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Prakash Mehra v. K.L Malhotra .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant–landlady let the suit premises to the respondent-tenant on 1 September 1962, with rent payable in advance. From 1 January 1972 the monthly rent was Rs 515. The contractual tenancy was determined by notice on 29 November 1972. Although rent had been received up to 31 March 1976, by the time a demand notice was served on 7 May 1976 arrears for April and May 1976 had fallen due.
On 13 May 1976 the tenant tendered a bank draft of Rs 515 (April rent); the landlady refused it. The same draft, sent by registered post two days later, was retained but not encashed. After the landlady wrote on 7 June 1976 that the tender was invalid, the tenant mailed a second draft on 11 June 1976 for Rs 515 (May rent), which again remained uncashed.
An application for ejectment was filed on 2 August 1976. The Additional Controller dismissed the petition, holding that the tenant was not in default. The Rent Control Tribunal reversed, finding three consecutive defaults (April–June 1976) and holding the tenant ineligible for further protection under Section 14(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. In second appeal the High Court set aside the Tribunal’s order, reasoning that the notice demanded only the April and May rents and that both were tendered within two months. The landlady obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, giving rise to the present decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under Section 14(1)(a) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, “arrears of rent” include rent that becomes due after service of the landlord’s demand notice but within the two-month statutory period for payment.
- Consequently, whether the respondent-tenant committed a default sufficient to justify eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Section 14(1)(a) requires the tenant to pay or tender not only the arrears outstanding on the date of the demand notice but also any rent that accrues during the two-month grace period; failure to do so constitutes default.
- Because the tenant did not tender rent for May and June 1976 within that period, three consecutive defaults occurred, entitling the landlady to eviction and denying the tenant a second benefit under Section 14(2).
The opinion does not recount the respondent’s submissions in detail.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jag Ram Nathu Ram v. Surinder Kumar, SAO No. 52 of 1975 | Interpreted Section 14(1)(a) as requiring tender of rent accruing after the demand notice within the two-month period. | The Supreme Court expressed dissatisfaction with this construction and declined to follow it. |
| S.L. Kapur v. Dr. P.D. Lal, 1975 RCJ 322 | Adopted the same interpretation of Section 14(1)(a) as the Jag Ram case. | The Court similarly disapproved this view, holding it did not state the correct law. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court focused on the statutory language of Section 14(1)(a). It held that “arrears of rent” mean the rent specifically demanded in the landlord’s notice and do not extend to rent that falls due after the notice is served. Accordingly, the tenant’s obligation was confined to paying the April and May 1976 rents identified in the notice.
Both bank drafts covering those two months were tendered within two months of service of the notice. The refusal or non-encashment by the landlady did not negate the tender. Because the statutory pre-condition for eviction—failure to pay or tender the whole of the arrears within two months—was not met, the ground for eviction under Section 14(1)(a) was not established.
In reaching this conclusion the Court disagreed with earlier single-judge decisions that had expanded the meaning of “arrears” to include subsequently accruing rent, finding that those rulings did not lay down the correct law.
Holding and Implications
Appeal dismissed.
The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s dismissal of the ejectment petition and left the parties to bear their own costs. The decision clarifies that, for the purposes of Section 14(1)(a) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, arrears are limited to the amounts specified in the landlord’s demand notice; rent accruing after service of that notice cannot be relied upon to ground eviction for non-payment. The ruling thus narrows the scope of landlord recourse under the provision and implicitly overrules contrary single-judge authorities, but it sets no broader precedent beyond the statutory interpretation at issue.
R.S Pathak, C.J— This is a landlady's appeal by special leave arising out of proceedings for the ejectment of the respondenttenant.
2. The appellant let out the premises in suit to the respondent on 1-9-1962, the rent being stipulated as payable in advance. With effect from 1-1-1972 the rent payable was Rs 515 per month. On 29-11-1972, the contractual tenancy was determined by notice. The respondent received a notice on 7-5-1976 calling upon him to pay the arrears of rent. The rent in fact had been received up to 31-3-1976 and, therefore, when the notice of demand was served on the appellant, rent for the months of April and May 1976 had fallen due. The rent was payable in advance.
