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Commissioner Of Income Tax, Andhra Pradesh v. Nawab Mir Barkat Ali Khan .
Factual and Procedural Background
The litigation concerns income-tax assessments made on Nawab Mir Barkat Ali Khan, the legal representative of the late Nizam of Hyderabad, for the assessment years 1959-60 to 1963-64 and certain later years. Two broad categories of income were in dispute:
- Income generated by a settlement titled “HEH the Nizam’s Pilgrimage Money Trust.”
- Income arising from assets transferred by the assessee to several trusts created for the benefit of three women—Smt. Mazharunnisa, Smt. Laila Begum and Smt. Jani Begum—and the minor sons of two of them.
The Andhra Pradesh High Court answered the relevant questions of law in favour of the assessee. The Commissioner of Income Tax appealed to the Supreme Court in three sets of matters:
- Civil Appeal Nos. 1404-07 & 1407-A of 1975 (main assessments covered by five assessment years).
- Civil Appeal Nos. 1208-1212 of 1979 (refusal of the High Court to direct a reference under s. 256 (2)).
- Civil Appeal No. 2989-NT of 1980 (another reference concerning a later assessment year).
The Supreme Court delivered a consolidated judgment dismissing all appeals filed by the Revenue.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the annual income of the “Nizam’s Pilgrimage Money Trust” for the relevant assessment years was taxable in the assessee’s hands under Section 16(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 or its counterpart Sections 60 and 61 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
- Whether income arising from assets settled in trust for the benefit of (a) Smt. Mazharunnisa, (b) Smt. Laila Begum, (c) Smt. Jani Begum and the minor sons of the latter two ladies constituted income arising to a “wife/spouse” or a “minor child” under Section 16(3)(b) of the 1922 Act and Section 64(v) of the 1961 Act, thereby warranting clubbing in the assessee’s total income.
- Incidental reference-jurisdiction questions—whether new facts had been placed before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal so as to justify a reference under Section 256(2)—but these were resolved by applying an earlier Supreme Court ruling and were not treated as live issues for decision.
Arguments of the Parties
Revenue (Appellant)
- Clause 3(c) of the Pilgrimage Money Trust permitted the settlor to direct use of both income and corpus for his own pilgrimage expenses, thereby conferring on him a right to re-assume power over the trust property; hence Section 16(1)(c) / Sections 60-61 were attracted and the trust income should be taxed to him.
- The three women were the lawful wives of the assessee, and the sons born to two of them were his legitimate minor children; therefore the provisions on clubbing of income attributable to spouse and minor child under Section 16(3)(b) / Section 64(v) applied.
- No new facts had been overlooked by the Tribunal; hence reference to the High Court was unnecessary (raised conversely when resisting the assessee’s application for reference).
Assessee (Respondent)
- The settlor’s discretion under Clause 3(c) was exercisable only in his capacity as a trustee; it did not amount to a power of revocation or re-assumption contemplated by Section 16(1)(c) or Sections 60-61.
- The women in question were merely “ladies of position” in the palace, not wives; contemporaneous affidavits, statutory declarations and a firman described them precisely in that status. Consequently, the clubbing provisions for wife/spouse and minor child were inapplicable.
