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Sampat Singh And Others v. State Of Haryana And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners—sixteen Members of the Haryana Legislative Assembly and three Members of Parliament—filed Civil Petition No. 14500 of 1991 in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana under Article 226 of the Constitution. They sought, inter alia, an order directing the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to investigate FIR No. 372/1987 (Sadar Police Station) alleging corruption and abuse of authority by Ch. Bhajan Lal and to set aside a Magistrate’s order discharging him.
The High Court summarily dismissed the writ petition, holding that the relief sought would conflict with a prior judgment of the Supreme Court. The petitioners then approached the Supreme Court of India by way of a Special Leave Petition (SLP).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioners, who were not parties to the original criminal proceedings, possessed the locus standi to seek a fresh investigation and other reliefs.
- Whether the Magistrate had legal authority to act on a police “cancellation report” under Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code in a matter involving offences triable exclusively by a Special Judge under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners’ Arguments
- The police investigation was perfunctory and hurried, culminating in an unsupported cancellation report under Section 173 CrPC.
- The Magistrate discharged Ch. Bhajan Lal without applying judicial mind, rendering the order legally unsustainable.
- Ch. Bhajan Lal allegedly induced the original complainant, Dharam Pal, to withdraw the allegations by offering him the Chairmanship of the Haryana Khadi Board, thereby undermining the integrity of the investigation.
- Given the compromised state machinery, only an independent CBI probe could ensure a fair investigation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary (1992) 4 SCC 305 | Defines and limits locus standi of third parties in criminal proceedings. | Relied upon to hold that the present petitioners, not being parties to the original case, lacked standing to seek the requested reliefs. |
| Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India (1992) 4 SCC 653 | Further clarifies restrictions on public interest interventions in criminal matters. | Applied alongside Janata Dal to deny standing to the petitioners. |
| A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602 | Holds that offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act must be tried exclusively by Special Judges. | Used to conclude that the Magistrate lacked competence and should have forwarded the final report to the Special Judge. |
| K. Siva Kanchi Reddy v. State of A.P., 1991 APLJ 1 | Reiterates procedural requirements when dealing with offences triable by Special Courts. | Supports the view that the Magistrate’s direct action on the cancellation report was improper. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
First, the Court examined the petitioners’ standing. Citing Janata Dal and Simranjit Singh Mann, it held unequivocally that individuals unconnected with the underlying criminal case lack locus standi to seek investigative directions. On that basis, the SLP was not maintainable.
Nonetheless, exercising its inherent jurisdiction, the Supreme Court scrutinised the legality of the Magistrate’s discharge order. The FIR alleged offences under Sections 161 and 165 IPC and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act—offences triable only by a Special Judge in view of the dictum in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak. Consequently, when the police filed a cancellation report under Section 173 CrPC, the Magistrate was obliged to transmit the report and case records to the competent Special Judge rather than act on it himself.
Because the Magistrate exceeded his jurisdiction by accepting the cancellation report and discharging the accused, the Supreme Court set aside that order. All papers were directed to be sent to the Special Judge, who is to consider the matter afresh according to law.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Special Leave Petition is DISMISSED for want of locus standi, but the Magistrate’s order dated 22 July 1991 is SET ASIDE. The Magistrate must transmit the cancellation report and entire record to the appropriate Special Judge, who will pass orders in accordance with law.
Implications: The decision re-affirms that offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act are exclusively triable by Special Courts and that subordinate magistrates lack authority to dispose of such matters, even at the stage of a police cancellation report. It also underscores stringent limits on the standing of third parties to intervene in criminal investigations, while preserving the Supreme Court’s power to act suo motu to correct jurisdictional errors.
S. Ratnavel Pandian, J.— The above special leave petition is preferred by the petitioners of whom petitioners 1 to 16 are members of the Legislative Assembly of Haryana and petitioners 17 to 19 are members of the Parliament. They all jointly filed a Civil Petition No. 14500 of 1991 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, Chandigarh seeking various reliefs, the main of which being to direct an investigation by Central Bureau of Investigation against Ch. Bhajan Lal on the basis of FIR No. 372 of 1987 of Sadar Police Station, registered on the complaint of Dharam Pal, making serious allegations of corruption, misuse of authority etc. and for setting aside the order of the Magistrate discharging the accused, Ch. Bhajan Lal.
2. The High Court dismissed the petition by a brief order without going into the locus standi of the petitioners. The relevant portion of the impugned order is as follows:
“3. The reasons disclosed in the writ petition and canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioners broadly are, that respondent 2 being in the helm of affairs of State, there is a reasonable apprehension in the minds of the people that a fair and impartial investigation in the aforesaid FIR is not expected, more so when respondent 2 in the earlier case has already refuted the allegations levelled against him in the affidavit filed by him before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It has been vehemently stressed by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the State Police Agency will not be in a position to hold free and fair investigation and on that account, the investigation should be conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation.
4. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioners and having gone through the writ petition, we do not find any merit in the contentions, as in substance the prayer of the petitioner is to ask this Court to pass an order which may have the effect of running directly counter to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as contained in the concluding paragraph of the judgment referred to above. Dismissed.”
