.”
2. It appears from a plain reading of this order that it is an order of discharge simpliciter attaching no stigma whatsoever. It also appears from the office note which was prepared prior to the making of this order that the Deputy General Manager (Personnel and Administration) found that the work of the first respondent was reported to be unsatisfactory and hence he was not recommended for confirmation. This decision was based on the confidential reports called for assessing the “suitability” of the first respondent.
3. On the basis of this note which was produced at the behest of the first respondent, a further note dated 28-10-1983 was put up recommending termination of his service on the ground of unsatisfactory performance. This note was approved by the Chairman of the appellant Trust also. As stated above, this note was based on the earlier assessment reports made by different officers of the Trust.
4. The first respondent challenged the order of termination of his service by a writ petition filed in the High Court of Calcutta. A learned Single Judge upheld his challenge on the ground that the impugned order was stigmatic in character and this was confirmed in appeal by the Division Bench of the High Court. The appellant Trust feeling aggrieved by and dissatisfied with this order has moved this Court by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution.
5. We have extracted the order of termination passed against the first respondent on 29-10-1985 which is ex facie an order of discharge simpliciter. It is evident from the facts placed on record that as the performance of the first respondent was not found to be satisfactory, he was informed about the same by the letter of 15-5-1985, with a view to giving him an opportunity to show improvement. The probation period was, therefore, extended by another six months to enable him to do so. Unfortunately, the subsequent assessment report shows that he did not show any improvement in performance and was not suited for the job and hence the management was constrained to terminate his services.
6. The first respondent contends before us that the impugned order is penal and stigmatic in character and springs from bias on the part of officers of the appellant Trust. In support of this contention he has placed reliance on the case law which was placed before the High Court.
7. We have carefully considered this submission of the first respondent but we are afraid, we do not find any material on record to conclude that the impugned order smacks of bias or is in any way mala fide. As stated earlier, from the language of the order, we do not think that any stigma attaches to the first respondent. In fact, the management showed sensitivity in not stating the reason for termination of service but in order that the first respondent may know the reason for termination, the same was separately communicated to him by confidential letter of even date i.e 29-10-1985.
8. The first respondent contends that the Court ought not to go by the plain language of the termination order but must lift the veil to ascertain the true reason which prompted the management to put an end to his service.
9. We have examined the backdrop in which this order came to be passed. As stated earlier even on close scrutiny of the material on record, we are not in a position to persuade ourselves to the view taken by the High Court. In the first place there is nothing on record to support the first respondent's contention that the order suffers from the vice of bias, prejudice or mala fides. Secondly, there is nothing in the order to conclude that it is penal or that it stigmatises the first respondent. Thirdly, the reason which weighed with the management was his unsuitability for the job based on his unsatisfactory performance during the probation period. This is obvious from the office note on which the decision was taken. The confidential assessment reports were called from different officers to assess his suitability for the job. The decision on suitability could only be taken from his work or performance during the probation period. We have also perused the confidential office note which preceded the decision to terminate his services and we are satisfied that no consideration which can be said to be extraneous or irrelevant had entered the decision-making. Having perused the record carefully, we do not think that the order of termination suffers from any bias as alleged by the first respondent.
10. In State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das AIR 1961 SC 177, (1961) 1 SCR 606 this Court held that the services of a probationer can be terminated in accordance with the rules because a probationer has no right to the post held by him. The very purpose of placing a person on probation is to try him during the probation period to assess his suitability for the job in question. It is settled law that an order of discharge is not an order of punishment and, therefore, there was no question of giving a hearing before termination of service. The decisions in Madan Mohan Prasad v. State of Bihar (1973) 4 SCC 166, Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) 2 SCC 831, (1975) 1 SCR 814, Anoop Jaiswal v. Govt. of India (1984) 2 SCC 369, (1984) 2 SCR 453 do not take any different view.
11. The decision in Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 217, (1983) 2 SCR 517 has no relevance or application to the facts of the present case. The facts here are simple, namely, during the probation period the performance of the first respondent was watched and was not found to be satisfactory, despite he having been given an opportunity to show improvement. Hence the management was constrained to put an end to his service by an order of discharge simpliciter. We are, therefore, of the view that the management had acted within the framework of the rules and law and its decision ought not to have been upset by the High Court.
12. For the above reasons, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and direct that the first respondent's writ petition be taken as dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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