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Gajanan Jaikishan Joshi v. Prabhakar Mohanlal Kalwar .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant (plaintiff) filed Original Suit No. 103 of 1981 before the 2nd Additional Civil Judge, Belgaum seeking specific performance of an agreement dated 16 July 1976 for the sale of a shop and a “bhatti” room on Kirloskar Road, Belgaum, for ₹20,000. An advance of ₹5,000 was paid and possession was delivered to the appellant. The agreement required the respondent-defendant to execute a registered sale deed within one month of receiving a “No Objection Certificate” under the Karnataka Urban Land Ceiling Act. Although such permission was obtained on 31 March 1981, the respondent failed to execute the deed, prompting the suit on 30 June 1981.
The plaint, however, omitted the mandatory averment under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 that the plaintiff “was and had always been ready and willing” to perform his part of the contract. The respondent raised this omission as a preliminary objection, leading the trial court to frame that plea as a preliminary issue.
To cure the defect, the appellant applied for amendment of the plaint to insert the readiness-and-willingness averment. The trial court rejected the amendment. A revision to the Karnataka High Court was dismissed by a learned Single Judge, who held that granting the amendment after limitation would disturb a vested right of the defendant. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an amendment to a plaint in a suit for specific performance—introducing the statutory averment of readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act—can be allowed after the expiry of the limitation period.
- Whether allowing such an amendment would prejudice the defendant by destroying a vested limitation defence.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent’s Arguments
- The application for amendment was filed beyond limitation and, if allowed, would defeat the defendant’s vested right to rely on limitation.
- Reliance was placed on Ouseph Varghese v. Joseph Aley (1969) 2 SCC 539 to contend that absence of the readiness-and-willingness plea renders the suit itself not maintainable and cannot be rectified belatedly.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil, AIR 1957 SC 363; 1957 SCR 595 | Amendments should be allowed if (a) they do not cause injustice to the other side, and (b) they are necessary for determining the real questions in controversy. | The Court applied this leading authority to hold that inserting the statutory averment caused no injustice and was necessary for adjudicating the dispute. |
| L.J. Leach & Co. v. Jardine Skinner & Co., AIR 1957 SC 357; 1957 SCR 237 | Although limitation is a relevant factor, it does not fetter the court’s power to allow amendments when required in the interests of justice. | Used to reinforce that limitation alone is not an absolute bar; the discretionary power to amend can still be exercised. |
| Ouseph Varghese v. Joseph Aley, (1969) 2 SCC 539 | A plaintiff in a specific-performance suit must plead readiness and willingness; absence of such a plea renders the suit not maintainable. | The Court distinguished this case, noting that it concerned a decree based on a different agreement, whereas the present suit involved the same agreement and only sought to cure an omission. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court reiterated the broad, liberal principles governing amendment of pleadings as laid down in Pirgonda Hongonda Patil and L.J. Leach & Co. The proposed amendment did not introduce a new or inconsistent cause of action; it merely sought to supply an essential averment inadvertently omitted. Therefore:
- No injustice or irremediable prejudice would be caused to the defendant; any inconvenience could be met by costs and opportunity to file a supplementary written statement.
- The defendant’s “limitation defence” was illusory because the underlying cause of action had already been pleaded; adding the statutory assertion did not revive a time-barred claim but completed the existing one.
- The reliance on Ouseph Varghese was misplaced, as that decision involved a decree on an agreement wholly different from that pleaded, whereas in the present case the agreement remained the same.
Consequently, the High Court had erred in treating limitation as a rigid bar and in construing the defendant’s position as a vested right immune to amendment.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; High Court order set aside. The plaint may be amended to include the readiness-and-willingness averment within eight weeks; the defendant may file a supplementary written statement thereafter, and the trial court will proceed to decide the suit on merits.
Implications: The judgment reinforces the liberal approach to amendments under the Civil Procedure Code, particularly in specific-performance suits, clarifying that statutory averments inadvertently omitted can be supplied even after the limitation period, provided no substantive prejudice befalls the opposite party. No new precedent is created, but existing principles are reaffirmed.
M.H Kania, J.— This is an appeal from a judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court.
