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Union Of India v. Khazan Singh .

Supreme Court Of India

Apr 6, 1992

Judgment

CaseIQ

Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

Khazan Singh, a Head Constable (Driver) with the Delhi Police, was issued a show-cause notice on 14 December 1989 for allegedly absenting himself from VIP route duty, thereby leaving an Inspector without transportation. Finding his reply unsatisfactory, the Deputy Commissioner of Police imposed the minor penalty of censure.

Invoking Rule 25 of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 (“the Rules”), Khazan Singh appealed. The Additional Commissioner of Police (appellate authority) set aside the censure and directed that a regular departmental inquiry be held.

Khazan Singh then approached the Central Administrative Tribunal (“CAT”), which on 20 March 1991 quashed the appellate authority’s order, holding that the direction to conduct a fresh inquiry exceeded the powers conferred by Rule 25.

The Union of India filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court challenging the CAT’s decision. The Supreme Court granted leave and rendered the present judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether, under Rule 25(1)(e) and 25(1)(f) of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980, the appellate authority could set aside a penalty of censure and remit the matter for a regular departmental inquiry when no inquiry had previously been conducted.
Whether the Central Administrative Tribunal erred in holding that the appellate authority had acted outside its jurisdiction by ordering such an inquiry.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Union of India)

Rule 25(1)(e) and 25(1)(f) confer “very wide powers” on the appellate authority, including the power to remit a case for further inquiry and to pass any order deemed fit.
The appellate authority’s omission to cite the exact sub-rule does not invalidate the order if the exercise of power can be justified under any provision of law.
No prejudice is caused to Khazan Singh because his defence can be fully examined only in a regular inquiry.

Respondent (Khazan Singh)

Rule 25(1)(e) applies only where a departmental inquiry has already been held by the disciplinary authority; since no inquiry had taken place, the appellate authority lacked power to remit the case.
The appellate authority effectively enhanced the punishment without following the procedure under Rule 25(1)(d), which requires a fresh show-cause notice and opportunity to be heard.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court observed that Rule 25(1)(e) allows the appellate authority to “remit the case to the authority which made the order … to make such further inquiry as it may consider proper.” Read with Rule 25(1)(f), this grants broad discretion to render “such other orders as it may deem fit.” Accordingly, even though the appellate authority did not expressly invoke sub-rule (e) or (f), its decision squarely fell within their ambit.

The Court emphasized the settled principle that an administrative order is not vitiated merely because it omits to specify the exact statutory provision, so long as the power exists elsewhere in the statute. It held that the Tribunal erred in accepting counsel’s concession that the order was made under Rule 25(1)(d) and in ignoring the broader powers available under sub-rules (e) and (f).

The Court rejected the respondent’s contention that sub-rule (e) is triggered only after an inquiry has been held, noting that the language of the rule imposes no such limitation and is designed to “enable the appellate authority to do justice in a given case.” Since a full inquiry would afford Khazan Singh an opportunity to present his defence, no prejudice resulted from the remand.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; CAT’s judgment dated 20 March 1991 set aside; order of the appellate authority dated 25 April 1990 restored.

Direct Effect: The censure penalty remains quashed, and a regular departmental inquiry against Khazan Singh will proceed as directed by the appellate authority.

Broader Implications: The decision affirms the wide remedial powers of appellate authorities under Rule 25(1)(e) and (f) of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980, clarifying that orders need not explicitly cite the enabling sub-rule if the authority can otherwise be discerned from the statutory scheme. No new precedent beyond this interpretative clarification was set.

Show all summary ...

Order

1. Special leave granted.

2. Khazan Singh, Head Constable (Driver), Delhi Police was awarded the punishment of censure by the Deputy Commissioner of Police. On an appeal filed by Khazan Singh the Additional Commissioner of Police, Armed Police, Delhi set aside the punishment of censure and directed that regular departmental inquiry be held against him under Rule 25 of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 (the Rules). Against the order of the Additional Commissioner of Police, Khazan Singh filed an application before the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal by its judgment dated March 20, 1991 quashed the order of the appellate authority. This appeal by way of special leave petition by the Union of India is against the order of the Tribunal.

3. A show-cause notice dated December 14, 1989 was issued to Khazan Singh by the Deputy Commissioner of Police on the allegations that he while deputed to act as Motorcycle Rider, to an Inspector Police, absented himself from duty leaving the Inspector without any vehicle. They were on VIP route duty. The show-cause notice was in the following terms:

“The above act on your part amounts to grave carelessness, negligence, misconduct and dereliction in the discharge of your government duties. You are, therefore, called upon to show cause as to why your conduct should not be censured for the above lapse.'

