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Bhanwar Lal v. Prem Lata And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Gokulchand and Rekhchand obtained an ex-parte money decree for Rs 5,557.10 against Bal Mukund and, in execution, caused the joint family house to be auctioned. Mohanlal, his minor son and his widow objected under Order XXI Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC); their objections were dismissed, the sale was confirmed on 24 October 1958, and a sale certificate issued on 28 November 1958.
The objectors then instituted O.S. No. 37/1959 under Order XXI Rule 63 CPC to set aside the sale. The trial court dismissed the suit (5 December 1961), but the District Judge, Kotah, allowed the appeal and decreed restitution because possession had already passed to the auction-purchaser.
A second appeal in the High Court abated when Mohanlal died and his legal representatives were not substituted. During execution of the restitution decree the auction-purchaser raised several objections, principally that the appellate decree was a nullity for want of pecuniary jurisdiction and that it was merely declaratory and hence inexecutable. The executing court rejected the objections; the appellate court sustained them; the High Court reversed and remitted the matter for execution before the competent civil court. The present Supreme Court appeal is by the auction-purchaser challenging the High Court’s order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the decree of the District Judge, Kotah, was a nullity for lack of pecuniary jurisdiction under Section 21(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1950.
- Whether the decree, being allegedly declaratory, was incapable of execution despite an express direction for restitution of the property.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The District Judge lacked pecuniary jurisdiction because the suit property was valued at Rs 15,000, which exceeded the District Court’s appellate jurisdictional limit of Rs 10,000; hence the decree was a nullity.
- The decree was purely declaratory and therefore could not be executed, notwithstanding any reference to restitution.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents’ legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Radha Kunwar v. Reoti Singh, AIR 1916 PC 18 | The valuation for a suit under Order XXI Rule 63 CPC is the amount of the decree sought to be set aside, not the market value of the property sold. | Used to hold that the relevant valuation was Rs 5,557.10, bringing the appeal within the District Judge’s pecuniary jurisdiction. |
| Phul Kumari v. Ghanshyam Misra (Privy Council) | Same principle: decree amount governs valuation under Order XXI Rule 63 CPC. | Relied upon, together with Radha Kunwar, to confirm that Section 21(1)(a) of the Ordinance applied; hence the decree was valid. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Jurisdiction: Interpreting Section 21(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1950, and applying the two Privy Council decisions, the Court held that the valuation of the appeal was confined to the decree amount (Rs 5,557.10). Since this was below the Rs 10,000 ceiling, the District Judge had competent jurisdiction; the decree was therefore not a nullity.
2. Executability: The decree not only declared that the execution sale did not bind the plaintiffs but also expressly directed restitution of the house. Consequently, it was more than declaratory and was fully executable.
3. Equitable Adjustment: Given the protracted litigation and the appellant’s long possession, the Court invoked principles of justice and equity. It accepted the appellant’s willingness to pay the market value and directed the District Court, Kotah, to assess the current market value of the property. The auction-purchaser must pay that amount within a period to be fixed by the District Court. If payment is defaulted, the decree for restitution will be executed, delivering possession back to the respondents. Any balance of the original sale proceeds still lying in court may be set off against the sum payable.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED.
The Supreme Court upheld the validity and executability of the District Judge’s decree, remitted the matter to the District Court, Kotah, to ascertain present market value, and imposed a conditional payment/restoration scheme. The decision affirms that, in suits under Order XXI Rule 63 CPC, the value of the decree—not the property—governs pecuniary jurisdiction, but it sets no new broad precedent beyond clarifying that principle and fashioning an equitable remedy tailored to the parties.
K. Ramaswamy, J.— Heard learned counsel for both sides and special leave is granted.
2. This appeal by the auction-purchaser is against the judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, dated March 7, 1989 made in S.B Civil (Misc.) Second Appeal No. 2 of 1976. The facts, though many, relevant to dispose of the appeal are stated as under:
3. S/Shri Gokulchand and Rekhchand, respondents 5 and 6 herein, defendants 2 and 3 in O.S No. 37 of 1959 on the file of the Court of the Civil Judge, Jhalawar, obtained in another suit, an ex-parte money decree to recover Rs 5557.10 against Bal Mukund and brought to sale the joint family house which is the disputed property in the present litigation. Mohanlal, his minor son and his widow filed objections under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC which were rejected. The sale was confirmed on October 24, 1958, and sale certificate was issued on November 28, 1958. The objectors filed O.S No. 37 of 1959 under Order XXI Rule 63 CPC to set aside the sale.