2. Only a few facts are necessary to appreciate the controversy raised before us.
3. The appellant herein was the plaintiff in Original Suit No. 103 of 1981 in the Court of 2nd Additional Civil Judge, Belgaum. It was the case of the appellant in the plaint that on July 16, 1976 the respondent-defendant entered into an agreement in his favour for sale of the suit property comprising a shop and a bhatti room situated at Kirloskar Road, Belgaum City for a sum of Rs 20,000. The appellant paid to the respondent as part consideration a sum of Rs 5000 and pursuant to the agreement for sale the appellant was put in possession of the suit property. The sale agreement provided that the registered sale deed was to be executed by the respondent after securing a ‘No Objection Certificate’ or permission from the competent officer as required under the Karnataka Urban Land Ceiling Act and within one month of the grant of such permission. The respondent received the No Objection or permission as aforesaid on March 31, 1981 but failed to execute the registered deed of sale as provided under the said agreement. Hence, on June 30, 1981, the appellant filed the present suit. It may be observed here that in the plaint, there was no specific averment that the appellant was and had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the said agreement. The respondent filed a written statement raising several contentions and inter alia raised the contention that the suit was not maintainable for non-compliance with the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The issue as to whether the suit was not maintainable on the aforesaid ground was directed to be tried as a preliminary issue. At this stage, the appellant applied for leave to amend the plaint by incorporating an averment in the plaint that the appellant was and had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the said agreement. The learned Additional Civil Judge before whom the said application was made, rejected the same. A revision petition was preferred by the appellant against the judgment of the learned Additional Civil Judge to the High Court of Karnataka but the said revision petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the said High Court as aforesaid. The learned Judge took the view that the application for amendment was filed beyond the period of limitation and the application could not be granted as a vested right of the respondent would be disturbed by allowing the said amendment. It is the correctness of this decision which is challenged before us.
4. In the leading case of Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil AIR 1957 SC 363, 1957 SCR 595, a bench comprising three learned Judges of this Court laid down the principles which should govern the question of granting or disallowing amendments. It was held by this Court that all amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions: (a) not working injustice to the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. Amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. It is merely a particular case of this general rule that where a plaintiff seeks to amend by setting up a fresh claim in respect of a cause of action which since the institution of the suit had become barred by limitation, the amendment must be refused; to allow it would be to cause the defendant an injury which could not be compensated in costs by depriving him of a good defence to the claim.
5. In L.J Leach & Co. v. M/s Jardine Skinner & Co. Ltd., AIR 1957 SC 357, 1957 SCR 237 another bench comprising three learned Judges of this Court held that it is no doubt true that courts would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered, and does not affect the power of the court to order it, if that is required in the interests of justice.
6. If these principles are to be followed, there is little doubt that the learned Judge was in error in rejecting the application for amendment made by the appellant. In the present case no fresh cause of action was sought to be introduced by the amendment applied for. All that the appellant sought to do was to complete the cause of action for specific performance for which relief he had already prayed. It was only that one averment required in law to be made in a plaint in a suit for specific performance in view of the provisions of sub-section (c) of Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act was not made, probably on account of some oversight or mistake of the lawyer who drafted the plaint and that error was sought to be rectified by the amendment applied for. There was no fresh cause of action sought to be introduced by the amendment and hence, no question of causing any injustice to the respondent on that account arose.
7. Learned counsel for the respondent placed strong reliance on the decision of this Court in Ouseph Varghese v. Joseph Aley (1969) 2 SCC 539. In that case, a suit for specific performance was filed by the plaintiff on the basis of an alleged agreement with the first defendant. The defendant denied the agreement and went on to state that just before his death her husband had agreed to sell to the plaintiff Item No. 1 of the suit property less one acre of paddy field for a sum of Rs 11,000 but due to the illness of her husband, the sale in question could not be effected. After the written statement to this effect was filed, no application for amendment to the plaint was made. The trial court decreed the suit. In the appeal, the High Court did not accept the agreement pleaded by the plaintiff, but granted a decree on the basis of the agreement set out in the written statement. It was held by a bench comprising two learned Judges of this Court that the agreement pleaded by the defendant was wholly different from that pleaded by the plaintiff. The plaintiff did not plead either in the plaint or at any subsequent stage that he was ready and willing to perform the agreement pleaded in the written statement and hence, no decree on the basis of that agreement should have been passed in his favour as done by the High Court. The court held that it was well settled that in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff should allege that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and in the absence of such an allegation in the plaint, the suit is not maintainable. In our opinion, this case does not lend any support to the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent, as in the present case there is no question of any decree being passed on the basis of any agreement other than the one pleaded by the appellant in the plaint.
8. In the result, the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge are set aside. The appeal is allowed. The amendment applied for by the appellant is allowed. The amendment to be carried out by the appellant at his own expense within eight weeks of a certified copy of this order being received by the trial court. The trial court shall thereafter give time to the respondent to file a supplementary written statement, if so advised, and dispose of the case on merits according to law. There will be no order as to costs of the appeal.
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