- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Isabella Johnson (Smt) v. M.A Susai (Dead) By Lrs. .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant (plaintiff) filed Suit O.S. No. 789 of 1973 in the Court of the Third Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, seeking eviction of the respondent (defendant) and mesne profits. She alleged ownership of the premises and claimed the respondent was a monthly tenant at Rs 30 who had become irregular in rent payment and a source of nuisance. Prior to this suit, the appellant had twice approached the Hyderabad Rent Controller for eviction, but both petitions were dismissed after the respondent successfully contended that Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Rent Control Act barred the proceedings because no valid tenancy existed.
In the civil suit, the respondent reversed course and argued that only the Rent Controller, not the City Civil Court, possessed jurisdiction. The trial court rejected this stance, holding that the respondent was estopped from asserting inconsistent jurisdictional pleas after earlier persuading the Rent Controller that the civil court alone had power. The suit was decreed in the appellant’s favour. The respondent’s first appeal before the Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, was dismissed.
On second appeal, a learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court ruled that estoppel cannot confer jurisdiction where none exists and held that the Rent Controller had exclusive jurisdiction. The present appeal by special leave challenges that High Court decision before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an earlier decision of the Rent Controller, incorrectly declining jurisdiction, operates as res judicata so as to bind the civil court on the question of jurisdiction in a subsequent eviction suit.
- Whether a party is estopped from taking an inconsistent plea on jurisdiction after earlier asserting the contrary before another forum.
- Consequently, whether the City Civil Court or the Rent Controller has exclusive jurisdiction over the appellant’s eviction claim.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Rent Controller’s prior orders holding that only the civil court had jurisdiction constitute a final adjudication between the parties and therefore operate as res judicata.
- Even if those orders were erroneous on the merits, the respondent is barred by estoppel from contending to the contrary in the civil court.
- Reliance was placed on Avtar Singh v. Jagjit Singh (1979) 4 SCC 83, where this Court held that a decision declining jurisdiction acts as res judicata in subsequent proceedings.
Respondent's Arguments
This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy, (1970) 1 SCC 613; (1970) 3 SCR 830 | A decision on pure questions of law relating to jurisdiction is not res judicata; estoppel cannot confer jurisdiction where none exists. | Considered binding (three-judge bench); formed the main basis for rejecting the appellant’s plea of res judicata and estoppel. |
| Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra, (1990) 1 SCC 193 | Reiterates that erroneous decisions on jurisdiction do not operate as res judicata. | Followed to reinforce the principle that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent or estoppel. |
| Avtar Singh v. Jagjit Singh, (1979) 4 SCC 83 | Held that a civil court’s decision declining jurisdiction operated as res judicata. | Declared not good law to the extent it conflicts with the earlier three-judge decision in Mathura Prasad, as it failed to notice that precedent. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court that jurisdictional questions are pure questions of law and cannot be foreclosed by estoppel or res judicata. Relying principally on the three-judge ruling in Mathura Prasad, the Court underscored that procedural doctrines cannot override substantive limits on a court’s authority. It emphasized:
- A court lacking jurisdiction by statute cannot acquire it merely because the parties, or even a previous tribunal, erroneously concluded otherwise.
- Estoppel cannot apply to a pure question of law such as forum competence.
- The two-judge decision in Avtar Singh, which suggested otherwise, lacked precedential weight because it overlooked the binding three-judge precedent and was therefore not good law.
On these premises, the Court held that the eviction dispute lay exclusively within the statutory jurisdiction of the Rent Controller, and the City Civil Court’s decree was without authority.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed.
The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s conclusion that the City Civil Court lacked jurisdiction and that the doctrine of res judicata or estoppel cannot validate an otherwise incompetent forum. No order as to costs was made.
Implications: The judgment clarifies that jurisdictional defects are never curable by consent, waiver, or prior erroneous rulings, reinforcing the supremacy of statutory forum provisions. It also limits the precedential value of Avtar Singh v. Jagjit Singh, thereby harmonizing subsequent case law with the authoritative three-judge decisions on jurisdiction and res judicata.
M.H Kania, J.— This is an appeal by special leave from the decision of a learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No. 526 of 1977.
2. As we are, with respect, in agreement with the conclusions arrived at by the learned Single Judge of the High Court, we propose to set out only the bare facts essential for the purposes of our judgment.