4. The reply filed by Khazan Singh was found to be unsatisfactory and penalty of censure was imposed. The powers of the appellate authority are provided under Rule 25 of the Rules which is as under:

“25. Orders on appeal.— (1) On appeal, the appellate authority may,

(a) confirm the impugned order; or

(b) accept the appeal and set aside punishment order; or

(d) disagree with the disciplinary authority and enhance the punishment after issue of a fresh show-cause notice to the appellant and affording him a reasonable opportunity (including personal hearing if asked for) against the proposed enhancement);

(e) [Added vide Notification No. P/5/132-81-H(P) Estt. dated July 20, 1988] remit the case to the authority which made the order or to any other authority to make such further inquiry as it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case; or

(f) pass such other orders as it may deem fit.

(2) Every order passed on appeal shall contain the reasons therefor. A copy of every appellate order shall be given free of cost to the appellant.”

5. Khazan Singh filed an appeal under the rules. The appellate authority set aside the punishment of censure and ordered the Deputy Commissioner Police to hold regular departmental inquiry in accordance with the Rules. The operative part of the order is as under:

“I have carefully gone through the appeal submitted by HC (Driver) Khazan Singh No. 10179.DAP, para-wise comments and other relevant papers. The appellant has raised the point that the duty from which he is alleged to have absented himself was not his duty and he had dropped Inspector Prem Chand for VVIP route duty at Dhaula Khan only as a matter of accommodation. He has also alleged that it is not part of his duty to drop any officer on such duties as he is only a Despatch Rider and any change in the nature of his duties requires approval of a Gazetted Officer. Before taking any decision on his pleas, I feel the matter calls for a thorough probe and disciplinary authority has adopted a short cut to arrive at this conclusion by choosing to issue him a show-cause notice for censure. In case the appellant did absent himself from duty in the manner stated in the punishment order, regular departmental inquiry was required to be held in order to ascertain all the facts and also award punishment commensurate with the misconduct. I, therefore, set-aside the punishment of censure and order that D.C.P/9th Bn. DAP will order a regular departmental inquiry to be held against HC (Driver) Khazan Singh No. 10179.DAP for absenting himself from VIP route duty and for alleged misbehaviour under Rule 25 of D.P (P&A) Rules 1980.”

The Central Administrative Tribunal set aside the order of the appellate authority on the following reasoning:

“The learned counsel for the respondents replied that under Rule 25(1)(d), the appellate authority disagreed with the disciplinary authority and enhanced the punishment after issuing a fresh show-cause notice to the appellants, affording him a reasonable opportunity. But the order of the appellate authority is in clear contravention of this provision. The appellate authority has accepted the appeal and set aside the order of punishment, but further directions by the appellate authority to the disciplinary authority for holding a fresh inquiry for major penalty is nowhere provided in Rule 25 of the Rules of 1980. If the appellate authority wanted to remit the case to the disciplinary authority, then he should have clearly done so under sub-rule (e), but the impugned order passed by the appellate authority is in clear contravention of the provisions of the Rules. The appellate authority has clearly exceeded the jurisdiction vested in him. Consequently, the impugned order passed by the appellate authority has to be set aside.”

6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Rule 25(1)(e) read with Rule 25(1)(f) of the Rules gives very wide powers to the appellate authority. It has the power to remit the case to the disciplinary authority for further inquiry and pass such other orders as it may consider proper or deem fit in the circumstances of the case. The appellate authority did not mention in its order as to under which sub-rule of Rule 25(1) the appeal was being disposed of. The Tribunal while noticing Rule 25(1)(e) of the Rules and conceding that the appellate authority could remand the case to the disciplinary authority for further inquiry under the said sub-rule, grossly erred in setting aside the order on the concession of the learned counsel to the effect that the appellate authority had passed the order under Rule 25(1)(d) of the Rules. It is settled proposition of law that when the exercise of power can be justified under any provision of law then non-mention of the said provision in the order can not ∼invalidate the same. We are of the view that the appellate authority validly exercised its powers under Rule 25(1)(e) and 25(1)(f) of the Rules. Mr K.R Nagaraja, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Khazan Singh stated that Rule 25(1)(e) would only be attracted if departmental inquiry was held by the disciplinary authority and since in this case no ∼inquiry was held the appellate authority had no power under the said rule to remand the case. We do not agree. The powers under the Rules are very wide enabling the appellate authority to do justice in a given case. No prejudice has been caused to Khazan Singh because the defence set up by him can only be examined in a regular inquiry.

7. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal dated March 20, 1991 and restore the order of the appellate authority dated April 25, 1990. No costs.