- Earlier High Court findings (75 ITR 133) already determined the factual status of the women; no additional facts warranted a fresh reference.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| CIT v. Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Bahadur, (1985) 153 ITR 514 (AP) | High Court ruling on identical questions regarding the Pilgrimage Money Trust | Followed; provided the immediate ratio that trust income was not taxable in settlor’s hands |
| CIT v. Raghbir Singh, (1965) 57 ITR 408 (SC) | Construction of Section 16(1)(c) – when power to re-assume income attracts taxation | Used to affirm that a power exercisable only as trustee does not invoke the proviso |
| CIT v. Jayantilal Amratlal, (1968) 67 ITR 1 (SC) | Scope of revocable transfers under Section 16(1)(c) | Reinforced the above principle and supported the High Court’s view |
| Harishikesh Ganguli v. CIT, (1972) 3 SCC 307 | Further exposition of revocable transfer provisions | Cited to demonstrate consistent Supreme Court interpretation applied by the High Court |
| Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan Bahadur v. ITO, (1970) 75 ITR 133 (AP) | Fact-finding on the marital status of the three ladies | The Court relied on the factual matrix in that case to reject Revenue’s “wife” argument |
| ITO v. Nawab Mir Barkat Ali Khan Bahadur, (1975) 4 SCC 370 | Determined that no new facts existed to revisit earlier findings; kept marital-status issue open | Invoked in the reference appeals to hold that the question was already concluded |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
First Issue (Pilgrimage Money Trust)
The Court agreed with the High Court that Clause 3(c) merely empowered the settlor to decide, in his fiduciary capacity as trustee, how the trust’s income (and, if necessary, corpus) should be spent on specified religious and charitable purposes. Drawing on a line of Supreme Court precedents interpreting Section 16(1)(c), the Court held that a power vested in the settlor qua trustee does not constitute a revocable transfer of assets or income. Therefore the trust income could not be brought to tax in the settlor’s personal assessment under either the 1922 or 1961 Acts.
Second Issue (“Wife/Minor Child” Trusts)
The Revenue’s attempt to characterise the three beneficiaries as the assessee’s wives failed for want of unequivocal evidence. Although some early trust deeds loosely referred to them as “wives,” later documents and the assessee’s sworn affidavit clarified that they were only “ladies of position” residing in the palace. A 1959 firman specifically described Jani Begum in those terms. The Court rejected the Revenue’s reliance on Mahomedan-law principles of acknowledgment, noting the absence of any categorical, consistent admission of marriage by the assessee. Consequently, Section 16(3)(b)/Section 64(v) did not apply, and the income of these trusts could not be clubbed with the assessee’s income.
Reference-Jurisdiction Appeals
Applying its earlier decision in ITO v. Nawab Mir Barkat Ali Khan Bahadur (1975) 4 SCC 370, the Court held that no new factual material had been adduced before the Tribunal; therefore the High Court correctly refused to direct a reference. Question 3 in the reference appeal overlapped entirely with the Pilgrimage Money Trust issue and was dismissed on the same reasoning.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED: All appeals filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax were dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Andhra Pradesh High Court’s answers in favour of the assessee and ordered no costs.
Implications: The decision confirms that a settlor’s discretionary power exercised only as trustee does not attract the revocable-transfer provisions, and that mere descriptive references in documents, absent clear acknowledgment, are insufficient to establish marital status for purposes of clubbing provisions under the Income-tax Acts. The ruling is primarily consequential for the parties and does not announce any new legal principle beyond reaffirming existing Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Order
Civil Appeal Nos. 1404-07 and 1407-A of 1975
1. These five appeals arise out of the assessments of Nawab Mir Barkat Ali Khan as the legal representative of the late Nizam of Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as ‘the assessee’). The appeals arise out of the assessments made on the assessee for the assessment years 1959-60, 1960-61, 1961-62, 1962-63 and 1963-64. Two questions, which are common to all these assessment years, were answered by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue and the Commissioner of Income Tax has preferred these appeals. We shall deal with these two questions.
2. The first question was in the following terms:
“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the income of Rs 83,709, Rs 83,709, Rs 84,076, Rs 84,779 and Rs 96,431 for the assessment years 1959-60, 1960-61, 1961-62, 1962-63 and 1963-64, respectively, relating to HEH the Nizam's Pilgrimage Money Trust are not taxable in the assessee's hands by reason of Section 16(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1922.Sections 60 and 61 of the Income Tax Act, 1961?”