3. The appellant was the plaintiff and the respondent was the defendant in Suit O.S No. 789 of 1973 filed in the Court of the Third Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. The appellant prayed for a decree for recovery of possession of the suit premises from the respondent and for mesne profits till the delivery of possession of the premises. The case of the appellant was that she was the owner of the suit premises and the respondent was in the occupation of the said premises on payment of Rs 30 per month. The respondent had been irregular in the payment of the said rent and had been a source of perpetual nuisance. It was on this ground that the eviction of the premises was sought by the appellant. In his written statement the respondent took a preliminary objection that the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as the suit fell within the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller at Hyderabad. Two petitions had earlier been filed by the appellant before the Rent Controller for eviction of the respondent and the Rent Controller had rejected the same on the ground that the purported tenancy of the respondent was hit by Section 3 of the A.P Rent Control Act and hence, the eviction suit was not entertainable by the Court of Rent Controller. This conclusion was arrived at on a plea to the said effect taken by the respondent. In the Court of learned Third Assistant Judge of the City Civil Court at Hyderabad the respondent took up the plea that the suit fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller and hence the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Certain pleas were made regarding amendments in the law with which we are not concerned in this appeal. What is material to note for our purposes is that the learned Assistant Judge took the view that as the respondent had, before the Rent Controller, taken up the plea that it was not the Rent Controller but the City Civil Court which had the jurisdiction to entertain the eviction petition against him, and the said plea was upheld, it was not open to the respondent to take up the inconsistent plea before the City Civil Court that it was the Rent Controller and not the City Civil Court which had jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings. It was held that the respondent could not be allowed to approbate and reprobate and that he was estopped by way of pleading to take up an inconsistent plea regarding jurisdiction.
4. On the basis of this conclusion, and other conclusions with which we are not concerned, the suit was decreed by the learned Assistant Judge in favour of the appellant. The decision of the learned Assistant Judge was upheld in an appeal filed by the respondent in the Court of the learned Additional Chief Judge of the City Civil Court at Hyderabad. On a second appeal preferred by the respondent, the learned Single Judge of the High Court took the view that in matters of jurisdiction the question of estoppel does not arise. If the City Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the doctrine of estoppel could not be invoked so as to confer jurisdiction on the Court of City Civil Court. On the question of jurisdiction the learned Judge took the view that the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as it lay exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Judge of the High Court was in error, as the earlier decisions of the Rent Controller to the effect that it was the City Civil Court and not the Rent Controller who had the jurisdiction to entertain the suit for eviction filed by the appellant against the respondent, constituted res judicata between the parties on the question of jurisdiction. It was submitted by him that, even if that decision was wrong, the issue of jurisdiction was finally decided between the parties and that decision was that it was the Civil Court and not the Rent Controller that had the jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of the suit for eviction. He further submitted that the respondent could not be permitted to take inconsistent pleas as he was barred by the principles of estoppel from taking up the plea before the Civil Court that it was the Rent Controller who had the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the suit. He placed reliance on a decision rendered by a Division Bench comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Avtar Singh v. Jagjit Singh (1979) 4 SCC 83 which took the view that the Civil Court's decision regarding lack of jurisdiction will operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit. In that case the Civil Court declined jurisdiction. The Civil Court took the view that it had no jurisdiction to try the suit in question and directed the return of the plaint for representation to the appropriate Revenue Court. When the claim was filed in the Revenue Court, the court took the view that it had no jurisdiction to try the claim. Thereupon, a suit was again instituted in the Civil Court for the same relief. This suit failed throughout on the ground of res judicata. The High Court affirmed the dismissal and the Division Bench of this Court took the view that the High Court was right in taking the view that the principles of res judicata were applicable to the issue of jurisdiction. In our opinion, the contention of learned counsel for the appellant cannot be upheld. We find that in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B Jeejeebhoy (1970) 1 SCC 613, (1970) 3 SCR 830 a bench comprising three learned Judges of this Court has taken the view that a decision on the question of jurisdiction of the court or a pure question of law unrelated to the right of the parties to a previous suit, is not res judicata in the subsequent suit. The court observed:
“It is true that in determining the application of the rule of res judicata the court is not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgment. The matter in issue, if it is one purely of fact, decided in the earlier proceeding by a competent court must in a subsequent litigation between the same parties be regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened. A mixed question of law and fact determined in the earlier proceeding between the same parties may not, for the same reason, be questioned in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. But, where the decision is on a question of law, i.e the interpretation of a statute, it will be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties where the cause of action is the same, for the expression “the matter in issue” in Section 11, Code of Civil Procedure means the right litigated between the parties, i.e, the facts on which the right is claimed or denied and the law applicable to the determination of that issue. Where, however, the question is one purely of law and it relates to the jurisdiction of the court or a decision of the court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort to the rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity of that order under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land.”
6. The same view has been reiterated by a bench comprising three learned Judges of this Court in Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra (1990) 1 SCC 193. We find that the decision of three learned Judges of this Court in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B Jeejeebhoy (1970) 1 SCC 613, (1970) 3 SCR 830 has not been noticed at all by the Division Bench comprising two learned Judges of this Court which delivered the judgment in Avtar Singh v. Jagjit Singh (1979) 4 SCC 83 and hence, to the extent, that the judgment in Avtar Singh case (1979) 4 SCC 83 takes the view that the principle of res judicata is applicable to an erroneous decision on jurisdiction, it cannot be regarded as good law. In our opinion a court which has no jurisdiction in law cannot be conferred with the jurisdiction by applying principles of res judicata. It is well settled that there can be no estoppel on a pure question of law and in this case the question of jurisdiction is a pure question of law.
7. In our view, therefore, the High Court was, with respect, right in its conclusions arrived at and the appeal must be dismissed.
8. The appeal is dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
Alert