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Curewell (India) Ltd. v. Sahib Singh (Dead) By Lrs. And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Dec 18, 1991
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was placed in possession of the premises by the principal tenant who held the land under a perpetual lease from the Government. The property was reserved for residential use, but the appellant allegedly used it for non-residential purposes (“misuser”). After notices from the Government to the original lessee and from the lessee to the appellant, eviction proceedings ensued. The High Court fixed misuse charges of Rs 1,17,761.73 for the period ending January 14, 1979 and Rs 3,57,391.61 for the period ending June 21, 1981, ordering eviction in default of payment. The appellant obtained special-leave to appeal against that judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant’s alleged misuser had in fact ceased and, if so, from what date.
  2. Whether the misuse charges were validly “determined” in accordance with Section 14(11) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, or merely unilaterally claimed by the Government and endorsed by the High Court.
  3. Whether, in the absence of a proper determination by the Controller, the appellant could lawfully be evicted for misuser under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Misuser stopped in 1981, as shown by an affidavit filed by the Government in October 1982; hence no basis for subsequent misuse charges.
  • Liability for charges exists only for the period up to June 21, 1981 and only to the extent such charges are determined by the statutory authority (the Controller) under Section 14(11).
  • The High Court erred in treating the Government’s claim as a determination; the Rent Control Tribunal had made no such finding.

Union of India’s Position

  • Counsel was unable to confirm whether the misuse charges had been determined by the Controller or whether, and when, misuser had ceased, noting that the available records were unclear.

Original Lessee's Arguments

  • The lessee is entitled to evict the appellant owing to continued misuser.
  • The quantum of misuse charges is for the competent authority to decide.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Clause (k) of sub-section (1) authorises eviction for misuse contrary to governmental conditions, while sub-section (11) bars eviction if the tenant:

  • Ceases the misuser within the time specified by the Controller, and
  • Pays compensation “as the Controller may direct.”

The Court found:

  1. The record did not establish whether misuser had in fact stopped, rendering factual determination essential.
  2. The High Court erred in concluding that misuse charges were properly assessed; there was no statutory determination by the Controller as mandated by Section 14(11).
  3. Consequently, eviction could not be sustained without first determining (a) the actual duration of misuser and (b) the compensation payable, both of which must be decided by the Controller after hearing the Government, the original lessee and the appellant.

Holding and Implications

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and the subordinate orders. It directed the Controller to:

  • Issue notice to all concerned parties.
  • Determine the precise period of misuser and the compensation payable by the appellant.
  • Specify a period within which the appellant must cease any ongoing misuser and pay the assessed compensation.

If the appellant complies—by stopping misuser within the specified period and paying the compensation—he will remain protected from eviction under Section 14(11). The decision provides immediate relief to the appellant and clarifies that misuse charges and eviction for misuser under the Delhi Rent Control Act require prior, formal determination by the Controller; however, it establishes no broader precedent beyond enforcement of the statutory procedure.

Show all summary ...

Order

C.A No. 462 of 1984

1. This appeal by special leave is by a person who was put into possession of the premises in question by the principal tenant who obtained the land from the government under a perpetual lease deed. By the impugned judgment, the High Court held that for the periods ending respectively on January 14, 1979 and June 21, 1981, the appellant was liable to pay Rs 1,17,761.73 and Rs 3,57,391.61 as misuse charges. In default of payment of these two amounts, the High Court held that the appellant was liable to be evicted from the premises.

2. Counsel for the appellant, Mr Bhat, contends that the misuser by the appellant had stopped in 1981. This, he submits, is clear from an affidavit filed by the government in October 1982. He, therefore, submits that there has been no misuser since 1981. Counsel further submits that although the appellant is liable to pay misuse charges for the period up to June 21, 1981, his liability is only for such misuse charges as are determined by the competent authority, namely, the Controller as provided under Section 14(11) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Such a determination has not been made. The High Court, counsel says, wrongly held that the misuse charges claimed by the government had been determined by the Rent Control Tribunal. The Tribunal had not made any such determination. In fact, the High Court was merely endorsing the claim of the government in respect of the misuse charges. The Act does not postulate that the misuse charges can be unilaterally determined by the government and that the person in possession of the land under a sub-lease from the original lessee is bound to pay it.

