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Delhi Stationers And Printers v. Rajendra Kumar .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent–landlord instituted an eviction suit in Jaipur against the appellant–tenant, alleging (i) reasonable and bona fide personal necessity and (ii) sub-letting/parting with possession of the leased premises, which comprise three rooms, a kitchen, and a toilet (marked “K” on site plan Ex. A-1). The trial court decreed eviction on both grounds. On the tenant’s appeal, the Additional District Judge set aside that decree, finding no sub-letting and rejecting the claim of personal need. The High Court, in second appeal, reversed the appellate court and ordered eviction solely on the sub-letting ground. The tenant sought relief before the Supreme Court, which granted special leave and heard the present appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellant had “assigned, sub-let or otherwise parted with possession” of any part of the premises within the meaning of Section 13(1)(e) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, thereby justifying eviction.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- Mahendra Singh, who occupies the adjoining room “J,” is the appellant’s brother-in-law and employee; his occasional use of the kitchen and toilet does not amount to sub-letting or parting with possession.
- Exclusive possession and payment of rent to the tenant are essential elements of sub-letting; neither is proved in this case.
- Relied on Jagan Nath v. Chander Bhan (1988) 3 SCC 57 and Gopal Saran v. Satyanarayana (1989) 3 SCC 56 to assert that mere occupation without exclusivity or consideration cannot constitute sub-tenancy.
Respondent’s Arguments
- Supported the High Court’s finding that the appellant had parted with possession of portions K-1 to K-4 in favour of Mahendra Singh, as evidenced by witness testimony.
- Invoked Roop Chand v. Gopi Chand Thelia (1989) 2 SCC 383 to contend that permitting another to use premises amounts to “parting with possession” under Section 13(1)(e).
- In the alternative, sought to sustain eviction on the ground of the landlord’s bona fide personal requirement.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jagan Nath v. Chander Bhan (1988) 3 SCC 57 | Mere user by another without exclusive possession or payment of rent does not constitute sub-letting. | Cited by appellant; supports conclusion that occasional use of facilities by a relative/employee is insufficient to prove sub-tenancy. |
| Gopal Saran v. Satyanarayana (1989) 3 SCC 56 | Defines sub-letting as transfer of exclusive right to enjoy premises in lieu of consideration; “mere occupation” is inadequate. | Supreme Court expressly relied on this principle to hold that exclusive possession and consideration were not established. |
| Roop Chand v. Gopi Chand Thelia (1989) 2 SCC 383 | Allowing a third party (a registered club) continuous use of premises can amount to parting with possession. | Distinguished: unlike the club scenario, Mahendra Singh’s use was limited and non-exclusive, so the precedent did not aid the landlord. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court interpreted Section 13(1)(e) of the Rajasthan Act, reiterating that:
- Sub-letting requires a transfer of an exclusive right to enjoy the premises, coupled with payment of rent or consideration.
- “Parting with legal possession” entails the ability to both include and exclude others; mere physical occupation falls short.
Applying these principles, the Court observed:
- Mahendra Singh is already a direct tenant of the landlord for room “J.”
- His use of the kitchen and toilet (parts of the appellant’s premises) stemmed from his relationship as brother-in-law and employee, and no exclusive right or rent payment to the appellant was proven.
- Testimony relied upon by the High Court did not establish that the appellant had ceded exclusive control over the disputed portion.
- The precedent in Roop Chand was inapposite because, in that case, the tenant had effectively surrendered control to a corporate club; such circumstances were absent here.
Consequently, the Court concluded that neither sub-letting nor parting with possession was made out. It further refused to revisit the landlord’s claim of bona fide need, as no substantial question of law on that issue had been framed in second appeal.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; eviction decree set aside; suit dismissed.
The Supreme Court restored the Additional District Judge’s judgment dismissing the landlord’s suit and vacated the High Court’s eviction order. No costs were awarded. The decision reinforces that, under Section 13(1)(e) of the Rajasthan Act, eviction for sub-letting requires proof of exclusive possession and consideration, offering further clarity but creating no new doctrinal shift.
S.C Agrawal, J.— Special leave granted.
2. The appellant is the tenant of premises consisting of three rooms, a kitchen and a toilet, situated at Jaipur. The respondent (landlord) filed a suit for the eviction of the appellant on the ground of reasonable and bona fide personal necessity and sub-letting of the premises without his consent. The said suit was decreed by the trial court on both the grounds. On appeal the suit was dismissed by the Additional District Judge. The High Court, in second appeal, reversed the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge and has passed a decree for eviction against the appellant on the ground that the appellant has sub-let or otherwise parted with the possession of the premises without the consent of the landlord.
