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Shridhar v. Nagar Palika, Jaunpur
Factual and Procedural Background
The Municipal Board, Jaunpur advertised a vacancy for the post of Tax Inspector, expressly stating that existing Revenue Department employees and external candidates were eligible. Respondent 3, Hari Mohan—the seniormost Tax Collector—declined to sit for the interview, insisting that the post must be filled solely by promotion. The Board nevertheless selected and appointed the appellant on 11 March 1978.
Respondent 3 first pursued a claim before the U.P. Services Tribunal but withdrew it on 23 December 1979. He then approached the Prescribed Authority (the Commissioner, Varanasi Division), who on 13 February 1980 cancelled the appellant’s appointment, holding that the post had to be filled by promotion in line with a Government Order dated 10 April 1950.
The appellant challenged that decision in a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court. A learned Single Judge dismissed the petition on 28 July 1986, sustaining the Commissioner’s view. The present appeal to the Supreme Court followed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under the U.P. Municipalities Act 1916, rules framed thereunder, or the Government Order dated 10 April 1950, the post of Tax Inspector could be filled only by promotion and not by direct recruitment.
- Whether the Government Order dated 10 April 1950 was intra vires the State Government’s powers under Section 71 of the Act (as it stood prior to its 1964 amendment).
- Whether the Commissioner’s order cancelling the appellant’s appointment, passed without giving the appellant an opportunity of hearing, violated the principles of natural justice.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Government Order dated 10 April 1950 was ultra vires Section 71 of the Act, which (before 1964) did not empower the State Government to regulate service conditions of municipal employees.
- Earlier High Court decisions—Rameshwar Prasad v. Municipal Board, Pilibhit (AIR 1958 All 841), Ram Kripal Garg v. State of U.P. (16-9-1966), and Inder Bahadur v. Municipal Board, Mirzapur (20-10-1972)—had already declared the Government Order invalid; judicial discipline required the Single Judge to follow them.
- Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Government Order did not mandate exclusive promotion for the Tax Inspector post; they merely prescribed qualifications and procedure for both promotion and direct recruitment.
- The Commissioner’s decision was void for breach of natural justice, as the appellant was not afforded a hearing before his appointment was cancelled.
Respondent's Arguments
- Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Government Order compelled the Municipal Board to fill the Tax Inspector post by promotion alone; being the seniormost Tax Collector, Respondent 3 was entitled to the post.
- Subsequent Government Orders (27 April 1957, 9 December 1959, 30 January 1972) purportedly imbued the 1950 Order with binding force.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rameshwar Prasad v. Municipal Board, Pilibhit, AIR 1958 All 841 | Held that the Government Order dated 10 April 1950 was ultra vires the State Government’s powers under Section 71 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. | The Supreme Court relied on this decision to affirm that the 1950 Order lacked statutory force and could not control appointments to the Tax Inspector post. |
| Ram Kripal Garg v. State of U.P., W.P. No. 4556 of 1965 (16-9-1966) | Approved the view in Rameshwar Prasad that the 1950 Government Order was ultra vires. | Cited as corroborative authority reinforcing the invalidity of the 1950 Order. |
| Inder Bahadur v. Municipal Board, Mirzapur, W.P. No. 235 of 1970 (20-10-1972) | Likewise affirmed the ultra vires nature of the 1950 Government Order. | Used to underscore the principle that a Single Judge should have followed consistent prior decisions, or referred the matter to a larger Bench if in disagreement. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first examined Section 71 of the U.P. Municipalities Act as it existed before 1964, concluding that it did not empower the State Government to prescribe service conditions for municipal employees. Consequently, the Government Order dated 10 April 1950 could not possess binding statutory force.
Reviewing the entire text of the 1950 Order, the Court determined that paragraphs 5 and 6 merely set out general rules for promotion and direct recruitment, subject to educational qualifications; only paragraph 3 imposed an absolute bar on direct recruitment, and that paragraph related exclusively to the posts of Head Clerk and Office Superintendent—not Tax Inspector. Therefore, the Municipal Board retained discretion to fill the Tax Inspector post either by promotion or by direct recruitment.
The Court criticised the High Court’s reliance on later Government Orders (1957, 1959, 1972), finding no language therein that could revive or validate an order already declared ultra vires. It also admonished the learned Single Judge for departing from earlier coordinate-Bench decisions without referring the matter to a larger Bench, contravening established principles of judicial discipline.
Finally, the Court held that the Commissioner’s order was void for violating natural justice: the appellant, whose appointment conferred a vested right, was deprived of that right without any notice or opportunity to be heard.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; orders of the High Court and Commissioner dated 28 July 1986 and 13 February 1980 respectively are set aside.
