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Bhoop Ram v. State Of U.P .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, along with five co-accused, was tried by the VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bareilly for offences under Section 148 IPC and Sections 302, 323 and 324 read with Section 149 IPC, arising out of an incident that occurred on 3 October 1975. On 12 September 1977 he was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life (the trial court rejecting the death penalty in view of his youth). Contending that he was a “child” (below 16 years) within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the U.P. Children Act, 1951, the appellant sought to be sent to an approved school instead of prison.
When the special-leave petition reached the Supreme Court, the Court ordered the Sessions Judge, Bareilly to hold an inquiry into the appellant’s age. The inquiry included: (i) a radiological and physical examination by the Chief Medical Officer (CMO), Bareilly, and (ii) liberty to both sides to adduce evidence. The CMO opined that the appellant was about 30 years old on 30 April 1987. The Sessions Judge, relying chiefly on this opinion, reported that the appellant appeared to be 28-29 years old, implying that he had crossed 16 years on the date of occurrence.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellant was below 16 years of age on 3 October 1975 and therefore a “child” under Section 2(4) of the U.P. Children Act, 1951, requiring detention in an approved school under Section 29 rather than imprisonment.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The school certificate (Annexure B) records his date of birth as 24 July 1960, conclusively showing he had not completed 16 years on the date of offence.
- The medical and Sessions Judge’s opinions are only estimates; a definite documentary record should prevail in the absence of contrary evidence.
- The Sessions Judge’s rejection of the school certificate rests on an unfounded assumption that parents routinely understate ages at school admission.
State's Arguments
- The CMO’s report, based on bone fusion and physical examination, indicates the appellant was about 18 years old at the time of occurrence, disqualifying him from the Act’s protection.
- The Sessions Judge’s age finding, grounded in the medical opinion, should be accepted.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bachchey Lal v. State of U.P. (1976) 4 SCC 305 |
Permissibility of awarding life imprisonment instead of death when the accused is below 18 years. | Referenced to show the trial court had already recognised the appellant’s youth by not imposing the death penalty. |
| Jayendra v. State of U.P. (1981) 4 SCC 149 |
Procedure where an accused, wrongly imprisoned instead of being sent to an approved school, has since crossed 18 years. | Followed to sustain conviction, quash sentence and order immediate release because the appellant had exceeded the maximum age for detention in an approved school. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court held that the appellant had not completed 16 years on 3 October 1975, basing its conclusion on three primary considerations:
- Reliability of the school certificate: The certificate specifies 24 June 1960 as the appellant’s birth date. There was no evidence impugning its authenticity or accuracy, yet the Sessions Judge disregarded it on mere surmise.
- Trial court’s own assessment of age: In 1977 the trial judge had described the appellant as “a boy of 17 years”, lending corroboration to the certificate.
- Limitations of medical estimation: The CMO’s age assessment was an approximate opinion; such estimates admit a margin of error, and the Sessions Judge’s view relied almost entirely on this medical opinion without independent support.
Weighing these factors, the Court concluded that the statutory definition of “child” was satisfied. Accordingly, the appellant ought to have been dealt with under Section 29 of the U.P. Children Act instead of being sentenced to imprisonment.
Because the appellant was now over 28 years old, detention in an approved school was impossible. Applying the ratio in Jayendra, the Court decided to maintain the conviction but nullify the custodial sentence.
Holding and Implications
The conviction is sustained; the sentence is quashed; the appellant is to be released forthwith.
Implications: The decision provides relief limited to the appellant by applying established precedent (Jayendra) for over-aged youthful offenders. It sets no new legal precedent but re-affirms the primacy of reliable documentary evidence over medical estimates in determining juvenility.
S. Natarajan, J.— Leave granted.
2. The only question for consideration in this appeal by special leave is whether the appellant who was convicted along with 5 others by the VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bareilly under Section 148 IPC and Sections 302, 323 and 324 all read with Section 149 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life besides concurrent sentence for lesser terms of imprisonment should have been treated as a “child” within the meaning of Section 2(4) ot the U.P Children Act, 1951 (U.P Act 1 of 1952) and sent to an approved school for detention therein till he attains the age of 18 years instead of being sentenced to undergo imprisonment in jail.
3. In support of his contention that he was less than 16 years of age on 3-10-1975, that being the date of the commission of the offences for which the appellant has been convicted along with others, the appellant relies upon a school certificate (Annexure B) wherein his date of birth is shown as 24-7-1960. The learned Sessions Judge without going into the question whether the appellant was below 16 years of age on the date of the commission of the offences, adverted only to the fact that the appellant was below 18 years of age at the relevant time and proceeded to follow the ratio in Bachchey Lal v. State of U.P (1976) 4 SCC 305 and awarded the lesser sentence of imprisonment for life instead of the extreme penalty of death sentence.