3. In the site plan (Ex. A-1) the premises which have been let to the appellant are marked as ‘K’. The adjacent room marked as ‘J’ has been let out by the respondent to Shri Mahendra Singh, the brother-in-law of the appellant. The case of the respondent is that the appellant has sub-let a part of the premises to Mahendra Singh and that he is residing therein. The Additional District Judge has found that Mahendra Singh is employed by the appellant and is residing in the room marked ‘J’, as a tenant under the respondent. It has been found that he has been using the latrine and kitchen which form part of the premises let out to the appellant. Mahendra Singh being the brother-in-law of the appellant and in the service of the appellant could not be taken to be a sub-tenant merely by the use of the kitchen and latrine and that for sub-tenancy it is essential that the possession of Mahendra Singh upon the premises must be exclusive. It was also found that the exclusive possession was not proved by the evidence of the respondent and much less any proof of rent paid to the appellant. The High Court, in second appeal has reversed the said findings of the Additional District Judge relying upon the evidence of Mahendra Singh (DW 2) who has admitted that the premises marked K-1 to K-4 are utilised by him and Vishnu Dev (DW 3) who has stated in cross-examination that the appellant is not in occupation of the premises and portion marked K-1 to K-4 has been in occupation of Mahendra Singh. The High Court has held that the appellant has sub-let or otherwise parted with the premises without the permission of the landlord and that being so, the appellant is liable for eviction.
4. Shri Sachar, learned counsel for the appellant, has assailed the said finding recorded by the High Court that the appellant has sub-let or parted with the possession of the premises, and has submitted that mere user of kitchen and latrine by Mahendra Singh, who is the brother-in-law as well as an employee of the appellant, cannot mean that the appellant has sub-let or parted with the possession of the premises. In support of the submission, Shri Sachar has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Jagan Nath v. Chander Bhan (1988) 3 SCC 57 and Gopal Saran v. Satyanarayana (1989) 3 SCC 56. Shri Chitale, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has supported the decision of the High Court and has urged that in the facts and circumstances of the case the High Court was right in holding that the appellant has sub-let or parted with the possession of the premises and he has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Roop Chand v. Gopi Chand Thelia (1989) 2 SCC 383.
5. Under Section 13(1)(e) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), the tenant is liable to be evicted, if he has assigned, sub-let or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without the permission of the landlord. Sub-letting means transfer of an exclusive right to enjoy the property in favour of the third party and the said right must be in lieu of payment of some compensation or rent. Parting of the legal possession means possession with the right to include and also a right to exclude others. Mere occupation is not sufficient to infer either sub-tenancy or parting with possession (see : Gopal Saran v. Satyanarayana (1989) 3 SCC 56).
6. If the instant case is considered in the light of the aforesaid principles laid down by this Court it cannot be said that the appellant has either sub-let or parted with the possession of a part of the premises in favour of Mahendra Singh who is brother-in-law of the appellant and is also employed with the appellant. Mahendra Singh is a tenant under the respondent in respect of room marked ‘J’ in the site plan (Ex. A-1). The mere user of the kitchen and latrine by Mahendra Singh while residing in the portion let out to him by the respondent cannot mean that the appellant has transferred the exclusive right to enjoy the kitchen and latrine and has parted with the legal possession of the said part of the premises in favour of Mahendra Singh.
7. In Roop Chand v. Gopi Chand Thelia (1989) 2 SCC 383, on which reliance has been placed by Shri Chitale, the tenant had allowed the premises to be used by a social club, which was registered as a limited company under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, and for the purpose of the Companies Act, the registered office of the club was situated in the leased premises. This Court found that there was no evidence to show that the tenant had at any time exercised the right to exclusive possession and kept the premises locked and denied the members of the club entry to the premises. This Court also observed that in view of the fact that the registered office of the club is situated in the leased premises, the tenant could not prevent the club from performing its statutory duties so long as the club had its registered office in the leased premises. Taking into consideration the aforesaid circumstances this Court held that the tenant had parted with the possession of the premises as envisaged in Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. This decision, in our opinion, does not lend any assistance to the respondent and that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, as mentioned above, it cannot be said that the appellant had parted with the possession of a part of the leased premises.
8. Shri Chitale has sought to support the decree of eviction on the ground that the premises are required reasonably and bona fide by the respondent for his personal use. We find that after considering the evidence the first appellate court has decided this issue against the respondent and the second appeal of the respondent was admitted only on the ground of sub-letting and no question of law was framed with regard to eviction on the ground of reasonable and bona fide personal necessity. We cannot, therefore, examine the finding recorded by the first appellate court on the question of need of the landlord.
9. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside and the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Jaipur, dismissing the suit for the respondent are restored. There will be no order as to costs.
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