The High Court answered this question in favour of the assessee, following its earlier decision in CIT v. Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Bahadur (1985) 153 ITR 514, 1974 Tax LR 86 (AP). The short point arose this way. The assessee had constituted a trust known as the “Nizam's Pilgrimage Money Trust”. Clause 3(c) of the Trust Deed authorised the trustees to utilise the income of the trust, inter alia:
“During the lifetime of the settlor, to defray the expenses of Haj of the settlor and of such of the members of his family as he may take with him and of their visit and pilgrimage to various Mahomedan shrines and holy places Hedjaz and Iraq and making religious offerings and expending monies for charitable purposes as the settlor in his absolute discretion may from time to time think fit and require out of the income as well as the corpus of the trust fund in such matter and to such extent as the settlor may from time to time direct and for all or any of such purposes as aforesaid to pay such monies out of the income of the corpus of the trust fund as the settlor may from time to time require.”
3. The department's argument was that this clause gave the settlor/assessee the right to re-assume power directly or indirectly over the income or assets which had been transferred to the trustees under the Trust Deed. This question was discussed at length by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Relying upon the exposition of Section 16(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 in the decisions of this Court in CIT v. Raghbir Singh (1965) 57 ITR 408, AIR 1966 SC 18, (1965) 3 SCR 684, CIT v. Jayantilal Amratlal (1968) 67 ITR 1, AIR 1968 SC 189, (1967) 3 SCR 946 and Harishikesh Ganguli v. CIT (1972) 3 SCC 307, AIR 1971 SC 2516, (1971) 82 ITR 60 the High Court came to the conclusion that though, under the clause, the settlor had a wide discretion to decide upon the manner in which the income from the trust could be paid for the above purposes such power was conferred on him only in his capacity as trustee and did not attract the first proviso to Section 16(1)(c) of the 1922 Act/Section 61 of the 1961 Act. The High Court accordingly answered the question against the department.
4. We have gone through the judgment of the High Court and we are of the opinion that the conclusion of the High Court follows upon the exposition of Section 16(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act by the decisions of this Court earlier cited. It has also been brought to our notice that the Commissioner of Income Tax preferred a special leave petition against the judgment reported in CIT v. Nawab Mir Barkat Ali Bahadur (1985) 153 ITR 514, 1974 Tax LR 86 (AP) but that the said petition was dismissed by this Court. In the circumstances mentioned above, we are of the opinion that the High Court answered the question correctly and that there are no grounds to interfere.
5. The second question which arises for our consideration is worded as follows:
“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the income arising for the respective assessment years from assets transferred by the assessee to trusts for the benefits of (i)(a) Smt Mazharunnisa, (b) Smt Laila Begum and (c) Smt Jani Begum, and (ii) the minor sons born of Smt Laila Begum and Smt Jani Begum was, income arising to ‘wife and minor child’ within the meaning of Section 16(3)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 and to ‘spouse’ and ‘minor child’ within the meaning of Section 64(v) of the Income Tax Act, 1961?”
6. The short question urged by the department is that the three ladies mentioned in the above question were the wives of the assessee; that, likewise, the sons born of two of them were also legitimate children; and that, therefore, the provisions of Section 16(3)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 and of the corresponding Section 64(v) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 were attracted. It is pointed out that the same question came up for consideration, though in a slightly different context, before the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan Bahadur v. ITO (1970) 75 ITR 133 (AP). It appears that an appeal was preferred against this judgment which has been disposed of by this Court by judgment in ITO v. Nawab Mir Barkat Ali Khan Bahadur (1975) 4 SCC 370, (1974) 97 ITR 239, AIR 1975 SC 703. However, this Court left open the question whether the three ladies mentioned above were wives of the settlor as contended for by the department or not.
7. Shri B.B Ahuja, learned counsel for the appellant, draws our attention to the only facts which are available to him, namely, the facts which have been already discussed in the judgment of the High Court in Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan Bahadur (supra). It appears that in four trust deeds executed on May 10, 1950, August 6, 1950, March 23, 1957 and December 5, 1957, the settlor has described the abovementioned persons as his wives. However, in a trust deed executed on December 29, 1950 one of the ladies, namely, Mazharunnisa was referred to as his wife and the other two — Laila Begum and Jani Begum — were referred to as ‘ladies of position’, adding within brackets the word ‘wife’. Shri Ahuja, on the strength of certain passages in Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan Law (19th edn., para 268 on page 230 and para 344 on page 281) submitted that under the Mahomedan law, where no marriage formalities had been gone through, it was sufficient to establish the validity of a marriage to show that there was an acknowledgment that a particular person was the wife of the person who makes the acknowledgment.
