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Union Of India And Others v. Bakshi Ram .
Factual and Procedural Background
Bakshi Ram, a constable in the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) at Devli, Rajasthan, was prosecuted for forcing entry into a fellow constable’s room and misbehaving with the latter’s wife on 17 March 1971. He was convicted under Section 10(n) of the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949—an offence prejudicial to good order and discipline—and sentenced to four months’ rigorous imprisonment on 23 March 1971.
While his criminal appeal was pending, the CRPF dismissed him from service. On 22 September 1971 the Sessions Judge upheld the conviction but, invoking Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, released him on probation for six months. After successfully completing probation, Bakshi Ram filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Rajasthan High Court, relying on Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, set aside the dismissal and ordered his reinstatement with all consequential benefits.
The Union of India challenged that decision before the Supreme Court through the present appeal. Special leave was granted.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, eliminates all consequences flowing from a criminal conviction so as to bar departmental punishment, specifically dismissal from service.
- Whether Bakshi Ram, having been released on probation, is entitled to reinstatement in the CRPF with consequential benefits.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway v. T.R. Chellappan (1976) 3 SCC 190 | Release on probation does not erase the fact of conviction; Section 12 removes only statutory disqualifications expressly provided by other laws. | Relied upon to hold that the stigma of conviction remains and departmental action is permissible notwithstanding probation. |
| Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398 | Article 311(2)(b) permits dismissal based on conduct leading to conviction without departmental enquiry. | Cited to reinforce that dismissal on the ground of conviction is constitutionally valid. |
| R. Kumaraswami Aiyar v. Commissioner, Municipal Council, Tiruvannamalai (1957) 58 Cri LJ 255 | Probation does not bar disciplinary action by the employer. | Referenced as part of uniform High Court view supporting the Court’s interpretation of Section 12. |
| P. Embaru v. Chairman, Madras Port Trust (1963) 1 LLJ 49 | Same principle as above. | Used to demonstrate consistent judicial opinion. |
| A. Satyanarayana Murthy v. Zonal Manager, LIC AIR 1959 AP 371 | Employer may impose disciplinary penalty despite probation order. | Reinforced the Court’s conclusion. |
| Prem Kumar v. Union of India (1971) Lab IC 823 | Probation under the Act does not nullify grounds for dismissal. | Relied upon for consistency in approach across jurisdictions. |
| Om Parkash v. Director Postal Services (1971) 1 SLR 648 | Departmental punishment not affected by Section 12. | Cited as supporting authority. |
| Director of Postal Services v. Daya Nand 1972 SLR 325 | Same principle regarding Section 12. | Referenced for unanimity of judicial view. |
| Trikha Ram v. V.K. Seth 1987 Supp SCC 39 | Supreme Court’s power to modify penalty from dismissal to removal so as to mitigate future hardship. | Basis for altering Bakshi Ram’s penalty from dismissal to removal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined Sections 3, 4, 9 and 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act. It emphasized the distinction between conviction, sentence, and departmental punishment, clarifying that:
- Conviction remains intact; probation under Section 4 suspends the sentence but does not erase the conviction.
- Section 12 only removes statutory disqualifications expressly predicated on conviction (e.g., electoral or appointment bars). It does not curtail an employer’s right to impose disciplinary penalties for the misconduct underlying the conviction.
- Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution, read with prior case-law, permits dismissal based on the conduct that resulted in conviction without a separate departmental enquiry.
The High Court’s interpretation—treating Section 12 as mandating reinstatement—was therefore erroneous. Nonetheless, following the precedent in Trikha Ram, the Supreme Court exercised discretion to mitigate hardship by converting the penalty from dismissal to removal, thereby preserving Bakshi Ram’s eligibility for future employment elsewhere.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment set aside. The penalty of dismissal is substituted with removal from service.
Immediate Effect: Bakshi Ram is not reinstated in the CRPF but his status is changed from “dismissed” to “removed,” potentially enabling him to seek other employment.
Broader Implications: The judgment reaffirms that Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act removes only statutory disqualifications and does not preclude employers—particularly uniformed forces—from taking disciplinary action when an employee is convicted of an offence.