3. On 13-5-1976, the respondent offered a bank draft of Rs 515 to the appellant. The appellant refused to accept it. Two days later, the respondent sent the same bank draft by registered post. The appellant received the bank draft and retained it. On 7-6-1976, the appellant wrote to the respondent informing him that his tender was not valid. On 11-6-1976, the appellant sent another bank draft for Rs 515 to the landlady, and this draft again was neither encashed nor returned.
4. On 2-8-1976, the appellant filed an application for ejectment out of which the present appeal arises. After filing the application for ejectment, the appellant informed the respondent that both the bank drafts sent by him were lying unencashed.
5. The Additional Controller, Delhi, dismissed the eviction petition holding that the tenant was not in default. The Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi, noted that the rent was payable in advance in accordance with the agreement between the parties, that the respondent had earlier enjoyed the benefit of Section 14(2) of the Act, that when the notice of demand was served on 7-5-1976 the arrears of rent for the months of April and May 1976 had arisen, that the bank draft sent on 13-5-1976 related to the rent of April 1976 only, that as the rent for the month of May 1976 had also become due but had not been tendered, the landlady was justified in not accepting the tender, and that when the respondent again sent a draft on 11-6-1976 to cover the rent for the month of May 1976 the rent for the month of June 1976 had also fallen due but was not tendered. Holding that the respondent had not tendered the arrears of rent due up-to-date within two months of the notice of demand, the Tribunal held that the ground of non-payment of rent stood established. The Tribunal noted that the rent had not been paid for the months of April, May and June 1976 in advance for each month and, therefore, the respondent had committed three consecutive defaults. That being so, the Tribunal observed, the respondent was not entitled to the benefit of Section 14(2) again.
6. In second appeal, the High Court reversed the decision of the Rent Control Tribunal and dismissed the application for ejectment upon the finding that the notice demanding the arrears of rent related to the months of April and May 1976, and as one draft had been sent on 13-5-1976 and another on 11-6-1976 representing a total of two months' rent, and as this rent had been paid within two months of the service of notice of demand, it must be taken that the rent due at the time of the service of notice of demand had been tendered by the respondent to the appellant. The High Court proceeded on the view that Section 14(1)(a) of the Act made out a ground for eviction only where the tenant had neither paid nor tendered the whole of the arrears of rent legally recoverable from him within two months of the date on which a notice of demand for the arrears of rent was served on him by the landlord, the arrears being the rent due on the date of the notice. In this case, the High Court said, as the notice called for payment of the arrears due for the months of April and May 1976 and the bank drafts were tendered within the period indicated in the notice, the notice was satisfied and no default could be said to have been committed in terms of Section 14(1)(a) of the Act. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the application for ejectment.
7. It is urged before us by learned counsel for the appellant that Section 14(1)(a) of the Act contemplates the payment or tender of the whole of the arrears of rent legally recoverable from the tenant on the date when the demand notice is sent including the rent which has accrued after service of the demand notice. When the notice was sent on 7-5-1976, rent for the months of April and May 1976 had become due, and as two months were given for payment of the arrears, it would include also the rent which had accrued during the said period of two months. We are not satisfied that there is substance in the contention. The arrears of rent envisaged by Section 14(1)(a) of the Act are the arrears demanded by the notice for payment of arrears of rent. The arrears due cannot be extended to rent which has fallen due after service of the notice of demand. In this case, the two bank drafts representing the arrears of rent covered by the notice of demand had been tendered within two months of the date of service of the notice of demand. The High Court is right in the view taken by it. We are not satisfied that the construction placed by B.C Misra, J. in Jag Ram Nathu Ram v. Surinder Kumar SAO No. 52 of 1975 and in S.L Kapur v. Dr. P.D Lal 1975 RCJ 322 lays down the correct law on the point.
8. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed but there is no order as to costs.
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