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Food Corporation Of India v. George Varghese And Another

Supreme Court Of India
Apr 3, 1991
Important Paras
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Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, an employee of the appellant, allegedly certified certain bills between March 14, 1974 and March 20, 1976, enabling a contractor to claim an excess amount of Rs 19,180 from the appellant. On March 14, 1975, the respondent was placed under suspension on the ground that disciplinary proceedings were contemplated. Before departmental proceedings were initiated, an FIR was lodged on June 23, 1975, after which the appellant refrained from proceeding departmentally.

The respondent was tried by the Special Judge and convicted by judgment and order dated January 25, 1978, following which he was dismissed from service by order dated May 15, 1978. The respondent appealed; the High Court allowed the appeal, granted him the benefit of doubt, and acquitted him by order dated October 23, 1979. After the acquittal of the respondent and his companions, the appellant set aside the dismissal order, reinstated the respondent, and immediately placed him under suspension by order dated August 12, 1980. The respondent was soon served with a charge-sheet and statement of allegations for a departmental inquiry.

The respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court, which was allowed by a learned Single Judge on the view that once there is an acquittal, no departmental proceedings could be initiated against the delinquent. The appellant filed a letters patent appeal. The Division Bench agreed with the ultimate conclusion but differed on the question of law; it nevertheless refused to interfere with the Single Judge’s ultimate order on the ground of delay. The present appeal was heard after special leave was granted.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Division Bench was justified in refusing to interfere with the Single Judge’s order solely on the ground of delay, in the circumstances of the case.
  2. Whether, following the respondent’s acquittal in the criminal case, the appellant could initiate and proceed with departmental inquiry proceedings against him (as addressed in the High Court proceedings).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court found that the Division Bench erred in refusing to interfere solely on the ground of delay because the delay was not attributable to inaction by the appellant. The Court emphasized that the appellant had acted fairly by refraining from pursuing the departmental inquiry once the prosecution was initiated, so as not to be seen as “overreaching” the judicial proceedings.

The Court reasoned that if the appellant had proceeded with the departmental inquiry during the criminal case, the respondent would have been compelled to file his reply, which could have been used against him in the criminal proceedings; this could have been regarded as unfair. After the respondent’s conviction, dismissal was ordered; however, upon acquittal, the appellant promptly set aside the dismissal order, reinstated the respondent, and then initiated departmental proceedings by placing him under suspension and serving a charge-sheet with statement of allegations.

On these facts, the Court concluded that the appellant could not be faulted for delay. Although there was a gap of about eight months between setting aside the dismissal and service of the charge-sheet, the Court held that this gap was not fatal in the circumstances.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; HIGH COURT ORDER SET ASIDE. The Court set aside the High Court’s order and directed that the appellant proceed with the departmental inquiry expeditiously and complete it, as far as possible, within about six months, provided the respondent cooperates and does not delay the proceedings. If the respondent had not filed his written statement to the charges, he was permitted to do so within two weeks.

The direct implication is that the departmental inquiry against the respondent may proceed despite the earlier High Court interference, and the matter is to be concluded on an expedited timeline. The opinion does not indicate any broader implications or articulation of new precedent beyond resolving the dispute on the facts and procedural fairness considerations described.

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Order

1. Special leave granted.

2. We have heard counsel on both sides. From the facts placed on record, it appears that between March 14, 1974 and March 20, 1976 the respondent who was an employee of the appellant, certified certain bills which enabled the Contractor to claim an excess amount of Rs 19,180 from the appellant. The respondent was, therefore, placed under suspension on March 14, 1975, on the ground that disciplinary proceedings were contemplated against him. Before the disciplinary proceedings could be initiated it appears that first information report was lodged on June 23, 1975 and as a result thereof the appellant stayed its hands so far as the disciplinary proceedings were concerned. The Special Judge who tried the respondent convicted him by his judgment and order dated January 25, 1978. Thereupon the respondent was dismissed from service by an order dated May 15, 1978. It appears that the respondent preferred an appeal against the order of conviction and sentence. The appeal was allowed, he was given the benefit of doubt, and was acquitted vide the High Court's order dated October 23, 1979. The respondent as well as his companions having thus been acquitted, the appellant set aside the order of dismissal, reinstated the respondent in service and immediately placed him under suspension by the order of August 12, 1980. Soon thereafter he was served with the charge-sheet and the statement of allegations, etc., for holding the departmental inquiry. Thereupon he filed a writ petition in the High Court which was allowed by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that once there is an acquittal, no departmental proceedings could be initiated against the delinquent. The appellant filed a letters patent appeal challenging the order of the learned Single Judge. While the Division Bench agreed with the ultimate conclusion of learned Single Judge, it differed with him on the question of law but refused to interfere with the ultimate order on the ground of delay. We do not think that the Division Bench was justified in refusing to interfere only on the ground of delay because the delay was not occasioned on account of inaction on the part of the appellant. The appellant acted fairly by staying its hands as soon as the prosecution was initiated. It did not proceed with the departmental enquiry lest it may be said that it was trying to overreach the judicial proceedings. If it had insisted on proceeding with the departmental inquiry, the respondent would have been constrained to file his reply which could have been used against him in the criminal proceedings. That may have been branded as unfair. After the conviction the order of dismissal was passed but immediately on the respondents being acquitted the appellant fairly set aside that order and reinstated the respondent and initiated departmental proceedings by suspending him and serving him with the charge-sheet and the statement of allegations, etc. It cannot, therefore, be said that the appellant was guilty of delay. It is true that between setting aside the order of dismissal and the service of the charge-sheet, there was a time gap of about eight months but we do not think that that can prove fatal.

3. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and direct that the appellant will proceed with the inquiry expeditiously and complete the same as far as possible within a period of six months or thereabout provided the respondent co-operates in the inquiry and does not delay the proceedings. If the respondent has not filed his written statement to the charges levelled against him, he may do so within two weeks from today. The appeal is allowed accordingly with no order as to costs.