4. The trial court by its judgment dated December 5, 1961 dismissed the suit, but on appeal, the District Judge at Kotah allowed the appeal and decreed the suit for restitution of the plaint schedule property since possession had, in the meantime, been taken. Second Appeal No. 91 of 1965 filed in the High Court abated as a whole since Mohanlal died on May 1, 1968 and his legal representatives being respondents 2 to 4 were not brought on record to substitution. When execution was levied for restitution, though the appellant raised several objections to its executability but challenge was confined to two grounds, namely, the decree passed by the District Judge is a nullity as he lacked pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the appeal against the decree in the suit admittedly valued at Rs 15,000 under Section 21(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1950, and it was entertainable by the High Court, and secondly, the decree being a declaratory one was incapable of execution, notwithstanding the direction for restitution of the plaint scheduled property. The executing court dismissed the objection petition, but on appeal the order of the executing court was reversed. On further appeal the High Court allowed the same, set aside the appellate order and directed the appellate court to transfer it to the appropriate civil court for execution as per law. As against it the present appeal has been filed.
5. The contention that the decree passed by the District Judge, Kotah, on appeal is a nullity is devoid of substance. It is true that under Section 21(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1950, the District Court is empowered to entertain an appeal against the decree of a trial court of the value only up to Rs 10,000 and by operation of sub-section (b) of Section 21(1) the appeal would lie only to the High Court as the value of the suit was admittedly Rs 15,000. But this is a suit laid under Order XXI Rule 63 CPC to set aside the sale by declaring the decree of Rs 5557.10 to be invalid and does not bind them. In Radha Kunwar v. Reoti Singh AIR 1916 PC 18 and Phul Kumari v. Ghanshyam Misra it was held that the value of the amount of decree is the value for the purpose of the suit under Order XXI Rule 63 CPC. Therefore, merely because the valuation of the property sold in execution had been put at Rs 15,000, the valuation of the suit under Order XXI Rule 63 CPC cannot be treated to be that valuation. Accordingly, we hold that Section 21(1)(a) of the Ordinance is attracted. Therefore, the decree of the appellate court in C.A No. 157 of 1961 on the file of the Court of the District Judge, Kotah, is not a nullity.
6. The only other question is whether the plaintiff is entitled to restitution of the property. Once the decree which was the subject matter of execution was declared to be not binding on the plaintiffs, Mohanlal and his mother Bhuli Bai, the execution sale would not bind them and as a result they became entitled to restitution. The decree does admittedly contain a direction for restitution. Therefore, it is not a mere declaratory decree but coupled with a decree for restitution of the plaint scheduled house. Accordingly, the decree is executable.
7. To a question put by the court whether in view of the long pendency of the proceedings it would not be equitable that the appellant should pay the proper value of the house or deliver possession thereof, the learned counsel for the appellant fairly stated that whatever amount be fixed by this Court, the appellant is prepared to pay the same. The learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand relying upon the statement made in the objections dated April 28, 1973, filed by the appellant maintained that he had then claimed only a sum of Rs 11,900 in all, and the appellant would be entitled only for that amount. On the other hand, the appellant having been in possession and enjoyment of the property, the respondents are entitled to the mense profits. On the facts and in the circumstances and in consideration of the fact that the litigation is pending for a long period, we are of the view that justice and equity would be met if we direct the District Court, Kotah, to assess the prevailing market value of the plaint scheduled house and the site as on date and direct the appellant to pay the value thereof within a time to be fixed by him. If the respondents have not drawn the balance of the sale amount in the original suit filed by S/Shri Gokulchand and Rekhchand after full satisfaction was recorded, the appellant is entitled to withdraw the said balance amount. In case the amount was already withdrawn, the appellant is entitled to deduct the same from the amount fixed by the District Court. In case the appellant fails to pay the value of the property assessed by the District Court as directed above, there shall be a direction for restitution of the plaint scheduled property as per the decree of the appellate court in C.A No. 157 of 1961. The appeal is accordingly allowed, but, in the circumstances, without costs.
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