Direct consequence: the appellant’s appointment as Tax Inspector stands restored, and Respondent 3’s challenge is rejected. The decision clarifies that, in the absence of valid statutory directions, municipal bodies may fill the post of Tax Inspector by direct recruitment, and re-emphasises adherence to natural justice and judicial discipline. No broader precedent beyond these specific principles was articulated.
K.N Singh, J.— This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Allahabad dated July 28, 1986 dismissing the appellant's petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the order of the Commissioner Varanasi Division dated February 13, 1980 setting aside the order of Municipal Board, Jaunpur appointing the appellant as Tax Inspector.
2. The Municipal Board, Jaunpur issued advertisement inviting applications for appointment to the post of Tax Inspector. The advertisement stated that the existing employees of the Revenue Department of the Municipal Board were eligible for consideration along with outsiders. Hari Mohan respondent 3 who was the seniormost Tax Collector working in the Municipal Board, Jaunpur was called for interview but he refused to appear for the interview on the plea that the post of Tax Inspector should have been exclusively filled by promotion and as he was the seniormost Tax Collector he should be promoted without considering any outsider. The Municipal Board ignored his claim and selected the appellant and appointed him to the post of the Tax Inspector by the order dated March 11, 1978. Respondent 3 thereafter filed a claim petition before the Services Tribunal constituted under the U.P Public Services Tribunals Act, 1976 but subsequently he withdrew the same on December 23, 1979. Thereafter he filed a representation to the Prescribed Authority i.e the Commissioner Varanasi challenging appellant's appointment to the post of Tax Inspector. The Commissioner by his order dated February 13, 1980 set aside the order of the Municipal Board and cancelled the appellant's appointment on the ground that respondent 3 was entitled to promotion in pursuance to the directions contained in the Government Order dated April 10, 1950. The appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court challenging the order of the Commissioner. A learned Single Judge (B.D Agarwal, J.) of the High Court of Allahabad dismissed the writ petition and affirmed the order of the Commissioner on the findings that the appellant's appointment was made in violation of the Government Order dated April 10, 1950. Hence this appeal.
3. After hearing learned counsel for the parties at length we are of the opinion that the High Court committed manifest error in upholding the order of the Commissioner. The basic question which arises for consideration is whether the post of Tax Inspector, under the provision of the U.P Municipalities Act, 1916 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) or any rules framed thereunder or under the Government Order dated April 10, 1950 the post of Tax Inspector was required to be filled by promotion only and not by direct recruitment. The Prescribed Authority i.e, the Commissioner as well as the High Court both proceeded on the assumption that the Government Order dated April 10, 1950 had been issued by the State Government in exercise of its supervisory powers under Section 71 of the Act and as such it was binding on the Municipal Board, and the directions contained therein required the Municipal Board to fill up the post of Tax Inspector exclusively by promotion and not by direct recruitment. In making the appellant's appointment as a direct recruit, the Municipal Board acted in violation of the directions contained in the aforesaid government order, therefore, the appellant's appointment was rendered illegal. The High Court upheld the order of the Prescribed Authority on these findings. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that the directions contained in the Government Order dated April 10, 1950 were ultra vires the State Government's powers under Section 71 of the Act. He placed reliance on Rameshwar Prasad v. Municipal Board, Pilibhit AIR 1958 All 841. The learned counsel further urged that the aforesaid decision was approved by two other learned Judges of the High Court in Ram Kripal Garg v. State of U.P Writ Petition No. 4556 of 1965 dt. 16-9-1966 and Inder Bahadur v. Municipal Board, Mirzapur Writ Petition No. 235 of 1970 dt. 20-10-1972 holding that the Government Order dated April 10, 1950 was ultra vires. These decisions were placed before the learned Single Judge but he did not agree with the view taken in the aforesaid decisions instead he took a contrary view in holding that the Government Order dated April 10, 1950 was valid and it required the Municipal Board to fill up the post of Tax Inspector only by promotion. It is well settled principle of judicial discipline as has been reiterated in a number of decisions of this Court that if a Single Judge, disagrees with the decision of another Single Judge, it is proper to refer the matter to a larger bench for an authoritative decision. But in the instant case the learned Judge acted contrary to the well established principles of judicial discipline in ignoring those decisions.
4. Section 71 of the Act before its amendment in 1964 did not confer power on the State Government to issue any direction regulating the conditions of service of municipal employees. The view taken by the High Court in Rameshwar Prasad case AIR 1958 All 841 and followed in other two cases, is correct. The High Court placed reliance on the Government Orders dated April 27, 1957, December 9, 1959 and January 30, 1972 in holding that the directions contained in Government Order dated April 10, 1950 were binding on the Municipal Board. We have gone through the aforesaid government orders and notifications but we find nothing therein to clothe the Government Order dated April 10, 1950 with statutory character. A government order declared ultra vires by High Court could not be revived by any subsequent government order without there being any statutory power for the same. Moreover the aforesaid government orders and notifications do not contain any direction requiring the Municipal Board to fill up the post of Tax Inspector exclusively by promotion. The High Court committed error in upholding the Commissioner's order.
