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B. Krishna Bhat v. Union Of India .

Supreme Court Of India
Mar 19, 1990
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, describing himself as a “public spirited individual,” filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution directly before the Supreme Court. He sought (i) a nationwide directive compelling the Union of India and all States—specifically the State of Karnataka—to implement total prohibition on manufacture, sale and consumption of intoxicating liquor and drugs in line with Article 47, and (ii) a declaration that sub-clause (b) of Rule 11 of the Karnataka Excise (Sales of Indian and Foreign Liquors) Rules, 1968 (as amended in 1989) is unconstitutional. The Court considered the maintainability of the petition and whether Article 32 could be invoked to enforce the petitioner’s demands.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Supreme Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 32, can compel the Union and State Governments to implement total prohibition as envisaged under Article 47 of the Directive Principles of State Policy.
  2. Whether sub-clause (b) of Rule 11 of the Karnataka Excise (Sales of Indian and Foreign Liquors) Rules, 1968 (as amended in 1989), which restricts licences for liquor sales to State-owned or State-controlled companies, is unconstitutional.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Preamble and constitutional philosophy inspired by Mahatma Gandhi mandate eradication of intoxicating drinks and drugs for social, economic and political justice.
  • Article 47 obliges the State to bring about prohibition; failure to do so violates the Constitution.
  • The State of Karnataka, instead of moving toward prohibition, is itself engaging in the business of liquor sales via the impugned Rule 11(b), which is contrary to constitutional directives and therefore void.
  • The Court should issue directions to the Union and all States to impose total prohibition and declare the impugned rule unconstitutional.

No counter-arguments from the Union of India or the State of Karnataka are recorded in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Rly.) v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 246 Directive Principles (Part IV) are non-justiciable and cannot be enforced through courts. Relied upon to hold that Article 47 directives cannot be enforced under Article 32.
Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 248; (1970) 3 SCR 530 Policy choices and legislative priorities lie outside the scope of Article 32 jurisdiction. Cited to emphasise that Article 32 is not a forum for determining policy preferences or priorities.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court stressed the constitutional distinction between Fundamental Rights (Part III) and Directive Principles (Part IV). Article 32 empowers the Supreme Court to enforce only Fundamental Rights, which are justiciable. Article 37 explicitly declares that Directive Principles are not enforceable by any court, though they are fundamental to governance. Consequently, the Court found:

  • No direct or causal violation of any Fundamental Right was alleged or established by the petitioner.
  • Implementation of prohibition under Article 47 is a matter for the legislature and executive; the Court cannot “inject a sense of priority” into legislative will.
  • Mandating the State to adopt a particular policy—even if socially desirable—exceeds the permissible ambit of Article 32.

Because the petition was founded solely on the non-implementation of a Directive Principle and the claimed unconstitutionality of a licensing rule without demonstrating infringement of a Fundamental Right, the Court held the petition to be non-maintainable.

Holding and Implications

Petition dismissed; no relief granted.

Immediate Effect: The State of Karnataka may continue to apply Rule 11(b) of the 1968 Excise Rules as amended, and no judicial mandate for nationwide prohibition issues. Broader Implications: The judgment re-affirms that Directive Principles, however desirable, are non-justiciable and cannot be enforced through Article 32 petitions, thereby limiting public interest litigations that seek to compel the State to adopt specific policy measures.

Show all summary ...

Sabyasachi Mukharji, C.J— This is a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner claims to be “a public spirited individual”. He further claims to be a person aggrieved and seeks to assail the constitutional validity of the State of Karnataka and the Union of India not promoting, enforcing and carrying out the policy of prohibition i.e manufacturing, sale and consumption of intoxicating drinks and drugs throughout the country — India — Bharat, and also assails the constitutional validity of sub-clause (b) of Rule 11 of the Karnataka Excise (Sales of Indian and Foreign Liquors) Rules, 1968 as amended by the Karnataka Excise (Sale of Indian and Foreign Liquors) (Amendment) Rules, 1989 which came into force on September 10, 1989.

2. The petitioner refers to the Preamble to the Constitution which, according to him, explains the general purpose behind the general provisions of the Constitution. He refers to Mahatama Gandhi and his commitment to prohibition. According to the petitioner, manufacture, sale and consumption of intoxicating drinks and drugs have become a stumbling block and a dangerous dragon to the progress and stability of the nation as a whole. The petitioner states that unless this dragon is completely destroyed the country could never think of achieving the objects of the Constitution and justice — social, economic and political. People are flouting the laws of this country, therefore, the petitioner objects that the State should take upon itself the business of selling liquors. He has asserted that the State of Karnataka instead of bringing total prohibition in the State, has evinced interest in taking up the responsibility of selling liquors to the general public. Hence, it is bad and contrary to the Constitution, and he challenges the amendment which prescribes the licence for sale shall be issued to only such company owned or controlled by the State Government as the State Government may specify. According to the petitioner, such a rule is unconstitutional. He draws our attention to Article 47 of the Constitution of India which indicates directive principles.

3. In the aforesaid view of the matter he claims that this Court should direct the Union of India and other State Governments to enforce the policy of total prohibition throughout the country including the State of Karnataka and to impose restrictions on manufacture, sale and consumption of intoxicating drinks and to declare Rule 3 of these Rules as void and unconstitutional.

4. We are unable to entertain this writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The petition of the petitioner is that the policy of prohibition is not being implemented as enjoined by Article 47 of the Constitution. In our opinion, it is not entertainable. Article 47 of the Constitution, which is part of our Directive Principles of State Policy enjoins that the State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and, in particular, the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health. Article 47 is in Part IV of the Constitution which contains Directive Principles of State Policy. Article 37 enjoins that the provisions of this Part shall not be enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws. It has to be borne in mind that Article 32 of the Constitution gives the Supreme Court the power to enforce rights which are fundamental rights. Fundamental Rights are justiciable, Directive Principles are not. Directive Principles are aimed at securing certain values or enforce certain attitudes in the law making and in the administration of law. Directive Principles cannot in the very nature of things be enforced in a court of law. See in this connection the observations of this Court in Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Rly.) v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 246. Whether a law should be made embodying the principles of Directive Principles depends on the legislative will of the legislation. What the petitioner seeks to achieve by this application is to inject a sense of priority and urgency in that legislative will. Determining the choice of priorities and formulating perspective thereof, is a matter of policy. Article 32 is not the machinery through which policy preferences or priorities are determined and this Court is not the forum where the conflicting claims of policies or priorities should be debated. See the observations of this Court in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 248, (1970) 3 SCR 530.

5. We find no direct or causal violation of any fundamental right of which the petitioner can legitimately claim enforcement in this application. To make the State accept a particular policy, desirable and necessary as the policy might be is not the function of Article 32 of the Constitution. Article 32 of the Indian Constitution is not the nest for all the bees in the bonnet of ‘public spirited persons’.

6. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we decline to entertain this application and the same is accordingly dismissed.