K. Jagannatha Shetty, J.— Special leave granted.
2. Bakshi Ram respondent was a constable in the Central Reserve Police Force at Devli in Rajasthan. On March 17, 1971 at about 8.45 p.m he along with another constable forced entry into the room of Garib Das the constable of the CRP Group Centre band platoon. Garib Das was then not present in the room. His wife Savitri Devi who was inside tried to prevent their entry, but in vain. Both the constables caught hold of her and misbehaved with her.
3. The respondent was tried for an offence under Section 10(n) of the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949. Section 10 of the Act sets out less heinous offences and Section 10(n) refers to any act or omission which, though not specified in the Act, is prejudiciable to good order and discipline. On the evidence adduced in the case he was found guilty of the charge and by judgment dated March 23, 1971 he was sentenced to four months' RI by the Magistrate I Class and Commandant Group Centre, CRPF, Deoli (Rajasthan). He was lodged in the Civil Jail, Jaipur to undergo the sentence.
4. In view of his conviction and sentence, the department by way of disciplinary action dismissed him from service. This action was taken when his appeal against the conviction and sentence was pending before the Session Judge. The learned Judge by judgment dated September 22, 1971 upheld the conviction but released him under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (“the Act”). Apparently he was released under Section 4 of the Act upon furnishing bonds to keep peace and be of good behaviour for a period of six months. The respondent complied with those conditions. After expiry of the period of good conduct, he moved the High Court with writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging his dismissal from service. The High Court relying upon Section 12 of the Act has set aside the dismissal and directed that he should be reinstated into service with all consequential benefits. The High Court has expressed the view that the sole reason for dismissal of the respondent was his conviction under Section 10(n) of the Central Reserve Police Force Act but in view of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, there was no disqualification for him to continue in service. This is how the High Court observed:
“The clear language of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 provides that a person dealt with under the provisions of Section 3 or Section 4 of that Act shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction under any law, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law. This provision has the effect of removing disqualification attaching to the petitioners' conviction under Section 10(n) of the CRPF Act. Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act dealing specifically with this situation clearly provides that the provisions therein is ‘notwithstanding anything contained in any other law’. Hence, effect has to be given to the same.”
5. The judgment of the High Court has been challenged in this appeal.
6. Since the result of the appeal turns on the scope and meaning of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, it is necessary to set out the section. Section 12 is in these terms:
“12. Removal of disqualification attaching to conviction.—Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of Section 3 or Section 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a person who, after his release under Section 4, is subsequently sentenced for the original offence.”
7. Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 provides power to the court to release certain offenders after admonition. Section 4 provides power to the court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct. Under the disposition made by the court under Section 4 the sentence is suspended during the period of probation and the offender is released on his entering into a bond to keep peace, and be of good behaviour. Section 9 provides for procedure in case of offender failing to observe conditions of bond. The court, if satisfied, that the offender has failed to observe any of the conditions of bond for keeping good behaviour, could sentence him for the original offence or where the failure is for the first time, then, without prejudice to the continuance in force of the bond, the court may impose upon him a penalty not exceeding fifty rupees.
8. It will be clear from these provisions that the release of the offender on probation does not obliterate the stigma of conviction. Dealing with the scope of Sections 3, 4 and 9 of the Probation of Offenders Act, Fazal Ali, J. in Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway v. T.R Chellappan (1976) 3 SCC 190, (1975) 2 SLR 587 speaking for the court observed:
“These provisions would clearly show that an order of release on probation comes into existence only after the accused is found guilty and is convicted of the offence. Thus the conviction of the accused or the finding of the court that he is guilty cannot be washed out at all because that is the sine qua non for the order of release on probation of the offender. The order of release on probation is merely in substitution of the sentence to be imposed by the court. This has been made permissible by the statute with a humanist point of view in order to reform youthful offenders and to prevent them from becoming hardened criminals. The provisions of Section 9(3) of the Act extracted above would clearly show that the control of the offender is retained by the criminal court and where it is satisfied that the conditions of the bond have been broken by the offender who has been released on probation, the court can sentence the offender for the original offence. This clearly shows that the factum of guilt on the criminal charge is not swept away merely by passing the order releasing the offender on probation. Under Sections 3, 4 or 6 of the Act, the stigma continues and the finding of the misconduct resulting in conviction must be treated to be a conclusive proof. In these circumstances, therefore, we are unable to accept the argument of the respondents that the order of the Magistrate releasing the offender on probation obliterates the stigma of conviction.”