5. We have closely scrutinised the Government Order dated April 10, 1950 (Annexure 1 to the petition) with the assistance of the counsel for the parties. But even after conceding supervisory power to the State Government to issue directions laying down conditions of service of municipal employees, we do not find any directions therein requiring a Municipal Board to fill the post of Tax Inspector only by promotion and not by direct recruitment. Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on paragraphs 5 and 6 of the government order in support of his contention that the post of Tax Inspector was required to be filled by promotion only. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the government order read as under:
“5. In the case of the posts mentioned in the annexure promotions should, as a rule, be made from the lower to the higher posts or grades, as the case may be, in the same class of service subject to the general orders contained in the above paragraphs. The prevailing practice of transferring at random officials in one class of service to another should be stopped.
6. When direct recruitment to any post specified in the annexure had to be made it will be governed by the educational qualifications shown therein. Recruitments to posts from outside should, however, as far as possible be made by inviting applications through advertisement in the press and making a selection therefrom preferably by means of a competitive test. Local bodies may also be advised to form a committee consisting of the Chairman or the President, the Executive Officer or the Secretary, as the case may be, and the principal administrative officer of the department concerned, to make a selection from among the applicants for a vacant post by interviewing after a competitive test. The actual appointment will, however, be made by the competent authority.”
6. In order to ascertain the correct scope of the aforesaid paragraphs it is necessary to refer to the entire content of the order. It appears that the U.P Pay Committee made certain recommendations prescribing minimum qualifications in respect of employees of local bodies. The State Government accepted the recommendations of the Pay Committee by its Resolution dated March 29, 1949 and in pursuance thereof it issued the Government Order dated April 10, 1950 prescribing minimum qualifications for the employees of local bodies mentioned in the schedule to the order which included the post of Tax Inspector. Paragraph 2 of the order directed that future vacancies on the promotion post will not ordinarily be given from a lower to higher post unless the officials holding the lower post, possess the requisite educational qualifications prescribed for the higher post. Paragraph 3 directed that the posts of Head Clerks or Office Superintendent should be filled by promotion only from among the educationally qualified Head Clerks. It further directed that under no circumstances the posts of Head Clerks or Office Superintendent be filled by direct recruitment from outside. Paragraph 4 directed the Municipal Boards to discontinue the posts of Sectional Head Clerks and to create posts of Office Head Clerks. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the order do not contain any directions with regard to the question of promotion. Paragraph 5 as quoted earlier directed that promotion as a rule should be made from the lower to the higher post or grade in the same class of service subject to the directions contained in other paragraphs of the order which means subject to the employee possessing the minimum qualifications prescribed for the higher post and the higher post should not be filled by transferring employees belonging to other class of service. Paragraph 6 directed that in case of direct recruitment to any post as specified in the annexure of the order it should be governed by the educational qualifications prescribed in the order and recruitment should be made in accordance with the procedure prescribed therein by constituting a committee and inviting applications. Paragraphs 5 and 6 as quoted above do not contain any directions requiring Municipal Board to fill the post of Tax Inspector exclusively by promotion. Though paragraph 3 as already noted directed that under no circumstance the post of Head Clerk or Office Superintendent should be filled up by the direct recruitment from outside, no such direction for the post of Tax Inspector was issued, therefore it was open to the Municipal Board to make appointment to the post of Tax Inspector either by direct recruitment or by promotion.
7. In the instant case, the Municipal Board, Jaunpur gave opportunity to its employees working in the revenue class of service to appear for selection to the post of Tax Inspector in competition with outsiders. Respondent 3 however, did not avail the opportunity for which he himself is to be blamed. The Municipal Board, in our opinion, acted within its jurisdiction in making appointment to the post of Tax Inspector by direct recruitment. The Commissioner, as well as the High Court committed error in taking a contrary view. Subsequently, the Act was amended and the statutory rules i.e, the U.P Palika Centralised Service Rules have been framed regulating the conditions of service of municipal employees and appointment to the post of Tax Inspector is regulated by statutory rules.
8. The High Court committed serious error in upholding the order of the government dated February 13, 1980 in setting aside the appellant's appointment without giving any notice or opportunity to him. It is an elementary principle of natural justice that no person should be condemned without hearing. The order of appointment conferred a vested right in the appellant to hold the post of Tax Inspector, that right could not be taken away without affording opportunity of hearing to him. Any order passed in violation of principles of natural justice is rendered void. There is no dispute that the Commissioner's order had been passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to the appellant therefore the order was illegal and void. The High Court committed serious error in upholding the Commissioner's order setting aside the appellant's appointment. In this view, orders of the High Court and the Commissioner are not sustainable in law.
9. We accordingly, allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court as well as the Commissioner.
10. There will be no order as to costs.
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