3. Hence this SLP.
4. When the very maintainability of this petition on the ground of locus standi of the petitioners was raised, Mr R.K Garg, learned senior counsel forcibly contended that the perfunctory and mutilated investigation, the hasty submission of the cancellation report by the police under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the unreasoned order of the Magistrate discharging Ch. Bhajan Lal without application of his judicial mind — writ large on the face of the final order dated July 22, 1991 — are all under a cloud of suspicion and dust and, therefore, this Court in the interest of justice has to step into the matter and direct a fresh investigation by the CBI. He further contended that Ch. Bhajan Lal by offering the post of Chairman of Khadi Board of Haryana State had inspired Dharam Pal to file an affidavit withdrawing the allegations made in the complaint and that Ch. Bhajan Lal had thus planned very meticulously and ingeniously to drive the final nail in the coffin of investigation and in that endeavour has become successful.
5. These petitioners were not at all parties to the earlier proceedings at any stage. Hence, notwithstanding the above submission, we unreservedly hold that these petitioners have no locus standi to approach this Court for the reliefs sought for in this petition. In this connection, reference may be made to the decisions of this Court in Janata Dal v. H.S Chowdhary (1992) 4 SCC 305 and Simaranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India (1992) 4 SCC 653, JT (1992) 4 SC 441. The copies of the affidavit of Dharam Pal and the order of the Magistrate, discharging the accused have been produced before us. We also sent for the file, containing the said affidavit and discharge orders and perused the same.
6. Though it is true that Dharam Pal who appeared before this Court supporting the case of the State of Haryana in Civil Appeal No. 5412 of 1990 with full vigour, appears to have suddenly reversed back from his earlier stand and given an affidavit withdrawing his allegations. The question whether the offering of the post of Chairman of Khadi Board of Haryana as a quid pro quo for tendering the affidavit or not, does not fall within our province in the present proceeding. Further we do not like to express any opinion on his conduct except observing that the Court should not be indirectly used as an instrumentality by anyone to attain or obtain any beneficial achievement which one could not get through normal legal process and that if anyone approaches the Court with ulterior motive, designed to wrench some personal benefit by putting another within the clutches of law and using the Court as a devise only for that end but not to get any legal remedy, then in such a situation the Court should heavily come upon such a person and see that the authority of the Court is not misused. Neither the State nor the complainant, Dharam Pal has challenged the order of the Magistrate discharging the accused, presumably for the reasons that the police has closed the investigation and sent its cancellation report and that Dharam Pal has expressed his desire in his affidavit not to probe into the allegations. We have gone through the entire file as well as the order of the Magistrate. Except observing that the complainant who initiated the law into motion alleging serious allegations against Ch. Bhajan Lal who was then holding a Cabinet rank in the Central Government, may become liable for criminal and civil liability in case the allegations are not proved. Whatever might have been the motive of Dharam Pal for withdrawal of his complaint, he, after having fought the case up to this Court in quashing proceedings cannot have any justification in requesting the investigating officer not to probe into the allegations and staging a ‘walk out’ of the Court. On the other hand, he ought to have submitted to the discipline of the Court, especially when he has initiated the proceedings as a public interest litigant.
7. Be that it may, having regard to the various facts and circumstances as brought to our notice, we feel that it has become necessary that this Court on its own has to examine the legality of the order of the Magistrate.
8. Needless to say, it is not for a court to keep track of an investigation and watch its day to day progress but, of course, when an investigation culminates into a final report as contemplated under Section 173 of CrPC, then the competent court enjoins a duty within its authority sanctioned by law to scrupulously scrutinise the final report and the accompaniments by applying its judicial mind and take a decision either to accept or reject the final report. In the present case, that stage has come on the submission of the final report, namely the cancellation report, by the investigating officer.
9. We shall now examine whether the Magistrate has got power to act on the basis of the cancellation report one way or the other under Section 173 of the Code.
10. In the instant case, the case is registered under Sections 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which offences can only be tried by a Special Court. We think it is not necessary to expatiate the proposition of law in this regard but suffice to refer to the decision in A.R Antulay v. R.S Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602, 1988 Supp (1) SCR 1 wherein at page 44, the following dictum is laid down:
“Section 7(1) of the 1952 Act creates a condition which is sine qua non for the trial of offences under Section 6(1) of the said Act. The condition is that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law, the said offences shall be triable by Special Judges only.”
11. In the light of the above observation, it was necessary for the Magistrate to have sent the final report to the Special Court which is alone competent to try the case.
12. Reference may also be made to K. Siva Kanchi Reddy v. State of A.P 1991 APLJ 1 to which one of us (K. Jayachandra Reddy, J.) was a party.
13. Reverting to the case on hand, the Magistrate before whom the cancellation report had been placed, instead of acting on it by himself, should have forwarded the same to the Special Judge but he has not done so especially when he has no power to try the offences.
14. Under these circumstances, we set aside the order of the Magistrate dated July 22, 1991 and direct him to transmit all the papers along with the cancellation report to the Special Judge having jurisdiction. The Special Judge to whom the entire matter will be transmitted may, after going into the records, pass the necessary orders according to law.
15. The special leave petition is dismissed subject to our suo motu direction as indicated above.
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