9. As to the scope of Section 12, learned Judge went on (at 596) :
“It was suggested that Section 12 of the Act completely obliterates the effect of any conviction and wipes out the disqualification attached to a conviction of an offence under such law. This argument, in our opinion, is based on a gross misreading of the provisions of Section 12 of the Act. The words “attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law” refer to two contingencies: (i) that there must be a disqualification resulting from a conviction; and (ii) that such disqualification must be provided by some law other than the Probation of Offenders Act. The Penal Code does not contain any such disqualification. Therefore, it cannot be said that Section 12 of the Act contemplates an automatic disqualification attaching to a conviction and obliteration of the criminal misconduct of the accused. It is also manifest that disqualification is essentially different in its connotation from the word ‘misconduct’.”
10. In criminal trial the conviction is one thing and sentence is another. The departmental punishment for misconduct is yet a third one. The court while invoking the provisions of Section 3 or 4 of the Act does not deal with the conviction; it only deals with the sentence which the offender has to undergo. Instead of sentencing the offender, the court releases him on probation of good conduct. The conviction however, remains untouched and the stigma of conviction is not obliterated. In the departmental proceedings the delinquent could be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge [See Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution and Tulsiram Patel case (1985) 3 SCC 398, 1985 Supp 2 SCR 131].
11. Section 12 of the Act does not preclude the department from taking action for misconduct leading to the offence or to his conviction thereon as per law. The section was not intended to exonerate the person from departmental punishment. The question of reinstatement into service from which he was removed in view of his conviction does not therefore, arise. That seems obvious from the terminology of Section 12. On this aspect, the High Courts speaks with one voice. The Madras High Court in R. Kumaraswami Aiyar v. Commissioner, Municipal Council, Tiruvannamalai (1957) 58 Cri LJ 255, (1956) Mad LJ 562 (Mad) and Embaru, P. v. Chairman, Madras Port Trust (1963) 1 LLJ 49 (Mad) the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A. Satyanarayana Murthy v. Zonal Manager, LIC AIR 1959 AP 371, the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Prem Kumar v. Union of India 1971 Lab IC 823, (1971) 2 LLJ 346, 1971 MPLJ 483 (MP), the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Om Parkash v. Director Postal Services (Posts and Telegraphs Deptt.) Punjab Circle, Ambala (1971) 1 SLR 648 (P&H), the Delhi High Court in Director of Postal Services v. Daya Nand 1972 SLR 325, 1972 Lab IC 736 (Del) have expressed the same view. This view of the High Courts in the aforesaid cases has been approved by this Court in T.R Challappan case (1976) 3 SCC 190, (1975) 2 SLR 587.
12. In Trikha Ram v. V.K Seth 1987 Supp SCC 39, (1987) 4 ATC 208 this Court after referring to Section 12 has altered the punishment of dismissal of the petitioner therein into “removal from service”, so that it may help him to secure future employment in other establishment.
13. Section 12 is thus clear and it only directs that the offender “shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law”. Such law in the context is other law providing for disqualification on account of conviction. For instance, if a law provides for disqualification of a person for being appointed in any office or for seeking election to any authority or body in view of his conviction, that disqualification by virtue of Section 12 stands removed. That in effect is the scope and effect of Section 12 of the Act. But that is not the same thing to state that the person who has been dismissed from service in view of his conviction is entitled to reinstatement upon getting the benefit of probation of good conduct. Apparently, such a view has no support by the terms of Section 12 and the order of the High Court cannot, therefore, be sustained.
14. In the result the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. However, we alter the penalty of dismissal from service into ‘removal from service’ as it was done in Trikha Ram case 1972 SLR 325, 1972 Lab IC 736 (Del).
15. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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