4. In such circumstances this Court felt it necessary, even at the stage of admission of the special leave petition, that the Sessions Judge Bareilly should be called upon to enquire into the age of the appellant and submit a report. The Sessions Judge was permitted to have the appellant examined by the Chief Medical Officer of the State and liberty was given to the parties to adduce evidence regarding the age of the appellant.
5. The Chief Medical Officer, Bareilly gave a certificate that as per radiological examination and physical features, the appellant appeared to be 30 years of age as on 30-4-1987. The appellant did not place any other material before the Sessions Judge except the school certificate to prove that he had not completed 16 years on the date of the commission of the offences. The Sessions Judge, after considering the medical certificate and the school certificate has sent a report on 1-6-1987 stating that the appellant appeared to be about 28-29 years of age which means that the appellant would have completed 16 years on the date of occurrence. The Sessions Judge has rejected the school certificate produced by the appellant on the ground that “it is not unusual that in schools ages are understated by one or two years for future benefits”.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the Chief Medical Officer's certificate and the Sessions Judge's report regarding the age of the appellant are based only on their respective opinions whereas the school certificate produced by the appellant contains definite information regarding the date of birth of the appellant and hence the school certificate should prevail over the certificate of the doctor and the report of the Sessions Judge especially in the absence of any material to raise doubts about the truth of the entries in the certificate. The learned counsel further stated that the reason given by the Sessions Judge for rejecting the school certificate is merely based on his assumption that parents very often understate the age of their children at the time of their admission in schools in order to secure benefits for the children in their future years. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the State laid stress upon the report of the Chief Medical Officer since it was based upon the fusion of bones etc., and argued that the appellant should have been about 18 years of age on the date of the occurrence and hence the appellant is not entitled to invoke the provisions of the U.P Children Act.
7. On a consideration of the matter, we are of the opinion that the appellant could not have completed 16 years of age on 3-10-1975 when the occurrence took place and as such he ought to have been treated as a “child” within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the U.P Children Act, 1951 and dealt with under Section 29 of the Act. We are persuaded to take this view because of three factors. The first is that the appellant has produced a school certificate which carries the date 24-6-1960 against the column “date of birth”. There is no material before us to hold that the school certificate does not relate to the appellant or that the entries therein are not correct in their particulars. The Sessions Judge has failed to notice this aspect of the matter and appears to have been carried away by the opinion of the Chief Medical Officer that the appellant appeared to be about 30 years of age as on 30-4-1987. Even in the absence of any material to throw doubts about the entries in the school certificate, the Sessions Judge has brushed it aside merely on the surmise that it is not unusual for parents to understate the age of their children by one or two years at the time of their admission in schools for securing benefits to the children in their future years. The second factor is that the Sessions Judge has failed to bear in mind that even the trial Judge had thought it fit to award the lesser sentence of imprisonment for life to the appellant instead of capital punishment when he delivered judgment on 12-9-1977 on the ground the appellant was a boy of 17 years of age. The observation of the trial Judge would lend credence to the appellant's case that he was less than 10 (sic 16) years of age on 3-10-1975 when the offences were committed. The third factor is that though the doctor has certified that the appellant appeared to be 30 years of age as on 30-4-1987, his opinion is based only on an estimate and the possibility of an error of estimate creeping into the opinion cannot be ruled out. As regards the opinion of the Sessions Judge, it is mainly based upon the report of the Chief Medical Officer and not on any independent material. On account of all these factors, we are of the view that the appellant would not have completed 16 years of age on the date the offences were committed. It therefore follows that the appellant should have been dealt with under the U.P Children Act instead of being sentenced to imprisonment when he was convicted by the Sessions Judge under various counts.
8. Since the appellant is now aged more than 28 years of age, there is no question of the appellant now being sent to an approved school under the U.P Children Act for being detained there. In a somewhat similar situation, this Court held in Jayendra v. State of U.P (1981) 4 SCC 149 that where an accused had been wrongly sentenced to imprisonment instead of being treated as a “child” under Section 2(4) of the U.P Children Act and sent to an approved school and the accused had crossed the maximum age of detention in an approved school viz. 18 years, the course to be followed is to sustain the conviction but however quash the sentence imposed on the accused and direct his release forthwith. Accordingly, in this case also, we sustain the conviction of the appellant under all the charges framed against him but however quash the sentence awarded to him and direct his release forthwith. The appeal is therefore partly allowed insofar as the sentence imposed upon the appellant are quashed.
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