8. There is no doubt that there has been some vacillation in the description by the settlor of the three ladies in question but we are unable to accept the plea of Shri Ahuja that, these descriptions can be treated as a categorical acknowledgment that the ladies were the wives of the settlor. In fact, in the deeds of 1950, though they were described as wives, the expression ‘wife’ was apparently loosely employed to include also persons who were admitted by the appellant into his palace and given a particular status. This is clear from the parenthesis in the trust deed of December 29, 1950. That apart, the assessee had made a categorical statement before the Income Tax Officer on September 9, 1957 explaining the circumstances in which the above description was given. An affidavit, by the assessee himself, had also been filed before the Income Tax Officer in which he specifically asserted that except for one Dulhan Pasha Begum, these ladies, whose names were mentioned in the affidavit, were not his wives though they enjoyed a special status as ladies of position in his palace. In the case of Jani Begum we also find that a firman was issued by the assessee on June 7, 1959, referring to her as ‘lady of position’. This declaration made on the occasion of the demise of this lady is a strong piece of evidence to show that the assessee had never married her and that she was only a lady of position.
9. We are of the opinion that, in these circumstances, the principle of acknowledgment on which Shri Ahuja relies cannot be brought into application. There was no unequivocal or categorical acknowledgment by the assessee that these ladies were his wives. In these circumstances, we agree with the answer given to this question by the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
10. In the result, these appeals fail and are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
Civil Appeal Nos. 1208-1212 of 1979
11. The appellant applied to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh for directing the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal to refer certain questions of law for its decision. The said questions were said to arise out of the assessments of the late Nizam of Hyderabad in respect of the assessment years 1960-61, 1964-65, 1966-67 and 1967-68. The High Court declined the prayer of the appellant.
12. The appellant filed special leave petitions before this Court which has granted leave to appeal only in respect of following questions Nos. 1 and 3:
“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that no new facts which were not considered by the High Court earlier in this case in its judgment reported in 75 ITR 133, were brought in by the Income Tax Officer?”
“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the income relating to “HEH the Nizam's Pilgrimage Money Trust” is not taxable in the assessee's hands by reason of Sections 60 and 61 of the Income Tax Act, 1961?”
13. We have had occasion to deal with one aspect of these questions in our decision of even date in C.A Nos. 1404-07 and 1407-A of 1975. So far as the first question is concerned, the issue is directly covered by the decision of this Court in ITO v. Nawab Mir Barkat Ali Khan Bahadur (1975) 4 SCC 370, (1974) 97 ITR 239, AIR 1975 SC 703. In view of the said judgment, this question is no longer a live one for reference.
14. So far as question No. 3 is concerned, this is directly governed by our decision of even date in the civil appeals abovementioned. Following the same, we concur with the High Court and direct that this question also need not be referred by the Tribunal. In the result, these appeals fail and are dismissed accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
Civil Appeal No. 2989NT of 1980
15. This is an appeal from the order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court answering a question referred to it in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There was a second question before the High Court but an answer to this was not pressed and, therefore, the court did not answer it. The appeal before us is, therefore, confined to the first question which reads as follows:
“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the income arising from assets transferred by the assessee to trusts for the benefit of (i)(a) Smt Mazharunnisa Begum (b) Smt Laila Begum and (c) Smt Jani Begum and (ii) the minor sons born of Smt Laila Begum and Smt Jani Begum, was income arising to ‘spouse’ and ‘minor child’ within the meaning of the Section 16(3)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1922?”
We have had to deal with the same question in the case of the same assessee in relation to certain other assessment years in Civil Appeal Nos. 1404-07, 1407A of 1975 which we have disposed of today. For the reasons set out in that judgment, we are of the opinion that the High Court was correct in the answer given to the question. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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