3. Mr Mahajan appearing for the Union of India is not in a position to say whether the amounts ordered to be paid by the High Court had been determined by the statutory authority or whether the misuser has stopped, and if so when. We appreciate Mr Mahajan's difficulty. The records made available to him do not clearly disclose these facts, apart from certain vague averments in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Government of India.

4. Mr Sodhi appearing for the original lessee submits that the lessee is entitled to evict the appellant by reason of his misuser. He submits that the appellant continues to misuse the premises contrary to the present submissions on behalf of the appellant. The amount payable by the appellant, counsel submits, is a matter for the concerned authority to decide.

5. Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 provides that misuser is one of the grounds on which a tenant is liable to be evicted. Clause (k) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 reads as under:

“14. (1) (k) that the tenant has, notwithstanding previous notice, used or dealt with the premises in a manner contrary to any condition imposed on the landlord by the government or the Delhi Development Authority or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi while giving him a lease of the land on which the premises are situate;”

It is not in dispute that the premises in question is reserved for residential purposes and any user for non-residential purposes amounts to a misuser falling within the ambit of Section 14. It is also not disputed that the appellant had been called upon by the original lessee by notice to desist from using the building for non-residential purpose.

6. Sub-section (11) of Section 14 reads:

“14. (11) No order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made on the ground specified in clause (k) of the proviso to sub-section (1), if the tenant, within such time as may be specified in this behalf by the Controller, complies with the condition imposed on the landlord by any of the authorities referred to in that clause or pays to that authority such amount by way of compensation as the Controller may direct.”

This sub-section prevents eviction if the tenant has complied with the condition imposed on the landlord by the government. The sub-section also requires the person in possession, namely, the sub-lessee to pay to the authority such amount by way of compensation as the Controller may direct. It is not in dispute that the original lessee, upon receipt of notice from the government, had in turn issued notice to the sub-lessee, namely, the appellant calling upon him to stop misuser or vacate the premises. If the appellant has, as contended by him, stopped misuser, he is of course not liable to be evicted by reason of the protection given to him under sub-section (11). Nevertheless, for the past misuser, the appellant is liable to pay such charges as are payable in terms of the sub-section. The charges under the sub-section are such charges as are determined by the Controller. The Controller must, therefore, after hearing the parties determine the amount payable by the person responsible for the misuser, namely, the appellant who is the tenant of the original lessee and determine the correct amount.

7. We are of the view that the appellant is liable to be evicted unless he has already stopped or stops immediately the misuser of the premises and pays the misuse charges for the period of misuse. Whether the misuser has stopped, and if so when, are questions of facts which do not appear to be clear from the pleadings or the impugned judgment and the orders of the statutory authorities.

8. There is substance in the appellant's submission that the High Court was wrong in holding that the amount had been determined in the manner postulated in sub-section (11). We are of the view that the correct amount has to be determined by the Controller.

9. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court as well as the orders of the authorities and direct the Controller to issue notice to the original lessee and the sub-lessee, namely, the appellant and the government represented by the Land and Development Officer and determine (1) the actual period of misuser by the appellant and (2) the compensation payable by the appellant in respect of such misuser. We make it clear that if the appellant has stopped the misuser or if he stops the misuser within a period to be specified by the Controller and also pays the amount determined by the Controller as compensation, he shall have the protection of sub-section (11) of Section 14 from eviction on the ground mentioned in clause (k) of sub-section (1) of that section.

10. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms. No. costs.

Writ Petition Nos. 13473-74 of 1983

11. Counsel for the petitioners Mr Bhat submits that in view of our judgment in Civil Appeal No. 462 of 1984, the petitioners do not wish to press the writ petitions. The submission is recorded. Accordingly, the writ petitions are dismissed as withdrawn.