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Raghunathi And Another v. Raju Ramappa Shetty .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants (plaintiffs/landlords) filed a suit against the respondent (defendant/tenant) seeking recovery of possession of three shops in a building at Dadar, Bombay. The eviction was sought, inter alia, on the ground that the respondent, as tenant of the three shops, had sublet them without the appellants' consent and was therefore liable to be evicted.
The respondent contested the suit, but the trial court decreed eviction. The respondent’s appeal was dismissed, resulting in concurrent decrees against him. The respondent then challenged these decrees by filing a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the Bombay High Court, which allowed the petition and set aside the concurrent findings/decrees. The present civil appeal by special leave was filed against the High Court’s judgment dated September 6, 1976 in Special Civil Application No. 2352 of 1972.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, was justified in setting aside the concurrent finding of unlawful subletting recorded by the courts below.
- Whether the High Court was correct in treating the alleged arrangements as leave and licence (and not a lease) based on the fact that the alleged sub-tenants had later left the premises.
- Whether interference was warranted on the ground that the burden of proof regarding subletting had been wrongly placed upon the respondent, despite both parties having led evidence.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The High Court erroneously set aside the concurrent finding of the courts below that the respondent had sublet the shops without the appellants’ permission, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227.
Respondent's Request (Post-Decision)
- The respondent sought reasonable time to vacate the premises, stating that he was carrying on business in the disputed shops.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gajanan Dattatraya v. Sherbanu Hosang Patel (1975) 2 SCC 668, AIR 1975 SC 2156, (1976) 1 SCR 535 | The tenant’s liability to eviction arises if unlawful subletting is proved as of the date of notice; subsequent departure of sub-tenants after that date is of no consequence. | The Court relied on this decision to reject the High Court’s reasoning that the sub-tenants leaving the premises indicated a leave-and-licence arrangement rather than a lease. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined the High Court’s basis for setting aside the concurrent findings and found that the High Court had interfered on two grounds: (i) that the alleged sub-tenants leaving the premises suggested the parties’ dominant intention was to create leave and licence rather than a lease; and (ii) that the burden of proof had been wrongly placed upon the respondent.
On the first ground, the Court held that the relevant inquiry is whether unlawful subletting existed as of the date of the notice. If unlawful subletting is proved at that point, eviction liability arises. The Court reasoned that the mere fact that the alleged sub-tenants may have left the premises after the date of notice does not affect the tenant’s liability. The Court stated that this view was supported by its prior decision in Gajanan Dattatraya v. Sherbanu Hosang Patel.
On the second ground, the Court held that where parties have been permitted to adduce evidence in support of their respective cases, and there is no grievance that any evidence was shut out, the question of burden of proof loses significance and becomes academic. The Court noted that, in the present case, it was not the respondent’s case that the trial court precluded him from producing any evidence. Therefore, the Court concluded that the High Court committed a manifest error of law in setting aside the decrees on the basis of burden of proof.
Holding and Implications
ALLOWED: The appeal succeeded. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Bombay High Court and restored the decree for eviction against the respondent, with costs quantified at Rs 1000.
As a direct consequence, the respondent remained bound by the restored eviction decree. However, upon the respondent’s request for time, the Court granted time until January 31, 1993 to vacate, subject to conditions: the respondent must pay Rs 500 per month as rent with effect from February 1, 1991 and furnish an undertaking in the Court within one month containing usual terms, including paying rent at the enhanced rate and vacating on or before January 31, 1993 to deliver vacant possession to the appellants. If the undertaking is not furnished within one month, the eviction decree becomes executable immediately after the expiry of that one-month period. The opinion does not indicate that any new legal precedent was created beyond applying settled principles and the cited decision.
Order
1. This civil appeal by special leave has been preferred against the judgment dated September 6, 1976 in Special Civil Application No. 2352 of 1972 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The facts in brief necessary for the decision of this appeal are that the appellants filed a suit against the respondent for recovery of possession over three shops in a building situate at Dadar in Bombay inter alia on the ground that the respondent was their tenant of the said three shops and he had sublet them without the consent of the plaintiff/appellants and consequently was liable to be evicted therefrom. The suit was contested by the respondent but was decreed by the trial court. An appeal filed by the respondent against the said decree was also dismissed. It is these two decrees which were challenged by the respondent in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India which was allowed by the judgment appealed against.
2. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellants that the concurrent finding recorded by the courts below that the respondent had sublet the shops in question without the permission of the appellants has erroneously been set aside by the High Court in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
3. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we find substance in the above submission. A perusal of the judgment appealed against indicates that the aforesaid concurrent finding of the courts below was set aside by the High Court on two grounds. Firstly, it was held by the High Court that the fact that the alleged sub-tenants had left the premises showed that the dominant intention behind the agreements between the defendant and those persons was to create a leave and licence and not a lease. The second ground for setting aside the finding of the courts below was that the burden of proof was wrongly placed upon the respondent. Both these grounds cannot be sustained. With regard to the first ground referred to above suffice it to point out that the tenant's liability to eviction arises when the fact of unlawful subletting is proved. At the date of the notice, if it is proved that there was unlawful subletting, the tenant is liable to be evicted. The mere fact that the sub-tenants may have left the premises after that date would be of no consequence. The view which we take finds support from the decision of this Court in Gajanan Dattatraya v. Sherbanu Hosang Patel (1975) 2 SCC 668, AIR 1975 SC 2156, (1976) 1 SCR 535. Insofar as the second ground is concerned it is again settled law that once the parties have been permitted to produce evidence in support of their respective cases and it is not their grievance that any evidence was shut out the question of burden of proof loses significance and remains only academic. In the instant case it is not the case of the respondent that he was precluded by the trial court to produce any evidence. In this view of the matter, the High Court apparently committed a manifest error of law in setting aside the decrees of the courts below on the ground of burden of proof.
4. Both the grounds on which the High Court interfered with the decrees of the courts below having been found to be unsustainable the judgment of the High Court deserves to be set aside. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and the decree for eviction passed against the respondent is restored with costs which we quantify at Rs 1000 (Rupees one thousand only).
5. Learned counsel for the respondent made a prayer that since the respondent is carrying on business in the shops in dispute some reasonable time may be granted to him to vacate the premises. These shops were let out to the respondent in the year 1960 and the rent payable by him, we are informed, is Rs 311 per month. The respondent is granted time till January 31, 1993 to vacate the shops in question subject to the condition that he pays a sum of Rs 500 per month as rent with effect from February 1, 1991 and furnishes an undertaking in this Court within one month containing the usual terms including the terms that he would pay rent at the rate of Rs 500 per month with effect from February 1, 1991 and would vacate the premises on or before January 31, 1993 and deliver vacant possession to the appellants. In case of failure to furnish the said undertaking, the decree for eviction shall become executable immediately after the expiry of one month from today.
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